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Abstract 
 
 
 
Resuscitation is the process medical teams use in an attempt to save a patient’s life 
when they have suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest.  It is a stressful, time-pressured 
procedure, and unfortunately is often futile.  Care of a patient in the emergency 
setting is particularly prone to errors and adverse events for a variety of reasons.  
These include the time-pressured decision making, increased rate of patient 
interventions, and the fact that teams are “assembled” by the emergency call that 
may have never worked together, or even met each other, before.  Recent analysis of 
incident reports specifically from resuscitation attempts suggests that the majority of 
incidents relate to issues with the resuscitation team, problems related to human 
performance, and incidents relating to malfunctioning or absent equipment.   
 
One of the aims of this thesis is to look at ways to address these issues, and reduce 
rates of adverse events and critical incidents at resuscitation attempts.  I will 
specifically look at the areas of non-technical teamworking skills, team training with 
environmental risk assessment, and the design of ergonomic equipment. 
 
In Chapter 4 I will describe the process of development and evaluation of a tool to 
assess non-technical teamworking skills in resuscitation teams. When this tool was 
initially developed, no other tools had been published.  However, another tool has 
subsequently been made available, therefore in Chapter 5 I will compare our tool, 
OSCAR, with this other tool, called TEAM.   
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In Chapter 6 I describe the process of in situ simulation for resuscitation training.   I 
organised resuscitation team simulations as part of a training programme, and 
gathered participant feedback on the training.  I also describe some of the 
unanticipated benefits of this training, such as risk assessment of the ward 
environment.  
 
 In Chapters 7 and 8 I describe two studies that were undertaken to evaluate the 
newly designed Resus:Station.  Specifically I assessed its use during simulated 
cardiac arrest scenarios, and when nursing staff performed a stock check of the 
trolley.   
 
	   5	  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
I would like to thank the many people who have made this thesis possible.  Firstly, 
my supervisors:  Charles Vincent for his vision, inspiration, expertise and unfailingly 
positive attitude; and Rajesh Aggarwal for his expertise in the world of simulation.  I 
am also indebted to Stephen Brett for all his advice and ‘words of wisdom’ 
especially in the latter stages with analysis and writing; and Nick Sevdalis for all his 
knowledge of non-technical skills and tool development. 
 
I must also thank Anthony McKay for his help at every stage of this process.  His 
encouragement, support and collaboration on the simulation studies was invaluable.  
I would also like to acknowledge the work he contributed to the study comparing 
OSCAR with TEAM.  The original concept for this study formed part of his MSc 
project in Patient Safety.   
 
My studies would not have been possible without the many willing participants, to 
whom I am very grateful; and all of my colleagues who helped with this work to 
whom I also express my thanks – especially Sanjay Gautama, Simon Lambden, 
Helgi Johannsson, Vashist Deelchand, and Oliver Anderson; and Jonny West for his 
continued advice and input from the Helen Hamlyn Centre.   
 
Finally, none of this would have been possible without the support and sacrifices 
made by my family.  My husband, Ben, has endured many evenings and weekends of 
‘thesis writing’, and has also patiently read through various drafts – for which I am 
very grateful.  My parents have supported me endlessly throughout my career, 
however most recently this support has extended to hours of babysitting for our son 
Ed, without which it would have been impossible to finish this thesis.  I am eternally 
grateful for all their help and encouragement.    
	   6	  
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis and all the work within this is 
my own, except where it is referenced or carried out in collaboration with others who 
are appropriately credited. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:        Date: 
 
 
 
	   7	  
Peer Reviewed Publications and Presentations 
 
 
 
Publications  
Walker S, Brett S (2010).  “Oiling the wheels of intensive care to reduce “Machine 
Friction”: the best way to improve outcomes?  Crit Care Med 2010; 
38(10):S642-648  
 
Walker S, Brett S, McKay A, Lambden S, Vincent C, Sevdalis N.  “Observational 
Skill-base Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR): Development 
and validation”.  Resuscitation 2011; 82(7):835-844   
 
McKay A, Walker S, Brett S, Vincent C, Sevdalis N.  “Team performance in 
resuscitation teams: Comparison and critique of two recently developed 
scoring tools”  Resuscitation 2012; 83(12):1478-1483 
 
Walker ST, Brett SJ, McKay A, Aggarwal R, Vincent C. “The “Resus:Station”: The 
use of clinical simulations in a randomised crossover study to evaluate a novel 
resuscitation trolley.  Resuscitation 2012; 83(11):1374-1380  
 
Walker ST, Sevdalis N, McKay A, Lambden S, Gautama S, Aggarwal R, Vincent C.  
“Unannounced In Situ Simulations: Integrating Training and Clinical Practice” 
BMJ Qual Saf – doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000986 
 
 
Oral Presentations 
International 
13th Oct 2010  “Development, Reliability, and Content Validation of the 
Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment Tool for 
Resuscitation (OSCAR)” 
  European Society of Intensive Care Medicine Annual 
Congress, Barcelona, Spain 
	   8	  
 
4th Dec 2010 “Unannounced in-situ simulation represents a realistic method 
for teaching the technical and non-technical skills required for 
resuscitation” 
 European Resuscitation Congress, Porto, Portugal 
 
30th Nov 2011 “Design is everything! Work environment design and how it 
matters” 
 Swiss Foundation of Patient Safety – 2nd International 
Congress, Basel, Switzerland 
 
National 
16th July 2010 “The Resus:Station” 
 Peri-operative Medicine Training Conference, St Thomas’ 
Hospital, London 
 
23rd July 2010 “Resus:Station – design to support the resuscitation process” 
 Centre for Patient Safety and Service Quality Summer 
Symposium, London 
 
8th Nov 2010 “Evaluation of the effect of a newly design Resuscitation 
Trolley on the efficiency of the Cardiac Arrest Team in a 
simulated environment” 
 Resuscitation Council (UK) Symposium 2010, Birmingham 
 
Trustwide 
7th July 2010 “Improving Cardiac Arrest” 
  Imperial College Centre for Perioperative Medicine and 
Critical Care Research Seminar 
 
9th June 2010 “Trauma Teams and Human Factors” 
 Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust Trauma Training 
Lectures 
	   9	  
Poster Presentations 
International 
12th Oct 2010  “Unannounced in-situ simulation represents a realistic method 
for teaching the technical and non-technical skills required for 
resuscitation 
 European Society of Intensive Care Medicine Annual 
Congress, Barcelona 
 
3rd Dec 2010 “Development, reliability, and content validation of the 
Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for 
Resuscitation (OSAR) 
 European Resuscitation Congress, Porto, Portugal 
 
4th Dec 2010 “Assessment of a newly designed resuscitation trolley in a 
simulated environment” 
 European Resuscitation Congress, Porto, Portugal 
 
13th Nov 2011 “Assessment of a newly designed resuscitation trolley in a 
simulated environment” (updated results) 
 American Heart Association Resuscitation Congress, Florida, 
USA 
 
Future Presentations 
Oral “A continuum of Design for Patient Safety research” 
 ISQua 29th International Conference, Geneva, 23rd Oct 2012 
 
Poster “The Resus:Station”: Can Design Support the Resuscitation 
Trolley Stock Check? 
 ISQua 29th International Conference, Geneva, 22-24 Oct 2012 
 
 
	   10	  
Contents 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5 
DECLARATION 6 
PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 7 
LIST OF TABLES 17 
LIST OF FIGURES 19 
 
1 INTRODUCTION – PART I – RESUSCITATION    
 
 1.1   RESUSCITATION  21 
  1.1.1  What is resuscitation?  21 
  1.1.2  History of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 22 
  1.1.3  History of resuscitation training   23 
  1.1.4  Current training and resuscitation guidelines   25 
 
 1.2   RESUSCITATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PATIENT SAFETY   27 
  1.2.1  Patient safety 27 
  1.2.2  Understanding error and harm 28 
   1.2.2.1  What are “human factors”? 28 
   1.2.2.2  Human factors in high risk industries 29 
   1.2.2.3  A systems approach to safety 31 
   1.2.2.4  How healthcare differs from industry 32 
  1.2.3  Error and harm in healthcare 34 
   1.2.3.1  Critical care medicine 34 
   1.2.3.2  Error in resuscitation 35 
 
  1.3   RESUSCITATION OUTCOMES AND INCIDENTS 36 
    1.3.1 The outcomes of resuscitation attempts 36 
    1.3.2 Critical incident reporting at resuscitation attempts 39 
     1.3.2.1  Critical incident reporting overall 39 
     1.3.2.2  Critical incident reporting related to the resuscitation trolley 43 
    1.3.3 Factors influencing resuscitation outcome 44 
     1.3.3.1  Patient factors 45 
     1.3.3.2  Systemic factors – team issues 45 
	   11	  
     1.3.3.3  Systemic factors – environment and equipment issues 45 
    1.3.4 Factors that may improve outcomes during resuscitation 46 
 
 
2    INTRODUCTION – PART II – DESIGN FOR SAFETY 
   
  2.1   DESIGN FOR SAFETY 47 
    2.1.1 Principles of “Designing for safety” 47 
    2.1.2 History of “Design for Safety” in the context of anaesthesia 48 
    2.1.3 Modern examples of “Design for Safety” in critical care  50 
     medicine 
 
  2.2 DESIGN OF THE RESUSCITATION TROLLEY 52 
    2.2.1  What is a resuscitation trolley? 52 
    2.2.2  History of the design of a resuscitation trolley 53 
    2.2.3  The need for a new trolley design 55 
    2.2.4  Previous attempts to redesign the resuscitation trolley 55 
    2.2.5  The “Resus:Station” 59 
     2.2.5.1  The redesign process 59 
     2.2.5.2  Assessment of the first prototype and further design refinements 61 
     2.2.5.3  Design features of the current Resus:Station 62 
     
 
3    INTRODUCTION – PART III – TEAMWORK AND NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS  
    
 3.1   TEAMWORK AND NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 64 
  3.1.1  What skills are needed for efficient teamwork? 64 
  3.1.2  What have we learnt about non-technical skills from industry? 65 
  3.1.3  The importance of non-technical skills in the emergency  66 
   setting 
   3.1.3.1  Communication 67
   3.1.3.2  Decision-making 68 
   3.1.3.3  Situation Awareness 69 
   3.1.3.4  Leadership 70 
  3.1.4  Non-technical skills training and assessment tools in  73 
  healthcare 
  3.1.5  General principles of developing a teamwork assessment tool 75 
  3.1.5.1  Skills identification 76 
  3.1.5.2  System development 78 
  3.1.5.3  Preliminary evaluation 78
 3.1.6  Development of the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills  79 
   (ANTS) tool 
   
 3.2   USE OF SIMULATION IN NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS TRAINING AND 
ASSESSMENT 81 
  3.2.1  What is simulation? 81 
  3.2.2  Drawbacks of simulation 82 
  3.2.3  The concept of in situ simulation 82 
	   12	  
   
 3.3   AIMS OF THE THESIS 84 
 
 
4  DEVELOPMENT OF AN OBSERVATIONAL SKILL-BASED  
  CLINICAL ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR RESUSCITATION   
  (OSCAR)   
 
 4.1   INTRODUCTION 86 
 
 4.2   AIM 87 
 
 4.3   DEVELOPING OSCAR 88 
 
 4.4   STUDY 1 – REVIEW OF EVIDENCE BASE, AND INITIAL TOOL  
  DEVELOPMENT 
  4.4.1  Aim 89 
  4.4.2  Methods 89 
   4.4.2.1  Review of the evidence base 89 
  4.4.2.2  Developing non-technical skills assessment for resuscitation 91 
   4.4.2.2.1  Choosing behaviour modes 91 
   4.4.2.2.2  Developing exemplar behaviours 91 
  4.4.3  Results 93 
 
 4.5   STUDY 2 – EXPERT REVIEW OF OSCAR TO DETERMINE FACE AND 
CONTENT VALIDITY 
  4.5.1  Aim 94 
  4.5.2  Methods 94 
   4.5.2.1 Statistical analysis 96 
  4.5.3  Results 96 
 
 4.6   STUDY 3 – RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
   4.6.1  Aim 97 
   4.6.2  Methods 97 
    4.6.2.1  Statistical analysis 98 
   4.6.3  Results 99 
    4.6.3.1  Internal consistency 99 
    4.6.3.2  Inter-rater reliability 100 
 
 4.7   DISCUSSION 101 
   4.7.1  Limitations 105 
 
 4.8    CONCLUSION 106 
 
 
 
 
 
	   13	  
5   COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE OF TWO RECENTLY DEVELOPED 
   SCORING TOOLS (TEAM VS OSCAR)  
 
 5.1   AIMS  107 
 
 5.2   METHODS 108 
  5.2.1 Phase 1 – Reliability assessment 108 
  5.2.2 Phase 2 – Content comparison and correlation of scorings 109 
  5.2.3 Statistical Analysis 109 
 
 5.3   RESULTS 111 
  5.3.1 Phase 1 – Reliability assessment 111 
   5.3.1.1  Inter-rater reliability of OSCAR 111 
   5.3.1.2  Inter-rater reliability of TEAM 112 
  5.3.2  Phase 2 – Content comparison and correlation of scorings  114
   (concurrent validity) 
 
 5.4   DISCUSSION 117 
  5.4.1  Limitations 120 
 
 5.5   CONCLUSION 121 
 
 
6  UNANNOUNCED IN SITU SIMULATIONS: INTEGRATING 
TRAINING AND CLINICAL PRACTICE  
 
 6.1   INTRODUCTION 122 
  
 6.2   AIMS  123 
 
 6.3   METHODS 124 
  6.3.1 Design 124 
  6.3.2 Participants 124 
  6.3.3 Procedure 125 
   6.3.3.1  Location Selection 125 
   6.3.3.2  Simulation set-up 126 
   6.3.3.3  Scenario 127 
  6.3.4  Measures 128 
   6.3.4.1  Aim 1  128 
   6.3.4.2  Aim 2 129 
   6.3.4.3  Aim 3 129 
  6.3.5  Statistical Analysis 129 
 
 6.4   RESULTS 130 
  6.4.1 Aim 1 130 
   6.4.1.1  Understanding the impact of the real environment on technical  130 
     skills 
   6.4.1.2  Assessing the non-technical skills of actual clinical teams 130 
   6.4.1.3  Equipment and Faculty 132 
	   14	  
   6.4.1.4  Availability of clinical staff 132 
   6.4.1.5  Potential impact on patient care 133 
  6.4.2 Aim 2  134 
  6.4.3 Aim 3 136 
 
 6.5   DISCUSSION 137 
  6.5.1  Limitations 142 
 
 6.6   CONCLUSION 143 
 
 
7  ASSESSMENT OF THE TROLLEY CHECKING AND STOCKING  
  PROCESS   
 
 7.1   INTRODUCTION 144 
 
 7.2   AIMS 146 
 
 7.3   METHODS 146 
  7.3.1  Design 146 
  7.3.2  Participants 146 
  7.3.3  Procedure 147 
  7.3.4  Measures 148 
  7.3.4.1  Attitudes and views 148 
  7.3.4.2  Speed of checking 148 
  7.3.4.3  Accuracy of checking 149 
  7.3.5  Statistical Analyses 149 
 
 7.4   RESULTS 150 
  7.4.1  Demographics 150 
  7.4.2  Aim 1 150
  7.4.3  Aim 2  153 
  7.4.4  Aim 3  155
    
 7.5   DISCUSSION 157 
  7.5.1  Limitations 160 
 
 7.6   CONCLUSION 161 
 
 
8  THE RESUS:STATION: THE USE OF CLINICAL SIMULATIONS  
  TO EVALUATE A NOVEL RESUSCITATION TROLLEY   
 
 8.1   INTRODUCTION 162 
 
 8.2   AIMS 163 
 
 8.3   METHODS 163 
	   15	  
  8.3.1  Design 163 
  8.3.2  Participants 164 
  8.3.3  Procedure 164 
  8.3.4  Measures 166 
   8.3.4.1  Demographics 166 
   8.3.4.2  Efficiency 167 
   8.3.4.3  Attitudes and views 167 
   8.3.4.4  Team performance 168 
  8.3.5  Statistical Analyses 168 
 
 8.4   RESULTS 169 
  8.4.1  Demographics 169 
  8.4.2  Aim 1  170 
   8.4.2.1  Time to drugs 170 
   8.4.2.2  Missing equipment 171 
   8.4.2.3  Unnecessary drawer openings 171 
  8.4.3  Aim 2  172 
  8.4.4  Aim 3  174 
 
 8.5   DISCUSSION 177 
  8.5.1  Limitations 183 
 
 8.6   CONCLUSION 184 
 
 
9  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
 9.1   INTRODUCTION 185 
 
 9.2   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 185 
  9.2.1  Key findings in the development of OSCAR study 185 
  9.2.2  Comparison between OSCAR and TEAM 186 
  9.2.3  In situ simulation for resuscitation training 187 
  9.2.4  Assessment of stocking and checking of the Resus:Station 188 
  9.2.5  Assessment of the Resus:Station in a simulated environment 188 
 
 9.3   METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 189 
  9.3.1  Development of OSCAR 189 
  9.3.2  In situ simulations for resuscitation training 190 
  9.3.3  Assessment of the Resus:Station  191 
    
 9.4   FUTURE RESEARCH 191 
  9.4.1  OSCAR 191 
   9.4.1.1  Testing during resuscitation attempts 191 
   9.4.1.2  Further development in training settings 192 
   9.4.1.3  Testing use and evaluation in other centres 192 
   9.4.1.4 Development of further non-technical skills assessment tools 192 
  9.4.2  Simulation training 193 
  9.4.3  Resuscitation trolley design 193 
 
	   16	  
 9.5   LOCAL CLINICAL IMPACT 194 
  9.5.1  Reduction in number of emergency calls 195 
  9.5.2  Ethical issues encountered when attending arrests 196 
  9.5.3  Important measures missed in delay in attending events 196 
  9.5.4  Large study numbers required 196 
 
 9.6 WIDER CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR RESUSCITATION 199 
  9.6.1  Teamwork 199 
  9.6.2  Training, assessment and guidelines 199 
  9.6.3  Debriefing 200 
  9.6.4  Equipment 201 
  9.6.5  Patient Safety 204 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix 1.1 223 
 
  Appendix 4.1 224 
  Appendix 4.2 225 
  Appendix 4.3 226 
  Appendix 4.4 227 
  Appendix 4.5 230 
 
  Appendix 5.1 233 
  Appendix 5.2 234 
 
  Appendix 6.1 236 
 
  Appendix 7.1 239 
  Appendix 7.2 240 
  Appendix 7.3 241 
  Appendix 7.4 242 
 
  Appendix 8.1 243 
  Appendix 8.2 244 
  Appendix 8.3 245 
  Appendix 8.4 246 
  Appendix 8.5 247 
  Appendix 8.6 248 
  Appendix 8.7 249 
  Appendix 8.8 250 
  Appendix 8.9 251 
  Appendix 8.10 252 
	   17	  
List of Tables 
 
 
 
2.1 Features identified on the current trolley that hinder the resuscitation  59 
  process 
 
4.1 Illustration of how exemplar behaviours were modified from OTAS 92 
  (operating room environment) for OSCAR (resuscitation environment). 
 
4.2 Level of experience of the experts asked to assess face and content  94 
  validity 
 
4.3 Example of sheet given to Specialists and Non-specialists to rate  95 
   behaviours 
 
4.4 Internal consistency reliability (Cronbach α coefficients) across all  100 
  OSCAR behaviours and rated subgroups 
 
4.5 Simple analysis of ratings between 2 observers demonstrating a learning 100 
  curve with a reduction in the number of differences between ratings with 
successive video scorings 
 
4.6 Inter-rater reliability (Intraclass correlations) across all OSCAR  101 
  behaviours and rated subgroups 
 
5.1 OSCAR intraclass correlation coefficients between the two assessors  111 
  across behaviours and subgroups 
 
5.2 OSCAR descriptive statistics (median/range) across behaviours,  112 
  subgroups and assessors 
 
5.3 TEAM intraclass correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics  113 
  across items and assessors 
 
6.1 In situ simulation locations 125 
 
6.2 Overall OSCAR ratings for individual teams from in situ simulations 131 
 
6.3 Participants’ attitudes towards unannounced adult in situ simulation  135 
  training in resuscitation 
 
6.4 Examples of some risk assessment issues identified during in situ  136 
  simulations, and the corrective action taken 
 
7.1 Participant opinions to statements relating to the trolley they have used 151 
 
7.2 Overall preference of trolley 151 
	   18	  
 
7.3 Participant opinions to statements about the Resus:Station depending  152 
  on whether they are familiar with it or not 
 
7.4 Mean time taken to check the standard trolley and the Resus:Station,  153 
  with significance of difference between the two trolleys assessed using  
  the paired t-test 
 
7.5 Comparison of mean trolley checking speeds, in seconds, depending on  154 
  whether participants were familiar or unfamiliar with the Resus:Station,  
  with significance of difference assessed using the independent t-test 
 
7.6 The percentage of participants that identified each piece of missing  155 
  equipment 
 
7.7 Comparing the accuracy of identifying missing equipment on the  156 
  standard trolley and the Resus:station 
 
7.8 Comparing the accuracy of identifying expired equipment in the  157 
  standard trolley and the Resus:Station, with significance of difference 
assessed using Wilcoxon test 
 
8.1 Time taken to find drugs, with significance of difference between the  171 
  two trolleys 
 
8.2 Participant opinions to statements relating to the trolley they have used 172 
 
8.3 Overall preference of trolley 173 
 
8.4 A representative selection of quotes from study participants about the 174 
  Resus:Station 
 
8.5 Overall results for the whole team using OSCAR to rate behaviours,  175 
  with Wilcoxon assessment of the significance of difference when using  
  the different trolleys 
 
8.6 OSCAR intraclass correlation coefficients between the two assessors  176 
   across behaviours and subgroups for all simulations 
 
9.1 Quotes from clinical staff about the Resus:Station 198 
 
9.2 Resus:Station design modifications suggested as a result of the studies 203 
	   19	  
List of Figures 
 
 
 
1.1 First composition of Cardiopulmonary-cerebral resuscitation guidelines  24 
from 1961 
 
1.2 Major disasters involving human error – Reproduced from  29 
“Patient Safety” by C Vincent, 2010 
 
1.3 A systems approach to safety, adapted from Moray, 2000 32 
 
1.4 Types and definitions of incidents related to cardiac arrest management, 41 
 adapted from Andersen, et al., 2010a 
 
1.5 Effect of any resuscitation system errors on a resuscitation attempt and  42 
 the rate of return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC), survival for 24  
hours, and survival to discharge, Ornato, et al., 2012 
 
1.6 Problems reported by the team leader – Adapted from NCEPOD 2012 43 
 
 
2.1 Pin-index system to prevent errors in gas connection to the  49 
anaesthetic machine 
 
2.2 Simple design solution to improve compliance with 300 head-up 51 
recommendation 
 
2.3 Image of a selection of resuscitation trolleys commonly found in the  54 
UK, and a larger image of the “standard trolley” found in Imperial  
College Healthcare NHS Trust 
 
2.4 The ergonomic resuscitation trolley produced by Medi-Marpeh Ltd 58 
 
2.5 Initial design concepts 60 
 
2.6 First prototype of the Resus:Station 61 
 
2.7 The second prototype Resus:Station with specific design solutions 63 
 
3.1 Gaba’s model of decision-making by anaesthetists 68 
 
3.2 Quality of care with varying leadership styles related to patient condition  73 
and team experience, Yun, et al., 2005 
 
3.3 Overall process undertaken in the development of the ANTS behavioural 80 
marker system for use in anaesthesia, Fletcher, et al., 2004 
 
4.1 Methodology and phases of development of OSCAR 88 
	   20	  
5.1 Chart comparing attributes of TEAM and OSCAR 114
  
5.2 a) Spearman’s rho correlation and scatterplot between TEAM and  116 
 OSCAR scores converted to percentages 
 b) Bland-Altman plot of the TEAM and OSCAR percentage scores. 
 
6.1 How to run an in situ simulation 126 
 
7.1 A brief explanation of the development process in designing the 145 
 Resus:Station 
 
7.2 Illustration of overall study format 147 
 
7.3 Items missing from the study trolleys 149 
 
8.1 Illustration of overall study format 165 
 
8.2 Approximate number of resuscitation attempts previously attended by  169 
 study participants 
	   21	  
 1 Introduction – Part I – Resuscitation  
 
 
 
“his mouth to his mouth” (2 Kings 4:32-35) 
1.1 Resuscitation 
Resuscitation is the process medical teams use in an attempt to save a patient’s life 
when they have suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest.  It is a stressful, time-pressured 
procedure, and whilst outcomes, which were historically very poor, have improved 
over recent years, there is still further room for improvement.  In this thesis I look at 
a number of issues that may contribute to a poor outcome, and hinder the team 
performance, and look at ways that addressing these issues may enhance 
resuscitation attempts.  These include ways to augment resuscitation training, 
addressing the need to train non-technical teamworking skills in resuscitation, and 
exploring whether improved ergonomic design might improve resuscitation attempts.  
I will begin by describing the process of resuscitation and current standards of 
training. 
 
1.1.1 What is resuscitation? 
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of resuscitation is to “revive (someone) 
from unconsciousness or apparent death” or to “make (something) active or vigorous 
again.”  The Oxford Medical Dictionary goes on to specify that it aims to achieve 
“the revival of cardiac and respiratory function.”  The term “resuscitation” can be 
applied loosely to mean the urgent treatment of a critically unwell patient at risk of 
suffering a cardio-respiratory arrest (peri-arrest), which may simply involve the 
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administration of oxygen or intravenous fluids.  However, the term 
“cardiopulmonary resuscitation” (CPR) always refers to the artificial maintenance of 
cardiac and respiratory function with the combined use of chest compressions, and 
artificial ventilation in combination with electric DC cardioversion if required, in a 
patient in whom cardiac and respiratory function has ceased, with the aim of 
restoring normal function whist retaining intact neurological function. 
 
1.1.2 History of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
There are references to artificial ventilation dating as far back as the 2nd book of 
Kings in the Old Testament.  The prophet Elisha went to the house of a child who 
had died, and revived him by putting “his mouth to his mouth” (2 Kings 4:32-35).  
There are many other references to various forms of resuscitation across the 
centuries.  The first society to form with the sole purpose of resuscitation was the 
“Dutch Humane Society” in 1768 (Cooper, et al., 2006).  It was founded to help the 
many victims of drowning in the waterways of Amsterdam, and published guidelines 
of how to achieve this. Over the years, there have been various setbacks in the 
practice of resuscitation due to conflicting beliefs and research.  For example, despite 
records of life-saving mouth-to-mouth, such as that of Tossach in 1744 (Tossach, 
1744), the subsequent discovery of oxygen and the feeling that expired air was 
“devitalized” led to this being discouraged in the 1770s.  Closed-chest compressions 
were described in the late 1800s (Safar, 1996), but the technique was then forgotten 
until a chance re-discovery in 1958 by Guy Knickerbocker.  In the interim, a 
technique of “back-pressure arm-lift” (Specht, 1952) was vigorously employed as a 
means of artificial respiration, although inadvertently this clearly incorporated an 
element of chest compression. 
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Many credit James Elam and Peter Safar for combining artificial ventilation with 
chest compressions, and pioneering much of our modern understanding of CPR from 
various studies they led in the 1950s. (Cooper, et al. 2006; Safar, 1996)  They 
demonstrated the theoretical benefits of “mouth-to-mouth ventilation”, initiated the 
“Airway, Breathing, Circulation (ABC)” approach and worked in conjunction with 
Laerdal, a Norwegian toy company to develop the first “Resusci Anne” for 
Advanced Life Support training.  The team credited with modern external chest 
compression techniques, Kouwenhoven, Jude and Knickerbocker, reported their 
findings in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) in 1960 
(Kouwenhoven, et al., 1960). Their finding that external chest compressions provide 
an artificial circulation was accidental whilst investigating techniques for 
defibrillation.  These two teams (Elam et al, and Jude et al) first presented their 
combined approach of artificial ventilation with external chest compressions at a 
medical conference in Maryland in 1960. 
 
1.1.3 History of resuscitation training 
In order to attempt to perform a successful resuscitation, the team members need to 
have the appropriate knowledge and skills. The first Advanced Life Support (ALS) 
guidelines were published by the American Heart Association’s CPR Committee in 
1961 (Figure 1.1).  
 
The ALS course in the UK was developed by the Resuscitation Council (UK), which 
started offering courses in 1989 (Baskett, 2004).  Over recent years, the course has 
been updated, brought in line with the European Resuscitation Council 
recommendations, and is now taught throughout Europe. Year-on-year there has 
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been an increase in the number of course participants.  The resuscitation guidelines 
that are taught are updated every five years on the basis of the latest evidence based 
guidance related to resuscitation. 
 
Figure 1.1 – First composition of Cardiopulmonary-cerebral resuscitation guidelines from 1961 
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1.1.4 Current training and resuscitation guidelines 
ALS courses are run in hospitals throughout the UK, generally by resuscitation 
officers.  They are assisted by a faculty of trained staff, all of whom have an interest 
in resuscitation, but are from a variety of nursing and medical backgrounds.  The 
course usually runs over two days, although recently a few courses have been 
introduced that have a one day “e-learning” module that can be completed at home, 
and then one day of practical sessions run in the hospital setting.  
 
Within the UK, any doctor who regularly attends a resuscitation call as part of their 
job is expected to attend an ALS course, and they are required to re-certify every 4 
years.  Participants all receive a detailed ALS manual with a pre-course test, that they 
are expected to read and complete prior to attending the course.  Training on the 
course consists of a series of lectures and practical skills sessions, working through 
the information in the ALS manual, and teaching the latest Resuscitation Council 
guidelines.  Participants practice in a series of resuscitation simulations throughout 
the course. At the end of the course candidates take a written test (multiple choice 
questions) and practical test to ensure they have reached the required standard to be 
“ALS Certified”.  Most of the teaching concerns the technical skills required to 
recognise and treat peri-arrest and arrest events, such as techniques to correctly 
manage the airway, correct chest compression techniques, and correct use of a 
defibrillator.  The resuscitation guidelines are taught in detail, however despite this, 
standardised “flow-chart” format algorithms are published that are commonly pinned 
on walls of emergency areas to act as an aide-memoir for clinicians (Appendix 1.1).  
Various algorithms have been developed covering all aspects of resuscitation care 
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from Basic Life Support and Advanced Life Support of an adult, to the management 
of various abnormal heart rhythms, or how to treat someone that is choking.   
 
The resuscitation council has become increasingly aware that good non-technical 
teamworking skills are an important part of running a successful resuscitation 
attempt.  The latest course manual issued at the beginning of 2011 includes a section 
describing these skills (Resuscitation Council, 2011a).  However, there is insufficient 
time on the course to broach this in any detail.   Therefore, whilst these skills are 
mentioned, they are not formally taught or assessed.  This is something I will discuss 
in more detail in Chapter 2.  
 
The guidelines are updated on the basis of latest best evidence.  However, it is 
universally acknowledged that this is an area of medicine with sparse robust 
evidence given that, for ethical and practical reasons, this is a difficult area of 
medicine in which to perform rigorous clinical studies.  In the future it is hoped that 
outcomes from the UK National Cardiac Arrest Audit (NCAA) (NCAA website; 
Nolan et al, 2009) will help inform resuscitation guidelines.  Its aim is to “identify 
and foster improvements in the prevention, care delivery, and outcomes from cardiac 
arrest”.  Participating hospitals, of which there were 127 in January 2012, collect 
data on all individuals receiving chest compressions and/or defibrillation and 
attended by the hospital-based resuscitation team in response to a crash call.  At 
present, no data has been published from the audit, however the team anticipates 
initial reports in 2012 and plan to extend the audit in due course. 
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1.2 Resuscitation in the context of Patient Safety 
Seeing resuscitation in the context of patient safety is invaluable for giving us 
information about how errors occur.  I will discuss the problem of errors in 
healthcare, and ways these are thought to come about.  I will then go on to discuss 
what we have learnt from high-risk industries with regards to errors and safety, 
whilst illustrating how healthcare differs from these industries.  I will then apply this 
to the areas of critical care medicine and resuscitation.  
 
1.2.1 Patient safety 
The issue of error in healthcare was highlighted in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine 
(IoM) report “To Err is Human” (Kohn, et al., 2000). This was based on two large 
studies looking at the incidence of adverse events in Colorado and Utah, (Thomas, et 
al., 2000) and New York. (Brennan, et al., 1991)  They found that medical errors and 
adverse events occurred in approximately 3% of all hospital admissions, and that 
between 7% and 12% of these led to death.  Extrapolating from this, they concluded 
that medical error was the 8th leading cause of death in the United States.  They 
estimated that the total national cost of these errors, including healthcare costs and 
lost income, amounted to between $17 and $19 billion annually.  
 
There are many differences between the UK and American healthcare systems.  
However, the following year (2000), the UK Department of Health (DoH) Report 
“An organisation with a memory” (Department of Health, 2000) estimated that in the 
UK, adverse events in which harm is caused to patients occur in approximately 10% 
of admissions, and cost the service an estimated £2 billion a year in additional 
hospital stays, without taking into account wider economic costs.   
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Unsurprisingly, from this time on, patient safety has become a high priority for 
governments worldwide, with efforts being made to identify the causes of these 
errors, and find ways to prevent them.   
 
1.2.2 Understanding error and harm 
I will now look specifically at the area of human factors as these are often implicated 
in errors and adverse events.  The term encompasses the understanding of how 
humans interact with their surroundings and how this may have an impact on overall 
performance.   
 
1.2.2.1 What are “human factors”? 
Human factors are suggested as being one of the key causative factors of medical 
errors and adverse events.  However, defining human factors is very difficult, as the 
term encompasses so many things, and is interpreted differently depending on 
whether your background is as a clinician, a designer, or a human factors expert.  
Evidence of this can be found on the “Clinical Human Factors Group” website 
(CHFG, 2012) which provides a commonly accepted definition stating they are 
“enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of 
teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture, organisation on human behaviour 
and abilities, and application of that knowledge in clinical settings”.  Ergonomic 
designers therefore use information about how humans interact with their 
surroundings to design a system that will optimise human well-being and overall 
system performance. 
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1.2.2.2 Human factors in high risk industries 
Much of our understanding about human factors, and errors in healthcare comes from 
lessons learnt from high profile industrial accidents. (Figure 1.2).  In the immediate 
aftermath of an accident, the person closest to it (such as the train driver in a railway 
disaster) is often quickly blamed, as described by Vincent, et al (1998).  However, 
closer analysis often identifies a series of events and deviations from safe practice, 
each influenced by the working environment, and the wider organisation.  Ironically, 
some of the deviations may be attempts to use unorthodox methods to avert disaster, 
as was seen in the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.   
 
Figure 1.2 – Major disasters involving human error – Reproduced from “Patient Safety” by C Vincent 
(Vincent 2010 (a)) 
 
Chernobyl (April 1986) 
Chernobyl’s 1000 MW Reactor No. 4 exploded, releasing radioactivity over much of 
Europe.  Although much debated since the accident, a Soviet investigation team admitted 
‘deliberate, systematic and numerous violations’ of safety procedures 
Piper Alpha (July 1988) 
A major explosion on an oil rig, which resulted in a fire and the deaths of 167 people.  The 
Cullen enquiry (1990) found a host of technical and organisational causes rooted in the 
culture, structure and procedures of Occidental Petroleum.  The maintenance error that led to 
the initial leak was the result of inexperience, poor maintenance procedures, and deficient 
learning mechanisms. 
Space Shuttle Challenger (January 1986) 
An explosion shortly after lift-off killed all the astronauts on board.  An ‘O-ring’ seal on one 
of the solid rocket boosters split after lift-off, releasing a jet of ignited fuel.  The causes of 
the defective O-ring involved a rigid organisational mindset, conflicts between safety and 
keeping on schedule and the effects of fatigue on decision making. 
Herald of Free Enterprise (March 1987) 
The roll-on-roll-off ferry sank in shallow water off Zeebrugge, Belgium, killing 189 
passengers and crew.  The enquiry highlighted the commercial management that led to safety 
lessons not being heeded.  The company was found to be ‘infected with the disease of 
sloppiness’. 
Paddington Rail Accident (October 1999) 
31 people died when a train went through a red light onto the main up-line to Paddington, 
where it collided head on with an express approaching the station.  The enquiry identified 
failures in training of drivers, a serious and persistent failure to examine reported poor signal 
visibility, a safety culture that was slack and less than adequate and significant failures of 
communication in the various organisations. 
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James Reason (Reason, 1990) is quoted as saying “Rather than being the instigators 
of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects . . . . their part is 
usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have 
already been long in the cooking”.  In a later publication (Reason, 2000), he went on 
to argue that human errors are generally the result of circumstances beyond the 
conscious control of those committing the error.  Therefore, processes that require 
perfect human performance are fatally flawed. 
 
Experience from these industries has demonstrated that by designing the facilities 
and equipment with the abilities and behaviours of the people that use them in mind, 
human error may be avoided (National Patient Safety Agency, March 2010a).  The 
earlier this information is used in the development process, the safer the system will 
be.  In order to improve safety, whether in industry or healthcare, it is essential to 
thoroughly analyse specific incidents to identify weaknesses and contributing factors.  
Rather than wait for an incident to occur to identify flaws, it is also possible to 
proactively assess a process and systematically examine it to identify potential failure 
points.  This is known as Human Reliability Assessment (Vincent 2010 (b)).  A 
number of techniques have been developed, of which “Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis”  (FMEA) is one.  This process considers the potential failures of a system, 
and then assesses the potential effect, and severity of this failure occurring.  It was 
developed by the US Military in 1949 as a way of determining the effects of system 
and equipment failures, and has gradually worked its way through to other high 
hazard industries, starting at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) in the 1960s (Kirwan, 1994). It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that it is 
only relatively recently that this process has been used in healthcare.  In 2001, the 
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Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in the 
United States, selected FMEA as a method to proactively improve patient safety 
standards (Croteau, et al., 2000).  In the same publication, Patrice Spath wrote “If 
healthcare is to improve patient safety, systems and processes must be designed to be 
more resistant to error occurrence and more accommodating of error consequence”.  
 
1.2.2.3 A systems approach to safety 
Using a “systems approach” has enabled various industries, such as aviation, to 
reduce their error rates dramatically.  The systems theory states that events, objects, 
locations, and methods are intertwined as components of complex systems, with 
“multiple layers of seemingly unrelated issues, including social, legal, cultural, and 
economic factors, which ultimately shape the system’s final form” (Calland, et al., 
2002).  Moray (Moray, 2000) illustrated this concept in a Figure, which I have 
adapted below (Figure 1.3).  By improving system components and their interaction, 
the safety of the overall system can be improved.  Design of a system must therefore 
consider all the aspects of the task in question (Calland, et al., 2002).  This approach 
is becoming important as a strategy to improve patient safety, and reduce adverse 
events in healthcare (Vincent, et al., 1998; Donaldson, 2002) 
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Figure 1.3 – A systems approach to safety, Adapted from Moray 2000 
 
 
 
1.2.2.4 How healthcare differs from industry 
Whilst we have learnt a lot from industry, as I have explained, it is important to 
remember that in many respects healthcare differs markedly from industry. 
 
The obvious difference is the fact that healthcare workers treat patients who are all 
individuals, and have individual differing responses to everything including the 
illness itself, treatment in terms of drug interventions, and treatment in terms of 
surgical interventions.  One patient having a simple operation, such as an 
appendicectomy, may react completely differently to another patient having the same 
operation.  Therefore, healthcare workers have to accept a great deal of variability 
and uncertainty in their daily practice.  In industry, however, workers tend to work 
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with machines, all of which are identical and should behave in an identical way 
except on the rare occasion when they are malfunctioning.  These workers therefore 
work in a very predictable and stable environment.    
 
The other striking difference is that in industry workers, such as nuclear plant 
operators and airline pilots, spend the majority of their time watching the equipment 
run itself, with only a small part of their job being “hands-on”.  In healthcare, 
however, the majority of tasks are “hands-on”, and require skill and attention, 
leaving the process vulnerable to human error at many stages.  Even a simple task, 
such as giving intravenous fluids, has multiple steps at which a mistake may be 
made.  
 
Finally, it is important to remember that the majority of patients are, by the very 
nature of the situation, unwell and therefore more vulnerable to error than when they 
are well.  This is in complete contrast to industry where machinery is remarkably 
reliable, and if the general public are involved (such as airline passengers) they are 
usually well. 
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1.2.3 Error and harm in healthcare 
I am now going to take these principles and apply them to critical care medicine and 
resuscitation, in the first instance looking particularly at the rates of errors and 
adverse events in these areas.  
 
1.2.3.1 Critical care medicine 
In the area of anaesthesia and critical care medicine, patients are particularly 
susceptible to error as these patients undergo a multitude of procedures, are often 
extremely unwell, and may have complex disease processes.  Gallesio (Gallesio, 
2008) noted that the frequency of potential errors and adverse events in the Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) is greatly increased because of the approximately 10-fold rate of 
patient interventions and patient contacts compared with the ward setting.  Two large 
studies, the Critical Care Safety Study in the United States (Rothschild, et al., 2005), 
and the Sentinel Events Evaluation Study in Europe (Valentin, et al., 2006) have 
attempted to quantify the rate of error in the critical care setting.  The Critical Care 
Safety Study found rates that translated into a daily rate of 0.8 adverse events and 1.5 
serious errors for a ten-bed critical care unit.  The Sentinel Events Evaluation Study 
found an error rate of 38.8 events per 100 patient days, and confirmed that the high 
rate of patient safety issues is a widespread problem.  Whilst neither of these studies 
can be directly extrapolated to the UK healthcare system, they clearly illustrate the 
potential problem.  In the critical care setting, a variety of approaches to improve 
safety have emerged over recent years (Walker & Brett, 2010), varying from system 
changes and simple design solutions, to more complex equipment design solutions. 
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The specialties of critical care and anaesthesia have followed the recent trend of 
emphasising the importance of patient safety and the role non-technical skills play in 
adverse events in healthcare (Reader, et al., 2006; Reader, et al., 2007; Reader, et al., 
2008).  In 2009, The European Society of Intensive Care Medicine launched “Patient 
safety in intensive care medicine: the Declaration of Vienna” (Moreno, et al., 2009) 
with the aim of raising the profile of patient safety and quality of care issues, and 
supporting research into this area of healthcare.  The declaration concludes that “a 
significant number of dangerous human errors occur in the ICU.  Many of these 
errors can be attributed to problems of communication between the physicians and 
nurses.  Applying human factor engineering concepts to the study of the weak points 
of a specific ICU may help to reduce the number of errors”.  In addition, the 
Helsinki Declaration on Patient Safety in Anaesthesiology (Mellin-Olsen, et al., 
2010) published in June 2010 also endorses non-technical skills training as a key 
component of improving patient safety. 
 
1.2.3.2 Error in resuscitation 
Care of a patient in the emergency setting is particularly prone to errors and adverse 
events.  Various studies (Rothschild, et al., 2005; Stahl, et al., 2009) have noted a 
higher rate of adverse events during emergency resuscitation (whether medical or 
trauma care) compared with the general hospital population (2 – 4 times higher).  
This is attributable to many factors including the increased rate of patient 
interventions, the time-critical nature of care, the need for rapid decision-making 
often with limited patient information, and the fact that “teams” are assembled 
instantly by the emergency call.  These ad hoc team members may have never 
worked together, or even met each other, before.  All these factors support the need 
	   36	  
to improve an awareness and training of non-technical skills for emergency team 
members.  Some of these skills are discussed in more detail in chapter 2. 
 
1.3 Resuscitation outcomes and incidents 
Having described what resuscitation is, and having briefly discussed general aspects 
of patient safety and adverse events, I am now going to talk specifically about 
outcomes from cardiac arrests.  I will try to explain some of the difficulties 
encountered during resuscitation attempts, and some of the reasons outcomes may be 
worse than necessary due to errors and incidents occurring during resuscitation 
attempts.  I will look at patterns of incident reporting to demonstrate areas where 
improvement may be made.  Finally I will briefly mention some ways that these 
errors may be prevented, such as by re-designing equipment, and so outcomes 
potentially improved. 
 
1.3.1 The outcomes of resuscitation attempts 
The eventual outcome of a resuscitation attempt on a patient who has suffered a 
cardiac arrest is often poor, although there has been some improvement over recent 
years.  The incidence of in-hospital cardiac arrest is quoted as being approximately 
1-5/1000 admissions (Sandroni, et al., 2007) although this is hard to assess and 
figures vary slightly depending on local factors such as implementation of a do-not-
attempt-resuscitation (DNAR) order.  Many studies have looked at the success of 
resuscitation, and overall survival to discharge of those receiving resuscitation is 
quoted as being approximately 16.5-20% (Sandroni, et al., 2007; Kalbag, et al., 
2006).  However, once again, this rate varies significantly between studies.  One of 
the results that is anticipated from the NCAA audit of cardiac arrests in the United 
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Kingdom, is more accurate data of the incidence and outcomes of cardiac arrests in 
the UK.  Preliminary data based on 3,184 adults (Resuscitation Council, 2011b) 
suggests that survival to hospital discharge after in-hospital cardiac arrest is 13.5% 
for all rhythms, with a better outcome (44%) for those with a shockable initial 
rhythm (ventricular fibrillation (VF) or ventricular tachycardia (VT)), and a worse 
outcome (7%) for those with a non-shockable rhythm.  The overall outcome depends 
on a variety of factors including patient factors such as co-morbidities and presenting 
clinical condition, management factors such as the speed at which the arrest is 
recognised and resuscitation attempts started, and any errors or delays during the 
resuscitation attempt, for example, due to missing equipment. 
 
Data recently published from the American “National Registry of Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation” (NRCPR) has illustrated specific factors that affect outcomes of 
cardiac arrests.  The NRCPR database is a more advanced and comprehensive 
version of the NCAA database we are attempting to create in the UK.  It has 
collected details of events from 10% of the hospitals in the United States since 
January 2000.  NRCPR investigators have reported lower survival from adult in-
hospital cardiac arrest for the following reasons: 
 
1. At night and weekends (Peberdy, et al., 2008) 
Analysing 86,748 in-patient cardiac arrest events from January 2000 to February 
2007, investigators found survival rates are lower during nights and weekends, even 
when adjusted for potentially confounding patient, event, and hospital characteristics. 
The team commented that they are unable to determine which factors are responsible 
for these outcomes.  However, they suggest that operational process of care issues 
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may play a role, and mentioned the fact that medical errors are higher at night, 
hospital staffing patterns are different with a lower ratio of staff to patients, and staff 
may be unfamiliar with the patients due to “cross-cover” with other teams. 
 
2. When defibrillation is delayed (Chan, et al., 2008) 
Current recommendation is that patients with ventricular fibrillation (VF) or 
pulseless ventricular tachycardia (VT) should receive defibrillation within 2 minutes 
of recognition of cardiac arrest.  Previous studies have suggested an association 
between time to defibrillation and survival, but have been unable to demonstrate this 
conclusively due to issues in data collection.  However, the NRCPR database has 
provided an opportunity to assess this relationship.  Analysis of 6,789 eligible cases 
of VF or VT between January 2000 and July 2005 revealed that those with delayed 
defibrillation (more than 2 minutes) were significantly less likely to survive to 
hospital discharge, and those that did survive were more likely to suffer major 
disabilities in neurological or functional status.  They found that factors related to the 
hospital setting were associated with the delay, including the arrest occurring out of 
normal working hours, and the patient being in an unmonitored bed, thus delaying 
recognition of an abnormal rhythm.   
 
3. In certain hospital locations (Kayser, et al., 2008) 
Analysis of the NRCPR database revealed that patients arresting in the Emergency 
Department have better survival rates compared to other locations.  They suggest that 
process issues, such as higher levels of staffing, better training in advanced life 
support skills, and more frequent use of resuscitation skills by staff may account for 
this finding.  However, it is important to note that there are certain patient population 
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differences between emergency department patients and in-hospital patients that may 
have some influence on survival. 
 
1.3.2 Critical incident reporting at resuscitation attempts 
1.3.2.1 Critical incident reporting overall 
A critical incident can be defined as “an unplanned event or series of events and 
circumstances that may result in an undesirable consequence”, with an adverse event 
being an incident that results in “unintended injury to patients” (Woloshynowych, et 
al., 2005).  Across healthcare reporting of critical incidents or adverse events is poor 
(Stanhope, et al., 1999; Sari, et al., 2007; Blais, et al., 2008). Anecdotally, it is felt 
that incidents are reported even less frequently when they occur in a cardiac arrest 
situation as the general perception of the team resuscitating is that the outcome was 
likely to be unsuccessful anyway.  Therefore, unless something very significant has 
occurred leading to patient death, it is unlikely to be reported by the resuscitating 
team.  In 2005 the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) analysed internal data on 
incidents reported to them leading to error or deaths during resuscitation.  They 
searched their database of incidents reported over the previous year, and discovered a 
total of 86 incidents relating to either missing equipment or staff uncertain how to 
use equipment.  Of these, 10 were thought to have led to patient death, and a further 
13 were thought to have harmed the patient in some way.  This data was forwarded 
to the Helen Hamlyn Centre as part of a study of resuscitation trolleys I will discuss 
later in this chapter. However, the issue was subsequently referred to in an open 
access publication from 2007 (NPSA, 2007).  
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We know that there is a higher rate of adverse events during emergency resuscitation 
(whether medical or trauma care) compared with the general hospital population 
(Rothschild, et al., 2005; Stahl, et al., 2009), as I have already described.  However, 
despite this, there are very few publications detailing adverse events and critical 
incidents during resuscitation.   Andersen, et al (2010a) searched the Danish Patient 
Safety Database for critical incidents related to cardiac arrest management.  Of the 
122 incidents they reviewed between January 2004 and March 2006, they found four 
main themes as the causes of incidents during the resuscitation itself: 
1. Incidents related to alerting the resuscitation team 26% 
2. Incidents related to human performance  18% 
3. Equipment issues: 
 Lack of equipment    11% 
 Malfunction of equipment   16% 
 Inability to use equipment   5%  
4. Physical environment     11% 
 
The remaining incidents related to failures in escalation of care pre-arrest, and 
medication errors (Figure 1.4).  These findings are very similar to those reported to 
the National Patient Safety Agency, and it can be seen that issues with team 
performance and equipment make up 50% of all the incidents. 
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Figure 1.4 – Types and definitions of incidents related to cardiac arrest management, adapted from 
Andersen, et al., 2010a 
 
Main Category Sub-category n % 
Incidents related to alerting 
the resuscitation team 
Error during telephone call 
Wrong or no information about location on paper 
No dispatch signal or phone call 
Dispatch or telephone system “down” 
Resuscitation team not answering pager or phone 
Wrong person called 
Cell phone interference 
Late or no arrival of personnel 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 
1 
1 
7 
5% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
6% 
Sub-total  32 26% 
Incidents related to human 
performance 
Lack of organised co-operation in resuscitation team 
Lack of knowledge about equipment 
Lack of knowledge about procedures 
11 
6 
5 
9% 
5% 
4% 
Sub-total  22 18% 
Malfunction of technical 
equipment 
Defibrillator not functioning 
Suction not functioning 
Ventilation equipment or oxygen supply not functioning 
13 
4 
2 
11% 
3% 
2% 
Sub-total  19 16% 
Resuscitation equipment 
not available 
Lack of technical equipment expected to be available at certain 
location 13 11% 
Sub-total  13 11% 
Physical environment Physical surrounding obstructing or delaying resuscitation 14 11% 
Sub-total  14 11% 
Insufficient monitoring or 
therapy 
Delay in transfer 
Delay in therapy 
No monitoring 
No information 
5 
4 
4 
1 
4% 
3% 
3% 
1% 
Sub-total  14 11% 
Medication error 
Administered incorrectly 
Prepared incorrectly 
Medication causing cardiac arrest 
Incorrect drug given 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
Sub-total  8 7% 
Total  122 100% 
 
 
More recently, Ornato, et al (2012) searched the NRCPR database to see if there was 
a link between resuscitation errors, and survival from an in-hospital cardiac arrest.  
They included 118,387 events recorded between January 2000 and August 2008.  
The data reporting system has a section for system errors that were noted during or 
following the resuscitation attempt.  Errors included issues alerting the resuscitation 
team, airway management issues, vascular access problems, poor leadership, 
deviation from protocol, and equipment function issues.  In total, 28.7% of cases had 
one or more system errors recorded.  They found that the presence of a documented 
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error during a resuscitation attempt was associated with a decreased rate of return of 
spontaneous circulation, survival to 24 hours, and survival to hospital discharge in all 
patients.  This remained the case when sub-analysis looked at the initial rhythm, 
whether shockable, or unshockable (Figure 1.5).   
 
Figure 1.5 – Effect of any resuscitation system errors on a resuscitation attempt and the rate of return 
of spontaneous circulation (ROSC), survival for 24 hours, and survival to discharge (Ornato, et al., 
2012)  
 
 
The study also confirms the previous results of Peberdy, et al (2008) that survival 
from arrest is lower at nights and weekends.  They conclude that this therefore 
suggests a link between increased error at nights and weekends and decreased 
survival during those times.  They also found that there was a relatively low 
percentage of cases in the Emergency Department (ED) where errors were reported, 
which correlates with Kayser, et al’s (2008) finding of improved survival from a 
resuscitation attempt in the ED. 
 
Most recently (June 2012), the National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome 
and Death (NCEPOD) has reported a review of patients who underwent resuscitation 
as a result of in-hospital cardiorespiratory arrest (NCEPOD, 2012).  They audited all 
resuscitation attempts in the National Health Service (NHS) over a 14-day period in 
2010 using a standardised data collection form.  Their aim was to describe and 
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identify factors in the process of care in resuscitation that could be improved upon.  
During the resuscitation process itself they discovered 234 problems identified 
during the 787 resuscitation attempts.  The most common related to equipment issues 
(7%), airway management problems (6%), and problems with teamworking and 
communication (4%) (Figure 1.6). However, it is important to note that there was no 
specific section of the form on which to collect information on problems or incidents, 
and so this is likely to under-represent the true figures.  Most interesting, however, is 
the fact that the nature of the problems encountered is very similar to those 
previously reported by other groups. 
 
Figure 1.6 – Problems reported by the team leader – Adapted from NCEPOD 2012 
 
Problems reported n % 
Equipment 51 6.8 
Airway Management 40 5.5 
Communication/teamwork 29 4.0 
Staff availability 23 3.1 
Drugs 22 2.9 
Defibrillation 6 <1 
Other 63  
All of the above 1  
    
 
1.3.2.2 Critical incident reporting related to the resuscitation trolley 
As I have previously mentioned, Andersen, et al (2010a) searched the Danish Patient 
Safety Database for critical incidents related to cardiac arrest management. Of the 
122 incidents they reviewed between January 2004 and March 2006, 11% related to 
missing equipment, and a further 11% related to malfunctioning defibrillators on the 
resuscitation trolley.  If a resuscitation trolley is thoroughly checked each day, 
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including a function check of the defibrillator, theoretically many of these incidents 
could be avoided. 
 
An earlier study performed in the UK by King, et al (1994) found that 18% of 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation attempts were delayed by equipment failures.  These 
included broken defibrillators, and missing equipment such as laryngoscopes and 
endotracheal tubes, therefore confirming that Andersen’s findings weren’t unique to 
Denmark.  This state of affairs obviously continued as the NPSA again highlighted 
the issue from analysis of their data in 2005.  
 
Dyson and Smith (2002) describe resuscitation equipment failures falling into three 
categories – i) basic device failure, ii) external factors, such as power failures, and 
iii) human error.  Of these, human error is the commonest.  They state “Inadequate 
checking of equipment and preventative maintenance leads to failure to detect the 
complete absence of whole pieces or components of equipment, incorrect equipment 
size, misassembly and defects due to manufacturing or wear and tear”.  They go on 
to make recommendations about what should be stored on the trolley, and how it 
should be checked to minimise these errors. 
 
1.3.3 Factors influencing resuscitation outcome  
A number of difficulties may be encountered during a resuscitation attempt, which 
could contribute to the higher rates of errors seen at resuscitation attempts.  It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these at length.  However, I will describe 
some of the difficulties in broad terms, as it will help to explain how some of the 
critical incidents mentioned above may occur. 
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1.3.3.1 Patient factors 
Patient factors include any medical condition that creates challenging circumstances 
for the resuscitation team.  For example, in some patients it may be a challenge to 
place an intravenous cannula.  This would delay administration of medications 
required during the resuscitation attempt.  
 
1.3.3.2 Systemic factors – team issues 
Team issues may also occur for a variety of reasons.  A team may function poorly 
because of poor leadership, poor team communication, or being inexperienced and 
lacking the skills to cope with the situation.  Alternatively a team may work well 
together, but may be delayed in attending for some reason, such as another 
emergency elsewhere, or a failure in being called to the emergency. 
 
1.3.3.3 Systemic factors – environment and equipment issues 
Environmental factors include the geographical location within the hospital where 
the patient has arrested.  As an example, an arrest occurring outside a ward on the 
ground adds a multitude of practical complications.  All the equipment required must 
be brought to the area, leading to delays in care, and the resuscitation team must 
adapt to treating the patient on the ground which can make some procedures, such as 
intubation, more of a challenge.   
 
Equipment issues relate to missing, broken or unavailable equipment hindering 
resuscitation attempts.  For example, missing defibrillator pads from a resuscitation 
trolley preventing rhythm assessment and DC shock delivery, if required. 
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1.3.4 Factors that may improve outcomes during resuscitation. 
Whilst the outcome of a cardiac arrest resuscitation attempt, in particular for non-
shockable events, is likely to remain poor by the very nature of the situation, as I 
have discussed above there are areas where improvements could be made which may 
improve the overall outcome, even if only marginally.  These areas in particular 
relate to the hospital or process issues I have discussed.  Ornato, et al (2012) 
conclude their study by stating “Given that resuscitation practices need to occur 
consistently well throughout all areas of the hospital, and that responders will 
always have varying degrees of expertise and experience, our findings suggest that 
resuscitation training should be targeted to emphasize avoiding the types of errors 
having the greatest impact on survival (e.g. delays in initial defibrillation and 
medication administration and adherence to ACLS protocols).  An increasing body 
of evidence indicates that effective leadership and teamwork rather than just 
individual knowledge, skills, and attitudes are required to optimize outcomes and 
minimize errors in a variety of medical emergencies”.  It is true to say that ensuring 
teams have good technical and non-technical skills when performing the 
resuscitation attempt is extremely important.  This is something I will examine in 
detail in chapter 3.   
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2 Introduction – Part II – Design for Safety 
 
 
 
“One has to be very clever indeed to make things idiot-proof” 
(P Sykes, 1992) 
 
2.1 Design for Safety 
 
I will now discuss one of the ways that errors may be reduced, and patient safety 
improved – by addressing the design of a system or piece of equipment. This will 
include a discussion of the ways flaws in a system may be identified, some historical 
examples of designing for safety in the context of anaesthesia, and then some more 
recent examples from critical care medicine.  In the final section of this chapter I will 
then discuss the design of the resuscitation trolley, and the work that has been 
undertaken to re-design the trolley with the aim of improving safety at resuscitation 
attempts.  
   
2.1.1 Principles of “Designing for Safety” 
Grout (2006) uses the term “Mistake proofing” to change the physical design of a 
process to reduce human error.  He goes on to explain that the design change may be 
a physical change in design, or may involve a change in strategy or process.  It 
should either prevent an error from occurring, detect an error after it has occurred but 
before harm occurs, allow a process to fail safely, or alter an environment to reduce 
the chance of an error occurring.  I will now illustrate the role of design in healthcare 
by examining the case of anaesthesia. 
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2.1.2 History of “Design for Safety” in the context of anaesthesia 
Interestingly, despite the fact that it is only relatively recently that patient safety and 
process design has received international attention, in the area of anaesthesia the role 
of human factors in error and adverse events has been discussed for many years.  An 
interesting review of errors in anaesthesia by Peter Sykes in 1992 (Sykes, 1992) is 
titled “Accidents Do Not Happen – They Are Caused”.  From the outset, 
anaesthetists have been reporting data of accidents and adverse events under 
anaesthesia; one of the first being John Snow in 1853 who discussed the incidence of 
deaths under anaesthesia in the UK compared with the rest of the world in his diaries.  
Sykes reports that in the 1890s “it was realised that when operations were carried 
out after dark, not only were the patients liable to die, but the theatre staff too”.  At 
that stage, operating theatres were lit by multiple gas burners hanging above the 
operating table, and chloroform was the anaesthetic agent commonly used.  It was 
then discovered that when chloroform comes into contact with a flame, phosgene gas 
is produced.  This is the highly poisonous gas that was used extensively in World 
War I.  By 1906 a solution to this problem had been discovered – to hang cloths 
dipped in ammonia near the lights, which eliminated phosgene, and formed the 
relatively safer ammonium chloride.  This is an early example of how a change in 
design may improve the safety of a system.   
 
Since the time that gases were compressed into cylinders, a recurring problem in 
anaesthesia was the possibility of confusion over which gas was being administered 
to the patient.  The compressed gases usually stocked were oxygen, carbon dioxide 
and nitrous oxide.  If either nitrous oxide or carbon dioxide are mistaken for oxygen 
and given at 100% concentration, then a patient may die if the error is not 
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recognised.  Initially, all cylinders were painted black with the name of the gas 
written on the side in white.  However, it was only after patients had died from 
incorrect gas administration that a system was devised where different cylinders were 
painted different colours.  Confusion arose again, however, during World War II 
when American gas supplies were sent to the UK, and once again there were a series 
of fatalities.  At that stage, the colour-coding system for cylinders in America was 
different to that in the UK.  Over the years, other systems were introduced to reduce 
the risk of patients being given the wrong gas.  Sykes comments that “One has to be 
very clever indeed to make things idiot-proof”.   It was not until 1954 that the pin-
index system that we use today was developed (figure 2.1) theoretically eliminating 
the possibility of connecting the wrong gas to the relevant section of the anaesthetic 
machine.  Whilst there continued to be occasional reports of incorrect gases being 
administered, in 1987 an Australian anaesthetist (Holland, 1987) reported that errors 
in anaesthesia leading to hypoxic gas administration from incorrect flowmeter 
settings, failed oxygen supplies, or cross-connections had disappeared, and were now 
predominantly considered to be of historical interest. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Pin-index system to prevent errors in gas connection to the anaesthetic machine. Pins at 
the cylinder connection point on the anaesthetic machine fit into holes drilled on the valve of the 
cylinder in corresponding positions (2 and 5 for Oxygen, 3 and 5 for Nitrous Oxide, 1 and 5 for Air) 
thus preventing an incorrect connection 
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Anaesthetists have also recognised the role of human error in anaesthetic accidents 
for many years.  In 1981 Craig and Wilson (Craig, et al., 1981) reported 65% of 
anaesthetic errors as being due to human error alone, and in 1986, Schreiber  
(Schreiber, 1986) reported that 70-80% of incidents were caused by human error, and 
only 2-5% by equipment failure.  This led to an editorial in “Anaesthesia” in 1986 
(Green, 1986) stating that “there is firm evidence that a considerable reduction in 
the incidence of avoidable mortality and severe morbidity could be achieved by the 
simple expedient of increased vigilance by individual anaesthetists” 
 
2.1.3 Modern examples of “Design for Safety” in critical care medicine 
In recent years there has been an emphasis on re-designing processes and equipment 
taking human factors into account, so as to create an environment where errors are 
less likely to occur, and if they do occur, to minimise the harm to a patient. 
 
In 2003, Pronovost et al looked at whether using a “daily goals” form on their daily 
ICU ward round improved communication (Pronovost, et al. 2003).  They had found 
previously that the daily round often included extensive discussions about the 
patient, but that the team often failed to state explicitly the goals for that patient.  
They assessed how well residents and nurses understood the patient aims for the day, 
and whether they understood what needed to be achieved in the long-term.  The 
“daily goals” form detailed a care and communication plan that had to be reviewed 
three times a day.  During the weeks prior to implementing the form, less than 10% 
of the residents and nurses understood the goals of therapy and tasks to be 
completed, but this increased to greater than 95% after introduction of the form.  
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Interestingly, they also found that the average length of stay decreased from a mean 
of 2.2 days to 1.1 days, facilitating an increase in the number of ICU admissions.   
 
Grout (2006) describes a simple design solution in his review.  He discusses the 
Institute of Healthcare Improvement’s “100,000 Lives Campaign” (Berwick, et al. 
2006). One of their recommendations to reduce the incidence of ventilator-associated 
pneumonia is to raise the head of the bed to between 300 and 450.  Grout describes a 
“mistake-proofing” solution to help staff remember to follow this recommendation.  
Whilst it was unlikely to eliminate errors, it did help reduce them substantially.  The 
design solution was to place a sticker on the side of the bed at a 300 angle reminding 
staff of the recommendation, but also assisting them in judging the correct angle – as 
staff simply have to raise the bed until the sticker is level (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Simple design solution to improve compliance with 300 head-up recommendation 
 
 
 
In response to numerous incidents relating to intravenous medications being 
administered by the spinal (intrathecal) route leading to death, (one of the most well-
known being the case of Wayne Jowett in Nottingham (Toft, 2001)) and of epidural 
medicines being administered by the intravenous route with equally fatal outcomes, a 
whole system design solution was required.  The National Patient Safety Agency 
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(NPSA) has been influential in encouraging the development of an international 
standard for a new single connector design so that it will be impossible to deliver 
intravenous medications through a spinal needle, and similarly impossible to deliver 
epidural or spinal medications through an intravenous needle.  Intravenous needles 
have standard “luer-lock” connectors, therefore this new connector is being termed 
“non-luer”.  It is obviously a complex process that requires not only healthcare 
professionals to be aware of and complying with the new regulations, but also 
requires manufacturers to be cooperative in the development and production of new 
standardised equipment.  The NPSA have issued clear timescales for introduction of 
this new equipment (NPSA, Jan 2011).  Despite the clear guidance, this is not 
without complication, and only very recently, the NPSA was forced to issue an alert 
as cases have been reported to them where staff have used the new safer “non-luer” 
spinal needle, but did not have the appropriate “non-luer” syringe with which to 
inject, therefore leading to unnecessary delay and additional risk to the patient 
(NPSA, Nov 2011). 
 
2.2 Design of the resuscitation trolley 
2.2.1 What is a resuscitation trolley? 
A resuscitation trolley contains all the equipment required to treat a patient in the 
critical first few minutes of a resuscitation attempt.  One should be stored in every 
clinical area of a hospital and should be wheeled to the patient when an emergency 
situation is identified.  In a joint statement by the Royal College of Anaesthetists, 
Royal College of Physicians, Intensive Care Society, and Resuscitation Council 
(UK), on the standards for clinical practice in resuscitation (Gabbott, et al, 2004), 
they state that the choice of equipment should be defined by the local resuscitation 
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committee depending on local circumstances.  However, they also refer to the 
recommended list of items available from the Resuscitation Council (UK) 
(Resuscitation Council, 2004).  The list consists of 43 different items, of which many 
are stored in multiples (e.g. syringes and needles).  It includes equipment to manage 
the airway, such as an endotracheal tube; equipment to manage the circulation, such 
as intravenous cannulae; medications, such as Adrenaline minijets; and other 
miscellaneous items such as gloves. 
 
The Resuscitation Council (UK) joint statement (Gabbott et al, 2004) offers clear 
guidance regarding the stocking and checking of resuscitation trolleys.  Suggested 
frequency of checking is daily, although in critical care areas it is generally 
recommended that checks should be performed at every staff shift change.  The 
check is usually performed by a member of nursing staff from the clinical area 
responsible for the trolley, and commonly involves ticking off items on a list 
supplied by the hospital’s resuscitation team.  However, local procedures may vary.   
These recommendations aim to ensure that working equipment is immediately 
available because successful resuscitation depends on this, in part. (Dyson & Smith, 
2002). 
 
2.2.2 History of the design of a resuscitation trolley 
“Emergency trays” for different procedures have been described since the early 
1950s.  Helen Dickie (1973) wrote a textbook called “Tray and Trolley Setting” 
which gave accurate instructions and drawings for the preparation of equipment and 
drugs for important procedures.  However, this was before the inception of CPR in 
the 1960s, as described above.  Shortly after this, a “trolley” or “cart” was developed 
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to store the equipment required for resuscitation, but whilst clinical care, and the 
equipment required, has progressed dramatically since this time, the design of the 
trolley itself remains largely the same as those used by mechanics as tool trolleys, 
and is not designed for purpose.  Figure 2.3 illustrates a selection of resuscitation 
trolleys commonly found in UK hospitals.  All have the same basic design of a series 
of drawers in which to store all the equipment required.  Also shown in Figure 2.3 is 
the trolley commonly found in St Mary’s Hospital, Paddington, which I will come to 
term the “standard trolley” later in this thesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Image of a selection of resuscitation trolleys commonly found in the UK, and a larger 
image of the “standard trolley” found in Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
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2.2.3 The need for a new trolley design 
I have already described a number of publications discussing incidents at 
resuscitation attempts caused by issues with missing or broken equipment. In 2004, 
prior to the NPSA report about Resuscitation equipment failures, the Department of 
Health “Design for Patient Safety” report (2004) recommended collaboration 
between designers, researchers, healthcare practitioners, and NHS agencies as a new 
approach to design in the NHS, recognising the need for ergonomic design to reduce 
error (Clarkson, et al, 2004).  With this is mind, rather than simply re-issue guidance 
on the stocking and checking of trolleys, the NPSA decided to sponsor a project to 
redesign the resuscitation trolley with the aim of improving the stocking process.  
This decision was stated as a recommendation on minutes from an internal meeting 
on 7th June 2005.   
 
2.2.4 Previous attempts to redesign the resuscitation trolley  
Whilst the design of the resuscitation trolley has changed little over the years – in 
terms of having equipment stored in drawers in a trolley on wheels – as a review of 
the literature revealed there have, in fact, been four previous attempts to redesign the 
resuscitation trolley.   
 
The first, published by Macleod et al (1986) and MacVicar et al (1986), aimed to 
produce a more versatile, yet commercially viable, trolley design that could take 
account of the variations in equipment each hospital used.  The project was a 
collaboration between medical staff at the Royal Infirmary in Glasgow and scientific 
staff from the Department of Clinical Physics and Bio-engineering in Glasgow.  
They enlisted help from personnel in the Product Design Department of the Glasgow 
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School of Art.  Their view was that there was a conflict between resuscitation staff 
needing resuscitation equipment next to the patient, and nursing staff needing to 
prepare drugs near the patient.  They therefore devised a double trolley system.  In its 
storage mode, a small trolley sat within a larger trolley.  However, these could be 
separated at an arrest into the large trolley containing all the resuscitation equipment, 
and the small trolley containing drugs and other supplies.  According to the 
publication, 23 units were produced by a company called Cardiac Recorders Limited, 
and were placed in service at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary.  However, according to 
public records, the company ceased trading in 1988, and there is no evidence of 
similar products being currently commercially available in the UK. 
 
The second was an attempt by Alistair Royse (Royse, 1989) in Victoria, Australia in 
1989.  He reported that “Current resuscitation trolleys represent the major weakness 
in the conduct of resuscitations for medical emergencies because they are generally 
not complete or standardised and lack a logical and systematic layout of equipment 
and drugs.”  He aimed to, and succeeded in, defining the main design principles to 
which an ergonomically designed trolley should adhere.  This included factors such 
as ease of mobility, standardised design, logical layout of equipment, and ease of 
identifying equipment.  He argued that the drawer systems of commercially available 
trolleys made finding equipment for the user difficult, and that familiarity with the 
trolley is required. It appears that whilst a prototype trolley was developed, the 
project was not continued to clinical trials or commercialisation.  The author 
describes frustrations with bureaucracy leading to delays in further development.   
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Interestingly, the third attempt was also from Victoria, Australia, but not until 1998.  
Cranswick and Rodda’s aim (Cranswick & Rodda, 1998) was to develop a trolley 
that “could provide oxygen and suction of a standard similar to that found in an 
Intensive Care Unit treatment bay”.  Whilst they did achieve their aim of increasing 
the oxygen and suction capacity of the trolley, the overall layout of the trolley was 
essentially the same as the standard trolley in terms of equipment being laid out in 
drawers.  At the time, the authors reported that a company called “ENGrIT” had 
produced prototypes, and then a finished model of the trolley.  However, while the 
company continues to sell medical equipment, they no longer seem to sell 
resuscitation trolleys. 
 
Finally, the most recent attempt to redesign the resuscitation trolley, and arguably the 
most successful from a commercial perspective, was by Donchin in 2002 in Israel 
(Donchin, 2002).  He discussed the problems with a standard trolley, stating “Careful 
analysis from a human engineering view showed that, even though it was easy to 
mobilise the cart, it was hard to locate drugs in the different compartments and at 
“time crucial” moments one drawer would not let the other one open properly”.  He 
argued “The carts were designed as a simple storage place without taking into 
account the needs encountered during moments of crisis and high tempo which 
regularly occur during a cardiac arrest.”  On the basis of this, his team designed a 
new trolley based on “supermarket principles” that everything should be seen and 
should be easily accessible.  Their trolley (Figure 2.4) consists of a series of 
transparent containers stored on a frame.  They explained that labeling was not 
required as it was easy for users to see the equipment, although one could argue that 
additional labeling might make the equipment even more obvious to the users.  This 
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trolley was manufactured and marketed by a company called Medi-marpeh Ltd 
(www.medimarpeh.co.il) based in Israel, and according to Donchin the trolley is now 
used in many hospitals across Israel.  Whilst the team stated there were no drawers 
on their trolley, I would argue that since there are insufficient containers to hold 
every item required in a separate container, and given that rows of containers are 
stored on top of each other, in practice these containers presumably act as small 
drawers containing a variety of items.  However, it is hard to comment conclusively 
without seeing the trolley in person. 
 
Figure 2.4 – The ergonomic resuscitation trolley produced by Medi-Marpeh Ltd, Israel 
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2.2.5 The “Resus:Station” 
2.2.5.1 The redesign process 
At the instigation of the NPSA, in 2006 a collaboration was formed between the 
Helen Hamlyn Centre, part of the Royal College of Art which specialises in 
Ergonomic Design, and clinicians and health psychologists from Imperial College 
and St Mary’s Hospital, with the aim of developing a new resuscitation trolley.  
Given that the designers and health psychologists confirmed they had no prior 
experience of resuscitation, the initial stages involved gaining an understanding of 
what the resuscitation process is, understanding what is required of a resuscitation 
trolley, and what is currently available.  They then mapped out the process of 
resuscitation and used a tool based on a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis process 
to identify all the key points where design might make a difference (Table 2.1) 
(Brodie, et al, 2009; West et al, 2008). 
 
 
Table 2.1 – Features identified on the current trolley that hinder the resuscitation process 
 
Problems Identified 
1. A crowded environment during resuscitation can make access to equipment stored in the current 
trolley difficult. 
2. Drawers in the current trolley often don’t open properly, exacerbating problems accessing 
equipment. 
3. The design of the current trolley often prevents several drawers being opened at once. 
4. It is difficult for more than one person to access the trolley at a time. 
5. Equipment may not be stored correctly, and may lead to wrong equipment being selected, or the 
equipment required not being found. 
6. Poorly stocked trolleys are being taken to the resuscitation scene, pointing to wider problems of 
the restocking procedure. 
7. A crowded environment at the resuscitation can potentially pressurise the team function, and poor 
trolley design may exacerbate this problem. 
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The initial design process then began.  The designers were encouraged to think as 
radically and creatively as possible, and a huge number of concepts were produced at 
this stage (Figure 2.5).   
 
Figure 2.5 – Initial design concepts 
 
 
 
 
Creative workshops were held with clinicians where the ideas could be developed 
further.  At these workshops, one design concept was selected over the others, and 
was then developed further.  This became the first prototype and was called the 
“Resus:Station” (Figure 2.6).  Various specific features of this prototype were 
thought to help resolve the issues previously identified.  For example, the open 
layout of equipment was thought to help staff searching for equipment, and it was 
anticipated that a feature enabling the trolley to split would help to define team roles 
during the resuscitation, and further facilitate access to equipment. 
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Figure 2.6 – First prototype of the Resus:Station   
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.5.2 Assessment of the first prototype and further design refinements 
At this stage the trolley was trialed in a simulation suite to demonstrate proof of 
concept and validate the design direction.  The simulations clearly showed that a 
resuscitation team that had never seen the prototype before was able to intuitively use 
the design.   
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The design was then taken forward to the next development stage.  It was at this 
point that Bristol Maid™ (www.bristolmaid.com), manufacturers of hospital 
equipment, became involved.  This was to help ensure the next prototype was a more 
feasible commercial proposition, and to enable the development team to benefit from 
their experience in the field, particularly in terms of engineering expertise. 
 
Prior to production of the second prototype, further feedback sessions were held to 
encourage potential users to make further suggestions for improvement.  Among the 
suggestions at this stage were: 
• A need to improve the robustness of the splitting mechanism 
• A need to improve security as the open layout meant that people could casually 
remove items from the trolley 
• A need to improve the layout of equipment within the trolley 
 
 
2.2.5.3 Design features of the current Resus:Station 
Bristol Maid manufactured five of the second prototype Resus:Station to be used in 
assessment studies.  It contained specific design solutions that were hoped would 
improve the current resuscitation situation (Figure 2.7).  The assessment studies 
performed using these prototypes will be described in detail later in this thesis, in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
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Figure 2.7 – The second prototype Resus:Station with specific design solutions 
	   	  	  	  	  
 
Design solutions in the “Resus:Station” 
1. An “open layout” design means all equipment can be seen at a glance, making access easier. 
2. The open layout, with individual labelled pockets for each item, may also help to facilitate the 
stock check. 
3. When the trolley is not being used, blinds are locked in place to prevent “casual theft” of items. 
4. The trolley splits into three sections – Airway, Drugs & Defibrillator, and Circulation – facilitating 
access to equipment for many team members.  For example, the Airway section can be placed at 
the head of the bed next to the Anaesthetist enabling direct access to all the airway equipment 
required. 
5. Labels on each individual item pocket helps with the stock check, and also helps inexperienced 
staff identify the correct equipment. 
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3 Introduction – Part III – Teamwork and Non-
technical Skills 
 
 
 
“Great leaders achieve a balance of thinking, looking forward, 
collecting data, but knowing when to act, accepting that there will be 
uncertainty” (P Barie, 2005) 
 
3.1 Teamwork and Non-technical Skills 
In this third introductory chapter I will discuss two other areas that may be 
addressed in an attempt to reduce errors and improve outcomes at resuscitation 
attempts.  First I will describe non-technical skills, and discuss their importance in 
an efficient team.  I will explain how some of our knowledge in healthcare has been 
extrapolated from high-risk industry, and will go on to describe individual 
behaviours in more detail.   
 
3.1.1 What skills are needed for efficient teamwork? 
The Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human” (Kohn, et al., 2000) 
acknowledged that failure in communication is one of the leading causes of patient 
harm, and stated that “Good teamwork is required to promote quality and safety in 
healthcare”.  While team members clearly require the technical skills to perform a 
task, it is increasingly recognised that other skills, known as “non-technical skills” 
are also required.  Non-technical skills can be described as “the cognitive, social, and 
personal resource skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and 
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efficient task performance” (Flin, et al., 2008a).  These skills include interpersonal 
skills such as communication, cooperation and leadership, and cognitive skills such 
as situation awareness and decision-making (Reader, et al., 2006; Reader, et al., 
2007; Anderson, et al., 2010b; Sevdalis & Brett, 2009). 
 
3.1.2 What have we learnt about non-technical skills from industry? 
Much of our understanding of non-technical skills comes from the aviation industry.  
A series of airline accidents in the 1970s, in which no primary technical fault was 
found, highlighted the importance of these skills in aviation.  The most famous of 
these is the Tenerife crash in 1977, in which 583 people died.  This remains the 
deadliest accident in aviation history.  The accident involved a KLM flight and a Pan 
Am flight.  A series of events leading up to the incident led to a busy congested 
airport, with foggy conditions.  The Pan Am plane was instructed to taxi on the 
runway, and then exit onto another taxiway, whilst the KLM plane was given 
clearance for the route it was to fly, but not clearance to take off.  The captain, 
however, mistook the message as being clearance for take off, and so accelerated 
down the runway.  This was despite the co-pilot questioning him.  Due to the fog, the 
KLM crew could not see the Pan Am plane ahead of them, and neither plane could 
be seen by the control tower.  A flight deck engineer on the KLM flight expressed 
concern, but was overruled by the captain.  Analysis of the accident revealed 
problems with communication, team co-ordination, decision-making, and leadership  
(Aviation Safety Network, 1977). 
 
Concern in the aviation industry led to a conference being held at NASA in 1979 at 
which psychologists and pilots discussed how to manage the human factors 
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contributing to accidents.  They started research to identify exactly which skills were 
important, and found that they were all skills that pilots already knew were key to 
being a good pilot.  However, they had never been formally taught (Beaty, 1995). 
Training courses were developed, named “Crew Resource Management” (CRM) to 
teach these skills.  The emphasis of these courses was to train leadership, decision-
making, situation awareness and communication skills to the flight crew.  There was 
also an emphasis on flattening the hierarchy to create a culture where junior team 
members feel they can voice their concerns, and to encourage the captain to listen 
and take note of that opinion at a time of crisis (Helmreich, et al., 1999). 
 
3.1.3 The importance of non-technical skills in the emergency setting 
To date, non-technical skills have been relatively overlooked in healthcare, with an 
emphasis on training the technical aspects of tasks.  However, this is beginning to 
change since the IoM and DoH reports (Kohn, et al., 2000; Department of Health, 
2000) identifying the incidence of error and adverse events in hospitals, and the fact 
that there is often a failure in teamworking skills and communication contributing to 
these events.   
 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, emergency care is particularly prone to error, and in 
recognition of this fact, the specialties of critical care and anaesthesia have followed 
the trend of emphasising the importance of patient safety and the role non-technical 
skills in adverse events in healthcare (Reader, et al., 2006; Reader et al., 2007; 
Reader, et al., 2008).   Some of these skills are discussed in more detail below. 
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3.1.3.1 Communication 
In the airline industry, encouraging a culture in which junior team members feel they 
can voice concerns has been cited as being a positive change.  Sexton, et al (2000) 
attempted to compare flight crews with operating teams.  They found that the 
perceived level of teamwork was thought to be high by 73% of surgical residents, but 
that this differed dramatically from the perception of the remaining team members 
(only 39% anaesthetists, and 28% nurses reported high levels of teamwork).  They 
also found that while only 55% of surgeons rejected steep hierarchies, 94% of the 
airline crew preferred flat hierarchies.  Other studies report positive attitudes towards 
junior staff speaking up when they have concerns.  However, Clarke et al (2005) 
noted that if such team members are then criticized, they are less likely to speak up in 
the future, even if they know there is a complication. 
 
Jain, et al (2006) described an ICU quality-improvement project in which improved 
communication among the multidisciplinary team led to better coordination of 
patient care.  Reader, et al (2007) extrapolated some of the lessons from the aviation 
industry into the ICU setting.  They also reflected on Donchin, et al’s (1995) earlier 
study finding that “although nurse and doctor communications occurred in just 2% 
of all activities performed in their unit, these were associated with over a third of 
detected errors”.  Reader, et al commented “Alongside safety, communication skills 
in the ICU have also been shown to be important for the quality of care received by 
patients.  For example, high levels of collaboration between nurses and doctors have 
been shown to result in improved patient mortality rates and reduced average patient 
length of stay” 
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3.1.3.2 Decision-Making 
Decision-making can be defined as “the process of reaching a judgment or choosing 
an option, sometimes called a course of action, to meet the needs of a given 
situation” (Flin, et al., 2008a).  Decision-making is a complex process and obviously 
requires a certain amount of knowledge and experience on which to base the 
decisions.  Gaba (1989) developed a model to describe anaesthetists’ decision-
making processes (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 – Gaba’s model of decision-making by anaesthetists 
 
 
 
In an emergency situation, “intuitive decision-making” may become predominant 
due to the time pressure.  However, this is especially dependent on experience as it 
relies on making decisions on the basis of recognition of a set of indicators leading to 
a certain course of action without weighing up alternatives.   
 
One of the fundamental differences between healthcare and industry is the fact that 
decision-making is much more complicated in healthcare, as patients are all different, 
have different problems, and respond in different ways. 
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In the context of decision-making, Xiao et al (1995) highlight issues of fixation error.  
A fixation error occurs when a practitioner concentrates excessively on one aspect of 
a case, ignoring other potentially more relevant aspects (Fioratou, et al., 2010).  This 
is something that repeatedly crops up in the world of anaesthesia, with two infamous 
cases – that of Elaine Bromiley in 2005 (Clinical Human Factors Group, 2010), and 
Gordon Ewing in 2006 (Sheriffdom of Glasgow and Strathkelvin, 2010) – both of 
whom died as a result of fixation errors by of the team caring for them.  Xiao saw 
fixation errors occurring when the anaesthetists moved too fast, and therefore rushed 
past some cues, and used other information incorrectly; but also from moving too 
slowly and failing to update their plans as required.  These fixation errors were 
thought to be “partly the results of the interplay between the nature of complex 
environments and the strategies used by practitioners in dealing with complexity”, 
and also because of a loss of situation awareness. 
 
3.1.3.3 Situation Awareness  
Endsley (2000) defines Situation Awareness as simply “knowing what is going on 
around you”.  In our modern world with multiple cues – in particular visual, audible, 
and tactile cues – it is impossible for our brains to process everything.  Therefore our 
brains focus on some things more than others.  How we choose what to focus on 
depends partly on experience, but also on specific cues in the environment, such as a 
noise.  Endsley (1995) reviewed aviation accidents from 1989-1992, and found that 
in 88% of accidents in which human error was implicated, situation awareness was a 
major causal factor.  An example that is frequently quoted is of the United Airlines 
crash in Portland, Oregon in 1978.  The crew circled the airport for an hour whilst 
trying to resolve an issue with the landing gear, and preparing for an emergency 
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landing. Whilst this was occurring they failed to notice that they had run out of fuel.  
This example also highlights the role of situation awareness in fixation errors, 
described above.   
 
Situation awareness is especially important in areas where information flow can be 
high, and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.  This perfectly describes 
emergency care of a patient, such as a trauma patient.  For example, it is a lack of 
situation awareness that might lead a team to take a haemodynamically unstable 
trauma patient to the CT scanner rather than straight to the operating theatre.  If they 
stood back, appreciated what was going on, and anticipated what could happen in the 
scanner, they might make a different decision. 
 
3.1.3.4 Leadership 
Philip Barie (2005) stated “Great leaders achieve a balance of thinking, looking 
forward, collecting data, but knowing when to act, accepting that there will be 
uncertainty”.  This clearly summarises some of the difficulties of leadership, and 
also the key qualities of a great leader.  In particular, the fact that you can’t always be 
certain that the direction you’re heading in is the right direction, all you can do is 
assess the situation and make a reasoned, balanced judgment of what to do.  You 
can’t wait and hold back until you’re completely certain of your decisions because 
people are waiting and relying on you to act. 
 
A study by Hjortdahl et al (2009) looked at the importance of leadership in trauma 
teams.  They interviewed trauma team members from different backgrounds with 
different levels of experience to obtain their views of non-technical skills.  From this 
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they concluded that leadership was the main determinant of team function during 
trauma team interactions and that insufficient leadership was a reason for failure in 
trauma management.  However, they also pointed out that there are sometimes huge 
expectations of the team leader, which are not always realistic.  They emphasised 
that no one is perfect at communicating all of the time, and everyone has 
weaknesses.  Whilst it is important to have an overall leader in charge of the team, 
we should aim towards a situation where the whole team is working together with a 
flattened hierarchy, encouraging members to speak up and voice concerns.  This 
compensates for weaknesses or omissions by the team leader.  Whilst this study 
looks at trauma teams, and not resuscitation teams, there are many similarities in the 
working environments.  In both situations, teams are brought together ad hoc, may 
have never worked together, and are working in a stressful time-pressured 
environment with limited information, and potentially multiple practical 
interventions required.   
 
In 1939 Lewin (Lewin, et al., 1939) reported a classic study aiming to identify 
different styles of leadership.  They found that autocratic leaders provide clear 
instructions of what should be done, and how it should be done, but they also make 
decisions without input from the team.  This leads to division between the leader and 
the rest of the team.  Whilst this leadership style can be beneficial in a very 
pressurised environment when people just need to be told what to do, in the long run 
it may lead to a lack of motivation and commitment from the team. 
 
In contrast, democratic leaders involve the team in the decision-making process, but 
retain the final decision-making authority.  This approach encourages and motivates 
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the team, and enables them to see that they are respected for the knowledge and skill-
mix they bring to the team.  It also recognises the fact that the leader is not expected 
to know everything, but is expected to make the most of all the resources available to 
them – including specialist knowledge of individual team members. 
 
A study by Yun, et al (2005) looked at trauma teams with different leadership styles 
– autocratic and democratic – and looked at the quality of care given under these two 
styles when the severity of the patient trauma varied, and when the level of team 
experience varied.  They found that when looking at the quality of care given under 
different leadership styles with varying patient severity, an autocratic style of 
leadership was beneficial when the trauma severity is very high, whilst a democratic 
(empowering) style is more effective when the trauma severity is low (Figure 2.6).  
They then went on to look at the relationship between leadership styles and the 
experience of the team, whilst keeping severity of trauma consistent.  They found 
that an empowering style of leadership was overall more effective for both 
experienced and inexperienced teams.  This relationship was more important for 
experienced teams (Figure 3.2).  This leadership style also gave the opportunity for 
learning, which is an important part of a trauma call.  These findings are important as 
they clearly demonstrate that we should modify our leadership styles depending on 
the severity of the situation and experience of the team, but also highlight the 
importance of knowing the abilities of individual team members.   
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Figure 3.2 – Quality of care with varying leadership styles related to patient condition and team 
experience, Yun, et al., 2005  
 
 
 
In relation to resuscitation teams, Cooper et al (1999) demonstrated that “where 
leaders initiate a structure within the team, not only do teams work better together, 
but they also perform the tasks of resuscitation quicker and more efficiently”.  They 
also point out that team members cannot improve unless they know where 
improvement is necessary.  Marsch et al (2004) similarly demonstrated that “absence 
of leadership behaviour and absence of explicit task distribution were associated 
with poor team performance”. 
 
3.1.4 Non-technical skills training and assessment tools in healthcare 
The Crew Resource Management (CRM) courses that were developed in the airline 
industry have gradually percolated through to healthcare.  Flin and Maran (2004) 
note that unlike industrial and military teams, which tend to be established and train 
extensively together, airline and healthcare teams tend to work on a more ad hoc 
basis.  Therefore, team members need to have effective non-technical skills to enable 
them to work with unfamiliar team members, and in unfamiliar situations.  
Anaesthesia was one of the first branches of healthcare to adopt a CRM-style of 
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training for non-technical skills.  Various courses such as the “Anaesthetic Crisis 
Resource Management” (ACRM) Course have been developed to train using a 
mixture of lectures and high-fidelity simulations.  Other specialties have begun to see 
the importance of training these skills.  The Royal College of Surgeons offers a 
“Patient Safety in Theatre Teams” course, similarly the College of Emergency 
Medicine has developed simulation training to develop non-technical skills.  
 
As Cooper (1999) quite rightly said, team members cannot improve their skills if 
they do not know what they need to improve.  Similarly, if a set of skills is being 
taught on a course, it is important to assess whether these skills are being taught 
effectively.  For these reasons, formal assessment of non-technical skills is essential, 
using a tool which captures these skills robustly, can be used to identify strengths and 
weaknesses, and also to facilitate systematic, constructive feedback.  In the Aviation 
Industry, one of the first assessment tools developed was called “NOTECHS” (NOn-
TECHnical Skills), (Flin, et al., 2003).  Subsequent work was carried out 
extrapolating this tool for use in healthcare.  Initial work focused on behaviours of 
operating theatre teams, (Sevdalis, et al., 2008; Undre, et al., 2006; Undre, et al., 
2007) and also moved into the area of anaesthesia (Fletcher, et al., 2003).  Of these 
tools, some measure non-technical skills for individual team members 
(Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS); NOTECHS), and others for the entire 
team (Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS)).  Whilst 
behaviours measured in these tools are given slightly different terms, broadly very 
similar assessments are made.   
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In January 2010, Cooper et al (Cooper, et al., 2010a) published a review of tools to 
measure non-technical skills in medical emergency care.  Of the nine tools they 
found, none specifically assessed the non-technical skills of the entire team of an in-
hospital resuscitation scenario.  Therefore in order to assess these skills in 
resuscitation teams, this is something I have developed.  I will discuss the process of 
developing a teamwork assessment tool for resuscitation in Chapter 4.  
   
3.1.5 General principles of developing a teamwork assessment tool 
Fletcher et al (2004) state “For any measure of behaviour to be useful and fair, it has 
to be both valid (measuring the variable it is supposed to measure) and reliable 
(measuring the variable consistently). Without sound measurement devices, there are 
risks that different observers/raters may assess performance in different ways 
against ill-defined or non-standardised criteria”.  They go on to acknowledge that 
there will always be an element of subjective opinion when assessing behavioural 
skills, but that a robust tool that has been thoroughly and systematically developed 
will produce more consistent findings.  In broad terms, the development phase can be 
divided into two stages – skills identification, and system development – with the 
third stage of preliminary evaluation required before the tool can be formally used 
and distributed.  This is a complex, detailed process that I will describe broadly, and 
will then illustrate with the example of the development of the ANTS behavioural 
marker system.  This will help in understanding the process I undertook to develop a 
tool to assess non-technical team working skills at resuscitation attempts, which I 
will describe in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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3.1.5.1 Skills identification 
When developing a teamwork assessment tool, the skills for the particular setting or 
occupation must be identified.  In the airline industry the set of skills required is 
well-established, and widely available – for example the Civil Aviation Authority’s 
(CAA) guidance for CRM training (CAA, 2009).  However, for other industries, 
such as healthcare, a comprehensive list of the non-technical skills required to 
perform to a high standard may not be so well elucidated.  In their book, Flin, 
O’Connor and Crichton (2008b) describe a variety of methods used to determine 
occupational skill sets.  These include interviews, questionnaires, observations and 
reviews of accident and incident reports.  
 
Whilst different occupations have different specific non-technical skills assessment 
tools, it is interesting to note that many of the basic skill/behaviour categories 
required appear to be generic.  Flin et al note that this is particularly true of high-risk 
occupations.  Whilst behaviour categories are broadly the same, specific skills vary, 
such that they advise against using a tool developed for one industry in a different 
industry.   
 
The first stage of development for a new tool involves identifying the skills and 
behaviours that influence safe and efficient performance, and then refining and 
organising this list.  The level of detail will depend on its intended use – research, or 
training and assessment – and whether the skills encompass an individual’s skills or 
an entire team’s skills.  Initially a literature search is performed for publications in 
the field in question.  This may reveal a tool that has already been developed in this 
area, but will also help to identify the appropriate behaviour categories to assess.   
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A variety of other methods to identify appropriate skills may then be employed.  In 
the aviation industry in particular, analysis of accidents has been an extremely useful 
way of identifying examples of good and poor non-technical skills.  The use of 
cockpit voice recorders makes this particularly relevant and helpful, as it is possible 
to contextualise decision-making and communication by the team.  The difference in 
healthcare is that incidents generally rely on individuals to report the errors.  The 
quality of this report depends on many factors – not least that the individual may be 
reporting their own error, and may be concerned about the degree of confidentiality 
of the reporting system.  Data from events, however, can be very useful as it helps in 
the design and development of safer systems.   
 
Techniques questioning expert workers are commonly employed.  These may 
comprise individual interviews, group sessions, and questionnaires, all eliciting 
details about the job.  This includes information about the technical tasks, cognitive 
skills, and social skills required.   
 
The final method used to identify the relevant skills often involves observations, 
which may be direct observations in the workplace, with the observer being as 
unobtrusive as possible, or indirectly via videotapes of the workplace.  In the 
healthcare environment in particular, there are obviously ethical implications to 
video recording patient care.  Whilst the assessment tools are often developed by 
researchers with a background in health psychology, some advantage is conferred by 
developers having a background in the area they are assessing, as they will have 
some pre-existing understanding of the tasks performed and standards required.   
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Often a combination of these techniques is used to determine the initial set of non-
technical skills to be observed.   
 
3.1.5.2 System Development 
Having identified the skills that are to be assessed a tool then needs to be developed.  
Care is required in the design of the tool to ensure it is appropriate for the people and 
situations in which it will be used. The system that is produced should be clear and 
simple to use with minimal instruction or training.   
 
Once the system has been developed, following these principles, it should be cross-
checked against all the information previously obtained to check that the relevant 
skills and behaviours have been included.   
 
3.1.5.3 Preliminary Evaluation 
At this stage the prototype tool is generally given to a panel of experts in the form of 
a questionnaire, to ask them to critique and refine it – a process of face and content 
validity.  The purpose of this is to ensure that all the skills and behaviours included 
are relevant, and to check that, in the experts’ opinion, the tool contains all the 
required skills.  The researchers will then modify the tool according to expert 
recommendation.  The first version of the assessment tool can then be used.  Further 
work is then required to check that the tool is usable, measures what it aims to 
measure, and that multiple assessors can use it with equal success, giving consistent 
assessments.  This process can be performed with experts using the tool to rate 
behaviours in video scenarios and comparing results such as level of agreement of 
ratings.  I will illustrate the complexity of this process in greater detail by using the 
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example of the development of the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) tool, 
as described by Fletcher, et al. (2003).   
 
3.1.6 Development of the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) tool 
The aim of this development process was to produce a tool to assess the non-
technical skills of individual anaesthetists, as prior to this available tools tended to 
assess entire teams performance. 
 
Fletcher describes the process being divided into three phases, as illustrated in Figure 
3.3 below – i) Skills identification, ii) System development, iii) Preliminary 
evaluation.  
 
In chapter 4 I will discuss my first study, which was the development of a non-
technical skills assessment tool for use in resuscitation.  As will be seen, I have 
broadly followed the process illustrated here by Fletcher et al.   
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Figure 3.3 – Overall process undertaken in the development of the ANTS behavioural marker system 
for use in anaesthesia, Fletcher, et al., 2004 
 
STAGE 1 - SKILLS IDENTIFICATION 
A – Review of the Literature 
1. Identification and analysis of six existing behavioural marker systems to establish which skills 
they contained 
2. Component skills extracted from these tools 
3. Behaviours from each system were grouped into common themes 
 
B – Interview with expert practitioners 
1. Cognitive task analysis technique to elicit knowledge of non-technical skills 
2. 29 consultant anaesthetists interviewed by a psychologist 
3. Participants asked to describe a challenging case or a critical incident 
4. Participants then asked which non-technical skills are important for good practice in anaesthesia, 
and what training was available for these skills. 
5. Participants were finally asked to group behaviours previously identified from the literature review 
into related items. 
 
C – Interview transcripts 
1. All interviews examined to identify non-technical issues 
2. Sample of transcripts were cross-coded by two other psychologists to ensure consistency 
3. Overall list of 116 non-technical items produced 
4. Items structured into eight categories 
 
 
 
STAGE 2 - SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
1. Criteria produced for system 
• Skill should be observable 
• System should have hierarchical structure for ease of use 
• System should be simple to use, minimal training 
• It should complement the system of medical education in the UK 
2. System based on NOTECHS (Flin, et al., 2003), as proven to work well 
3. Prototype tool developed from the skills list 
4. Prototype tool was then refined by making observations in theatre, and cross-checking with 
interview transcripts, and incident reports 
5. Exemplar behaviours (examples of good or bad behaviours) were then developed for each skill 
 
 
 
STAGE 3 - PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
1. Check the observability of the skills 
2. Check the completeness of the system 
3. Check its usability for rating non-technical skills 
4. Process to do this based on NOTECHS work – consultant anaesthetists used the tool to evaluate 
behaviours in six video scenarios.  Opinions about the tools, and results in terms of level of 
agreement of ratings was assessed. 
5. Minor alterations were then made to the tool on the basis of recommendations from the expert 
users. 
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3.2 Use of simulation in non-technical skills training and 
 assessment 
Finally, I will briefly describe simulation, and explain how using simulation in a 
clinical environment may improve the training opportunities for participants.  In 
particular I will discuss its use in the training and assessment of non-technical 
teamworking skills.  In chapter 6 I then go on to discuss my experience of this, and 
some unexpected benefits in the ward environment in the context of risk assessment 
and patient safety. 
 
3.2.1 What is simulation? 
Beaubien (Beaubien & Baker, 2004) describes a simulator as being “a device that 
attempts to recreate characteristics of the real world”.  Simulation-based training is 
now well-established as a viable and efficacious training tool, (Issenberg, et al., 
2005) particularly for training non-technical teamworking skills.  Simulations can be 
delivered in many different ways from low fidelity “part task” simulators, such as 
stitching a wound, to integrated fully immersive environments such as a simulated 
operating theatre (Kneebone, 2009).  When effective, the use of simulation 
significantly facilitates learning through the provision of feedback, repetitive 
practice, curriculum integration and the capacity to offer a range of levels of 
difficulty and clinical conditions in a controlled environment (Issenberg, et al., 
2005).  Importantly, simulation-based training offers trainees the opportunity to 
practice and hone teamworking skills, such as communication and leadership, that 
have been shown to be instrumental in ensuring safe delivery of care, as described 
above.  We also know that simulation training transfers to the clinical environment.  
For example, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, Wayne et al (2008) found that those 
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receiving simulator based training for resuscitation in addition to standard ALS 
courses showed a significantly higher rate of adherence to resuscitation guidelines, 
improved quality of care provided, improved life support skills, and improved 
retention of those skills.   
 
3.2.2 Drawbacks of simulation 
Although simulation is well developed in many areas of medicine, to date it has not 
been used routinely as a training tool.   One of the potential drawbacks is the cost of 
setting up a simulation suite.  One team reports set-up costs of $472,000 (Weinstock, 
et al., 2005), which is unaffordable for many, before taking into account the 
requirement for available space in which to deliver the service.  It may also be 
difficult to release staff for training in simulation suites, particularly from busy 
clinical environments.   
 
Because of the difficulty in assembling a full clinical team, many simulations are 
restricted to one clinical group, such as ‘junior doctors’ or ‘anaesthetists’, with the 
remaining team roles played by faculty or actors.  While this can be very effective, 
the impact of training is reduced because individuals rather than teams receive the 
training. 
 
3.2.3 The concept of in situ simulation 
In situ simulation is simulation that takes place in the clinical setting (Patterson, et 
al., 2008).  This form of simulation may therefore be pre-planned (announced) for 
training for a particular group in their own environment (e.g. ward), or may be 
unannounced.  If it is unannounced, staff may be, for example, suddenly called to a 
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simulated cardiac arrest, rather than being rostered to attend a training session in a 
dedicated simulation centre.  Technological advances over recent years mean that it 
is entirely feasible to deliver training in resuscitation, and indeed other forms of 
simulation, in the clinical environment. 
 
Patterson (2008) has described in situ simulation as “Simulations that occur in the 
actual clinical environment and whose participants are on-duty clinical providers 
during their actual workday”.  Simulation in a dedicated centre can be very effective 
in revealing the strengths and weaknesses of individual’s skills, but in situ simulation 
has the added benefit of providing training with all the contextual cues, practical 
difficulties, interruptions and distractions of the real clinical environment (Kneebone, 
et al., 2010; Kneebone, 2010).   While these can all be simulated within a training 
centre, the familiarity of the clinical environment heightens the realism of the 
simulations, and reduces the feeling that participants are “performing”, enabling 
them to behave as they would normally (Beaubien, et al., 2004).  In Chapter 6, I will 
go on to discuss my experience of in situ simulation and the benefits it may have for 
resuscitation training. 
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3.3 Aims of the Thesis 
The primary aim of this thesis was to assess the Resus:Station to see if it achieved 
the design brief of facilitating the resuscitation trolley stock-check process, and to 
verify and validate that it worked in the clinical environment.  
 
A piece of equipment cannot be seen in isolation because of the way people interact 
with it, and use it.  Therefore, I needed to see how the trolley was used in practice by 
resuscitation teams. As a result, I needed a tool to assess team performance at 
resuscitation attempts to enable me to determine whether the trolley itself had any 
impact on team performance.  As no such tool existed at the time, I developed and 
evaluated an instrument to assess team performance in resuscitation (OSCAR). As 
part of a series of studies to validate the OSCAR tool, I needed video recordings of 
resuscitation attempts.  Therefore, a further study was designed to perform in situ 
cardiac arrest simulations, which were recorded.  Having completed the development 
process for OSCAR, a tool was published by a different team claiming to measure 
non-technical teamworking skills in resuscitation teams.  This was called the “Team 
Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM)” (Cooper, et al., 2010b).  I therefore 
decided to critically compare my tool with their tool to ensure they both measured 
what they purported to measure, and to determine differences and potential uses.   
 
Whilst I have not performed a full systematic review of the literature in this field as 
part of this thesis, I did perform a narrative search.  From this I determined that there 
were significant gaps in the literature.  I discovered that no tool existed at that time to 
assess behaviours of resuscitation teams – hence the decision to develop such a tool.  
I also discovered no references relating to critical incident reporting at resuscitation 
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attempts.  Those included in this introduction have been published since my search in 
August 2009.  Finally, whilst I have described all the previous attempts to redesign a 
resuscitation trolley, none of these has been systematically evaluated after 
implementation, and the majority are no longer in existance.  It is unusual for new 
equipment to be trialled in any scientific way.  Therefore there was no literature to 
refer to discussing methods for assessing novel equipment.   
 
With this in mind, the aims of the thesis were: 
1. To develop and validate the “Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment 
tool for Resuscitation” (OSCAR) tool, which measures the non-technical skills 
of resuscitation team members. 
2. To assess the extent to which the OSCAR tool and TEAM tool scores correlate. 
3. To explore the feasibility, practical, and ethical issues of unannounced in situ 
cardiac arrest simulations for team training; and to explore participants’ 
attitudes towards this form of resuscitation training. 
4. To assess the impact of the ergonomic design of the Resus:Station on the 
trolley checking and stocking process. 
5. To assess the use of the 2nd generation Resus:Station in a simulated 
environment to ensure it was safe to use prior to placement in the clinical 
environment. 
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4 Development of an Observational Skill-based 
Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation 
(OSCAR) 
 
 
 
The next two chapters describe assessment tools for non-technical skills.  This 
chapter describes the development of the “Observational Skill-based Clinical 
Assessment tool for Resuscitation” (OSCAR), which was developed in three phases 
described here as three separate studies.  The following chapter describes a 
comparison of the finished tool with another tool developed to assess resuscitation 
teams, called the “TEAM” tool.  This tool was first published just after I had 
completed my development process, and was not available when I first started 
developing OSCAR. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the preceding chapters that effective resuscitation requires a 
combination of good technical and non-technical skills to ensure safe and efficient 
task performance. To date, non-technical skills have been relatively overlooked in 
healthcare, with an emphasis on training the technical aspects of various tasks.  This 
is, however, beginning to change in light of various reports (Kohn, et al., 2000; 
Department of Health, 2000) identifying the incidence of error and adverse events in 
hospitals, and the fact that there is often a failure in teamworking skills and 
communication as contributing factors.  
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Historically these skills have not been taught, and it is only in the most recent edition 
of the ALS course manual (Soar, et al., 2010), that any mention of teamworking 
skills is made. To facilitate effective training in non-technical skills, a reliable tool is 
required, which captures these skills robustly, can be used to identify strengths and 
weaknesses, and also to facilitate systematic, constructive feedback.  To date, whilst 
various tools have been developed to assess non-technical skills in operating theatre 
environments (Fletcher, et al., 2003; Sevdalis, et al., 2009; Sevdalis, et al., 2008; 
Yule, et al., 2008), no tool has existed specifically to measure the performance of 
individual team members within a resuscitation context. This means that while the 
technical skills of resuscitation have been assessed and trained, teamwork and non-
technical skills may have been neglected.  In addition to skills assessment and 
feedback, a further benefit of such a tool would be in the evaluation of the human 
factors impact of proposed developments in resuscitation, be they novel procedures 
or items of equipment (Sevdalis & Brett, 2009).   
 
4.2 Aim 
The aim of this study, therefore, was to develop and verify the “Observational Skill-
based Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation” (OSCAR) tool, which measures 
the non-technical skills of resuscitation team members.  
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4.3 Developing OSCAR 
To ensure validity, reliability, and feasibility, OSCAR was developed in three phases 
(Figure 4.1) (Abell, et al., 2009). This can be described as three separate studies:  
Study 1 Review of evidence base, and initial tool development 
Study 2  Quantitative Expert Consensus methodology for face and content 
 validation 
Study 3  Reliability assessment 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Methodology and phases of development of OSCAR 
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4.4 Study 1 – Review of evidence base, and initial tool 
 development 
4.4.1 Aim 
To review and modify existing assessment tools to create a tool suitable for 
assessing cardiac arrest teams 
 
4.4.2 Methods 
4.4.2.1 Review of the evidence base 
There are a number of non-technical skills assessment tools published in the context 
of surgery and anaesthesia, but none are directly applicable to resuscitation.  I chose 
three tools of relevance as a starting point for my study.  These were the 
Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS) (Sevdalis, et al., 2009), 
Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) (Fletcher, et al., 2003), and the revised 
Non-TECHnical Skills (NOTECHS) scale for operating theatres (Sevdalis, et al., 
2008).  These tools measure non-technical skills either for individual team-members 
(ANTS; NOTECHS), or for the entire team (OTAS), and have been shown to 
capture these skills in real-time observation in clinical environments, and in 
simulation-based training modules (Fletcher, et al., 2003; Undre, et al., 2007; Undre, 
et al., 2006; Moorthy, et al., 2005).  Whilst the behaviours measured are given 
slightly different terms in each of the tools, broadly very similar assessments are 
made.  For example, where a “teamworking” domain is listed in the ANTS tool, this 
is captured within “Communication”, “Co-operation” and “Co-ordination” in the 
OTAS tool, illustrating the fact that multiple terms are used for similar behaviour 
modes.   
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I was particularly interested in OTAS, which was developed by a team of 
researchers within the Patient Safety Unit at Imperial College.  It was developed to 
assess interactions between the team of anaesthetists, nurses and surgeons as they 
worked through a routine elective surgery list.  The tool consists of a routine task 
checklist and an assessment of five behavioural dimensions – communication, 
leadership, coordination, monitoring and cooperation. Tasks on the checklist are 
simply ticked off as they occur.  Behaviours, however, are observed throughout the 
surgical case, and scored on a 7-point scale based on whether the behaviour seen 
enhances or hinders overall team performance.  Whilst the whole team is assessed, 
the behaviours themselves are categorised into three subgroups - anaesthetic 
behaviours, surgical behaviours and nurse behaviours, and so therefore each sub-
group of the team is assessed.  Examples of “exemplary” behaviour are listed for 
each subgroup in each behaviour category to aid the assessment of behaviour 
performance.  
 
The OTAS tool is one of the only tools developed to assess individual members of a 
whole team, which enables observers not only to rate the interaction of the team as a 
whole, but also to determine the abilities of individual team members.  I felt this 
aspect was essential if developing a tool, which can be used in the long run for 
constructive feedback to individual team members as part of a learning process.  In a 
similar way to surgical teams, resuscitation teams can be divided into three 
subgroups to be assessed – anaesthetists, nurses (including resuscitation officers) and 
physicians.  These subgroups encompass all clinical personnel that would routinely 
attend a resuscitation event.  
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Ethics permission for this study was awarded by the North West London Research 
Ethics Committee on 4th November 2008.  Study title: A clinical study of a novel 
resuscitation trolley, REC reference: 08/H0722/91 (Appendix 4.1).   
 
4.4.2.2 Developing non-technical skills assessment for resuscitation 
4.4.2.2.1 Choosing behaviour modes 
Building on the evidence base, OSCAR was designed to evaluate six behavioural 
domains (Communication, Cooperation, Coordination, Monitoring/Situation 
Awareness, Leadership and Decision-making) for each of the three core team-
members with leadership and coordination roles in a typical resuscitation team (such 
individuals commonly lead sub-teams).  These were: 
1. The airway, ventilation and vascular access specialist, termed 
“Anaesthetists”, but could equally be a respiratory therapist, operating theatre 
practitioner etc – depending on local circumstances. 
2. The internal medicine specialist, termed “Physician”, but could equally be 
from critical care, surgery etc. 
3. Senior nurse – either from the ward / floor area, or arriving with the 
resuscitation team. 
 
4.4.2.2.2  Developing exemplar behaviours 
To minimise biases in the scoring and to ensure adequate inter-rater reliability in 
subsequent phases, “exemplar behaviours” were defined. These are examples of 
optimum behaviours ideally seen when observing resuscitation teams’ interactions. 
For example, we would hope to arrive at a cardiac arrest and for the nurse looking 
after the patient to communicate a clear, concise account of exactly what has 
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happened, and why the patient is in hospital, preferably using the “Situation, 
Background, Assessment, Recommendation” (SBAR) communication framework 
recommended by the Resuscitation Council (UK) (Resuscitation Council UK 2010). 
An example of poor communication would occur when the nurse is unable to give 
any helpful information on arrival of the team; this would actively hinder 
resuscitation attempts. The first version of these exemplars were developed by a 
process of extrapolation from the well-validated OTAS exemplars (Sevdalis, et al., 
2009; Hull, et al., 2011) – but modified as required to ensure applicability to 
resuscitation (Table 4.1). The tool and exemplars were developed to measure 
behaviours seen within all members of the sub-teams.  However, naturally, most of 
those looking at leadership qualities focused on the leader for each sub-team. 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Illustration of how exemplar behaviours were modified from OTAS (operating room 
environment) for OSCAR (resuscitation environment) 
 
Behaviour Team Member Existing OTAS Exemplar New OSCAR Exemplar 
Anaesthetist 
Provides update on patient 
condition and anything 
administered to patient 
Informs team whether patient is 
making respiratory effort 
Physician 
Requests and instructions to 
team communicated clearly and 
effectively 
Clear instructions communicated 
to the team regarding the arrest 
protocol 
Communication 
Nurse 
Scrub Nurse provides clear and 
audible requests for provisions to 
Charge Nurse 
Senior nurse provides clear, 
audible requests to junior nurse 
when requesting equipment etc 
Anaesthetist 
Anaesthetic group provided 
timely information on request 
from Nurse group 
Anaesthetic group provides 
information on request from 
Physician group 
Physician 
Responds to questions and 
request from Nurse group 
Responds to questions from 
other team members about 
decisions made regarding the 
arrest 
Co-operation 
Nurse 
Provide support and assistance to 
Anaesthetic group when needed 
Provide support and assistance to 
Anaesthetic group and Physician 
group when needed 
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To be a useful tool, the exemplar behaviours needed to incorporate activities that are 
observable and are performed at every event at which the tool is used.  The initial 
process of developing the “exemplar behaviours” was performed by myself, with a 
background in Medicine and Anaesthetics, and therefore extensive experience of 
resuscitation attempts, in conjunction with another anaesthetist, a resuscitation 
officer, and a clinical psychologist, on the basis of clinical experience and evidence.  
The behaviours were then discussed at length, and the list of exemplar behaviours 
for each team subgroup was finalised for the first draft.  
 
4.4.3 Results 
The result of this phase was an initial version of the OSCAR tool, which could then 
be face and content validated by resuscitation experts in Phase 2.  This first iteration 
contained three behaviour exemplars for each team member (anaesthetist, physician, 
nurse) in each of the six behaviour domains.  Therefore, a total of fifty-four different 
behaviour exemplars were assessed further. 
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4.5 Study 2 – Expert Review of OSCAR to determine Face and 
 Content Validity 
4.5.1 Aim 
To assess the face validity and content validity of the exemplar behaviours 
developed in study 1. 
 
4.5.2 Methods 
The face and content validity of exemplars developed for each sub-team 
(anaesthetists, physicians, and nurses) were systematically assessed following 
standard recommendations (Abell, et al., 2009) by ten experts within the field of 
resuscitation (Table 4.2).  An “expert” was defined as a senior member of staff with 
extensive experience of resuscitation attempts.   “Face validity” ensures a tool 
actually measures what it purports to measure, and “Content validity” ensures a tool 
measures all aspects of the subject it attempts to measure. 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Level of experience of the experts asked to assess face and content validity  
 
 Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
1 Senior Anaesthetic SpR Senior Medical SpR Senior Intensive Care Nurse 
2 Anaesthetic Consultant Senior ITU Registrar Resuscitation officer 
3 Anaesthetic Consultant Emergency Med Consultant Resuscitation officer 
4 Anaesthetic Consultant Intensive Care Consultant Resuscitation officer 
5 Senior Anaesthetic SpR Senior Emergency Med SpR Resuscitation officer 
 
To ensure content and face validation within and across specialties and minimise 
potential specialty-specific biases, each set of exemplars was rated by five experts 
within that speciality and five experts outside it. For example, the Anaesthetic 
behaviours were assessed by five Anaesthetists, and five Nurses or Physicians.  Each 
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exemplar was rated for importance using a Likert scale of 1-4 (1=of minor 
importance; 4=of critical importance) (Table 4.3), in a process of semi-structured 
interviews.    
 
Table 4.3 – Example of sheet given to Specialists and Non-specialists to rate behaviours 
 
EVALUATING THE “OSCAR” SCORING SYSTEM FOR SIMULATIONS 
ANAESTHETIC GROUP (A) BEHAVIOUR EXAMPLES 
 
COMMUNICATION RATING SCALE IMPORTANCE 
Informs team whether patient is making respiratory effort 1 2 3 4 
Informs team of any other relevant clinical signs e.g. dilated pupil, obvious 
injuries, signs of aspiration 1 2 3 4 
Communication to team that they plan to intubate the patient if required 1 2 3 4 
CO-OPERATION RATING SCALE  
A-group provides information on request from P-group (e.g. about airway) 1 2 3 4 
A-group assists P-group in decision making in difficult scenarios 1 2 3 4 
Assists voluntarily with non-airway tasks if airway secure and sufficient 
number of A-group present 1 2 3 4 
CO-ORDINATION RATING SCALE  
Junior anaesthetist prepares drugs and equipment for senior anaesthetist (if > 
1 present) 1 2 3 4 
Information provided about changes in patient condition as they occur 1 2 3 4 
A-group co-ordinate team to move patient e.g. floor to bed, up bed 1 2 3 4 
LEADERSHIP RATING SCALE  
Advises team on best management, and contingency plans for patient 1 2 3 4 
Anaesthetist assertively takes a lead in airway control and ventilation on 
arrival at arrest 1 2 3 4 
Lead anaesthetist supervises and supports staff lacking familiarity with tasks 
or equipment 1 2 3 4 
MONITORING RATING SCALE  
Maintains monitoring of patient condition, signs of respiration, other clinical 
signs 1 2 3 4 
Checks ventilation is adequate with regular blood gas analysis and amends 
ventilation accordingly 1 2 3 4 
Checks all drugs, monitoring and equipment is correct prior to use on the 
patient 1 2 3 4 
DECISION-MAKING RATING SCALE  
Prompt identification of the problem 1 2 3 4 
Rapidly and clearly outlines a strategy or plan, and asks for equipment 1 2 3 4 
Anticipates potential problems and prepares accordingly – e.g. asks for 
further blood crossmatch 1 2 3 4 
 
1. Please evaluate the importance of the behaviour examples given, for the successful running of an 
arrest 
 1 = minor importance 2 = moderate importance 3 = important 4 = critical 
 
Raters were also asked to make suggestions of additional exemplars, modifications 
of wording, or deletions, as they felt appropriate.  In this stage I was aiming to 
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establish expert consensus on a set of observable behaviours, and specific wording 
for each individual item. 
 
Content validity of exemplars was formally assessed further by computing a mean 
and standard deviation rating for each exemplar, one for the specialty experts (e.g. 
anaesthetists for anaesthetic exemplars) and one for the non-specialty experts (e.g. 
physicians and nurses for anaesthetic exemplars). 
 
Behaviours with a mean score of three or less (i.e., scored at or below the third 
quartile of the scale) were subsequently discussed by the development team (two 
anaesthetists and two psychologists with expertise in non-technical skills and tool 
development) and amended or discarded according to raters’ recommendations and 
opinions (Appendix 4.2 and 4.3).  
 
4.5.2.1 Statistical Analysis 
All data analyses were carried out using SPSS v. 18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA), to calculate mean and standard deviation, as described above. 
 
4.5.3 Results 
Thirty-nine of the fifty-four exemplars were deemed “critically important 
behaviours” by consensus of the resuscitation experts, with only fifteen of the fifty-
four exemplars scoring mean values of three or less from the specialty expert or non-
speciality expert group. The fifteen exemplars that were given low scores by either 
the specialty or non-specialty groups were reviewed by the tool development team 
(Appendix 4.3).  Modifications were made in accordance with suggestions made by 
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the experts, and opinions of the development team.  As a result, the wording was 
modified in seven exemplars, four exemplars were deleted, and four were reviewed 
but not modified as they were felt by the development team to be important, and had 
been rated highly by one or other of the expert rating groups.   In addition, wording 
was modified slightly for two exemplars that had been rated highly by both specialty 
and non-specialty teams, on the basis of suggestions made by these experts.  Finally 
one new exemplar was added due to recommendations made by the experts.  A total 
of eighteen changes were made. 
 
4.6 Study 3 – Reliability assessment 
4.6.1 Aim 
Study 3 aimed to assess the following features of OSCAR: 
a) Internal consistency 
b) Inter-rater reliability 
 
4.6.2 Methods 
Eight videos of cardiac arrest teams performing resuscitation simulations were 
watched by two expert clinical observers, both anaesthetists. They used OSCAR 
independently of each other to rate the cardiac arrest teams’ performance.  Four of 
the videos watched were simple cardiac arrests from a simulation training suite, and 
four were videos of unannounced in situ cardiac arrest simulations performed in a 
clinical hospital environment utilising the on-service cardiac arrest team for the day. 
These scenarios varied, from a massive post-partum haemorrhage on the labour ward 
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to a ruptured abdominal aneurysm in the radiology department. In situ simulations 
are part of St Mary’s Hospital’s continuous resuscitation training programme. 
 
4.6.2.1 Statistical Analysis 
All data analyses were carried out using SPSS v. 18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA).  Reliability in the form of internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach’s 
α.  Internal consistency measures the reliability of grouped measures in a tool to 
measure the same concept.  For example, it measures the reliability that all the 
exemplars rated for “Communication in anaesthetists” do actually measure that 
concept. Adequate internal consistency is typically demonstrated with Cronbach’s α 
in the region of 0.70-0.90.  This analysis identifies exemplars that should be removed 
to improve internal consistency; three exemplars were therefore removed. 
 
After deletions were made from the tool following primary Cronbach’s α analysis, 
the remaining exemplars were assessed for intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to 
demonstrate inter-rater reliability.  Inter-rater reliability is a measure of the extent of 
agreement between two observers when rating the performance of an individual or 
team.  If a tool demonstrates good inter-rater reliability, subsequent scorings of teams 
can be performed by one or other observer rather than requiring both observers to be 
present.  Intraclass correlations of 0.70 or higher typically indicate adequate 
agreement in the scoring between independent raters.  
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4.6.3 Results 
4.6.3.1 Internal consistency 
Table 4.4 summarises the Cronbach’s α coefficients in each behaviour domain for 
each of the three sub-teams (Anaesthetists, Physicians and Nurses). Cronbach’s α 
coefficient results range from 0.736 – 0.965, with fifteen of eighteen behaviours 
(83%) demonstrating very high internal consistency (Cronbach α >0.80).  Analyses 
dictated removal of three behaviour exemplars at this point (two removed from the 
Anaesthetist group, one from the Physician group). These were not necessarily 
behaviours that are unacceptable during resuscitation, but ones that were not 
consistently measureable.  The three that were removed are listed below:   
1. Cooperation: Anaesthetist assists voluntarily with non-airway tasks if airway 
secure and more than one airway expert present. 
2. Coordination: Team members prepare drugs and equipment for anaesthetist 
(with or without instruction). 
3. Decision-making: Timely and appropriate decisions by Physician regarding 
when to stop resuscitation attempts. 
 
These deletions did not compromise the tool, as the exemplar behaviours listed are 
not intended to be comprehensive, but purely illustrative of the types of behaviours 
one might expect to observe.  The behaviours removed are important in a real arrest, 
but are not commonly seen during a simulated arrest – hence the reason they were 
identified as not being consistently measurable.  It was important that the tool should 
be relevant to both simulated and real environments.   
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Table 4.4 - Internal consistency reliability (Cronbach α coefficients) across all OSCAR behaviours 
and rated subgroups 
 
 Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
Communication 0.951 0.925 0.874 
Cooperation 0.745 0.874 0.948 
Coordination 0.771 0.855 0.852 
Leadership 0.952 0.889 0.797 
Monitoring 0.814 0.949 0.736 
Decision-making 0.965 0.933 0.875 
Note: Cronbach alpha coefficients can range between 0-1, with high coefficient indicating 
better internal consistency of the scoring.  Coefficients of  ≥0.70 are typically considered as 
very good. 
 
4.6.3.2 Inter-rater reliability 
I am first reporting the findings on the initial analysis demonstrating reliability of the 
tool. Table 4.5 shows the progression of scorings from video 1 to video 8.  It details 
the number of point differences between the two raters given for each individual 
exemplar on the 7-point likert scale (0 – 6).  For example, if one observer gives a 
score of “5” and the other “6”, there is a 1 point difference.  For a tool to demonstrate 
inter-rater reliability, one would like each observer to give identical, or one-point 
difference scores the majority of the time.  If observers give very different scores it 
suggests the tool is unreliable and unusable.   
 
Table 4.5 – Simple analysis of ratings between 2 observers demonstrating a learning curve with a 
reduction in the number of differences between ratings with successive video scoring. 
 
 Video 1 Video 2 Video 3 Video 4 Video 5 Video 6 Video 7 Video 8 
3 diff 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 diff 4 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 
1 diff 22 28 22 20 21 13 21 12 
0 diff 24 19 27 30 28 38 30 39 
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In this set of results, I demonstrate a learning curve between the two observers, with 
a significant reduction in scoring discrepancies from the first to the eighth observed 
resuscitations.   
 
Intraclass correlations were subsequently calculated from the refined tool (Table 
4.6). Intraclass correlations were strong and highly significant for all behaviours 
across all three subgroups, thereby indicating very good inter-rater agreement in the 
scoring of all the behaviours.   The final version of OSCAR is shown in Appendix 
4.4. 
 
Table 4.6 – Inter-rater reliability (Intraclass correlations) across all OSCAR behaviours and rated 
subgroups 
 
  BEHAVIOUR MODE 
  Communication Cooperation Coordination Leadership Monitoring Decision-making Overall 
Anaesthetists 0.835 (N=32) 0.805 (N=16) 0.876 (N=16) 0.718 (N=24) 0.664 (N=24) 0.787 (N=24) 0.767 (N=136) 
Physicians 0.761 (N=24) 0.744 (N=16) 0.743 (N=16) 0.836 (N=24) 0.833 (N=24) 0.895 (N=16) 0.809 (N=120) 
Te
am
 
Su
bg
ro
up
 
Nurses 0.814 (N=24) 0.652 (N=24) 0.890 (N=24) 0.744 (N=16) 0.823 (N=16) 0.911 (N=24) 0.807 (N=128) 
Note: Intraclass correlation coefficients can range between 0-1, with higher coefficient 
indicating better agreement between two or more assessors.  Coefficients of ≥0.70 are 
typically considered as very good.  In the table above, all coefficients are significant at 
p<0.001 
 
4.7 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to address the lack of tools for the assessment of non-
technical skills in resuscitation.  Specifically, I sought to develop a tool that is 
feasible to use and psychometrically sound (reliable and valid).  In doing so, my 
specific motivation was to be able to measure and train non-technical skills, with 
systematic, evidence-based constructive feedback to emergency teams during 
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mandatory simulation training, with a view to improving patient safety, and reducing 
adverse events related to poor non-technical skills at resuscitation attempts.  No such 
tool previously existed.  My other motivation for developing the tool was to enable 
assessment of team performance when comparing the use of a standard resuscitation 
trolley with a new, ergonomically designed resuscitation trolley.  This will be 
discussed in later chapters of this thesis.  
 
I methodically developed the Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for 
Resuscitation (OSCAR). I developed OSCAR from existing well-validated 
instruments that have been developed for other contexts (OTAS, ANTS and 
NOTECHS) (Fletcher, et al., 2003; Sevdalis, et al., 2009; Sevdalis, et al., 2008) to 
ensure content validity and adequate coverage of evidence-based behaviours (Phase 
1).  I then undertook a thorough process of expert content validation leading to 
further tool amendments (Phase 2). Finally, I tested two forms of OSCAR reliability, 
internal consistency and inter-rater agreement, and empirically demonstrated good 
results in both. On this basis, I conclude that OSCAR is psychometrically robust, 
scientifically sound, and clinically relevant.   This tool is intended for use by 
someone with experience in resuscitation, although prior experience in the use of 
behaviour assessment tools would not be required.  It could be used in simulation 
centre training, or in a ward environment; simulated or real.  The user would require 
some limited instruction in its use. 
 
Prior to the publication of this work, two other research groups published tools 
similarly aimed at assessing non-technical skills in resuscitation. The first of these is 
called the Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) (Cooper, et al., 2010b).  
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This consists of eleven assessments of team performance rated on a Likert scale of 0-
4, and a final overall performance score rated from 1-10, therefore a total of twelve 
points. Assessments are made in a variety of domains including communication, 
situation awareness, and team morale.  A comparison of OSCAR with TEAM 
revealed overall similar behaviours being assessed and a similar development 
process.  The tools do differ however: whereas TEAM assesses the entire team on 
twelve discrete points, OSCAR assesses each resuscitation team-member 
(anaesthetist, physician and nurse) separately capturing six behaviours in detail 
within these subgroups – resulting in a total of forty-eight points assessed. I 
anticipated that whereas TEAM may be quicker for an assessor to use, OSCAR 
would be likely to provide a more detailed and insightful breakdown of resuscitation 
team behaviours. In addition, OSCAR allows feedback to individual team members 
on their non-technical skills.  A formal research comparison of the two instruments 
was performed to delineate how much they overlap in practice.  This is described in 
the next chapter.  
 
The second is from a research group based in Denmark, who firstly identified the 
non-technical skills suitable for improving team performance in cardiac arrest teams 
(Andersen, et al., 2010b), and then developed checklists to be used on a course they 
developed to assess technical and non-technical aspects of cardiac arrest team 
performance (Andersen, et al., 2010c).  Their list of recommended behaviour 
categories, whilst given slightly different terms to mine, incorporates the same 
behaviour groups I have identified to assess.  The assessment of behavioural markers 
assesses the behaviours of the team as a whole on a dichotomous scale (“yes” and 
“no”).  In their discussion they acknowledge that other behaviour assessment tools 
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are often scored using Likert-like scales, and that this gives the possibility of greater 
variability in assessment, but that they wanted a tool that was less complicated and 
easy to use.  In a similar way to the “TEAM” tool discussed above, I feel that when 
compared with the tool developed by Andersen et al, OSCAR is likely to provide a 
more detailed breakdown of non-technical skills of individual team members, whilst 
I acknowledge it may be more complicated to use.  A formal comparison of the tools 
is required. 
 
Further research is also required to assess the utility and scope of OSCAR.  First, I 
intend to use the tool to assess performance in real resuscitations. The study was 
limited to adult resuscitation and would need further development for a paediatric 
context, but I believe the basic underlying principles would be similar. I believe a 
similar tool, with minor changes would also apply in major trauma, which is a much 
more complicated clinical scenario, with further speciality groups involved, such as 
radiology, surgery, neurosurgery, and thus more vulnerable to non-technical skills 
failures impairing performance. 
 
I acknowledge that there has in the past been limited education of non-technical 
skills within clinical training curricula, although this is something that is gradually 
changing.  The most recent version of the European Resuscitation Council 
Guidelines includes a section about education techniques, emphasising the 
importance of non-technical skills to improve resuscitation (Soar, et al., 2010).  I 
expect that resuscitation team members may or may not exhibit some of the skills 
captured by OSCAR. However, I anticipate that use of OSCAR during real and 
simulated resuscitation attempts (peri-arrest or full arrest) will enable identification 
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of areas of weakness and opportunities for improvement in team members’ non-
technical skills, as illustrated in Appendix 4.5.  This in turn will enable us to 
facilitate post-arrest, or resuscitation scenario, constructive feedback, and focused 
training in these areas at a future date.  I anticipate this will lead to an overall 
improvement in team performance at emergency events, which will ultimately 
translate into a subsequent reduction in the rate of errors and adverse events. I also 
hope that an increased awareness of non-technical skills in the emergency setting 
will have an indirect beneficial effect on those skills in the day-to-day setting. 
Targeted training to improve specific weaknesses in non-technical skills will in the 
long run lead to a flattening of hierarchy, which is well-known to improve the culture 
of patient safety (Sexton, et al., 2000; Clarke, et al., 2005; Jain, et al., 2006). 
 
4.7.1 Limitations 
The main limitation of phase 2 of this study is the size of the groups of raters 
(Specialist and Non-specialist) used to assess the first draft of the tool.  It may have 
been preferable to have a larger group of people rating the tool.  However, it was felt 
that given the consistently high scores given to each behaviour exemplar, additional 
raters would have had a minimal impact in the overall results. 
 
Another limitation of the study is that as the initial developer, I have a base speciality 
of anaesthetics, with additional past experience in general medicine.  Whilst I felt 
that it was possible for one person to begin the development of exemplars for each of 
the 3 specialities, with subsequent discussion with others, it is interesting to note that 
fewer amendments were required in the anaesthetics group than the medical or nurse 
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groups.  This suggests that whilst I have a perception of what other team members 
should be doing, this doesn’t necessarily match with their perception.  
 
Despite demonstrating strong internal consistency and inter-rater reliability, I 
appreciate that another limitation of this study is the limited use in the assessment 
phase (a total of 8 simulation videos), rendering the correlation analyses less robust.  
However, future work will continue to analyse internal consistency and inter-rater 
reliability with subsequent use of OSCAR both in a study to assess teams using the 
novel resuscitation trolley, and in further unannounced in situ simulations performed 
as part of an ongoing staff training programme at St Mary’s Hospital.  Future work 
will also study other aspects of validity such as construct validity and concurrent 
validity, which will be addressed in the following chapter.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
I have developed the Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for 
Resuscitation (OSCAR) for the assessment of non-technical skills in resuscitation 
teams.  The tool has demonstrated face and content validity, feasibility, high internal 
consistency, and inter-rater reliability.  I propose the use of this tool in simulation 
and real cardiac arrest resuscitation attempts to assess, guide and train non-technical 
skills to team members, thus striving to reduce rates of adverse events in these 
incident-prone circumstances and improve patient safety. 
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5 Comparison and critique of two recently developed 
scoring tools (TEAM vs OSCAR) 
 
 
 
5.1 Aims 
As I have mentioned, shortly after completing the process to develop the OSCAR 
tool for the assessment of non-technical team working skills in resuscitation teams, 
another tool was published, prior to OSCAR, aiming to assess these same skills.  
This tool is called the Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM) (Appendix 
5.1), and was developed by an Australian research group (Cooper, et al., 2010b).  
TEAM rates 11 behavioural aspects of the whole team on a Likert scale of 0-4, with 
an additional overall team score rated from 1-10.  The behaviours that are measured 
are broken down into Leadership, Team Work (including communication, 
cooperation and monitoring), and Task Management.   
 
TEAM and OSCAR were developed independently, but are similar in their aim to 
capture team processes and performance.  I therefore undertook a small additional 
study to compare psychometrically the two tools, and determine the overall validity 
of the skills that they assess in the context of resuscitation.  This initially entailed 
determining the inter-rater reliability of both tools to ensure they both produced 
consistent results across different assessors.  Therefore the first 2 research questions 
that I addressed were: 
1. What is the inter-rater reliability of OSCAR? 
2. What is the inter-rater reliability of TEAM?  
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Given that OSCAR and TEAM aim to assess similar skills sets, albeit in subtly 
different ways, I also directly compared assessments of the same resuscitation teams 
carried out using each of the two tools. This is a question of concurrent validity, 
which addresses whether two instruments designed to assess similar skills and 
behaviours actually produce comparable assessments when used concurrently (Abell, 
et al., 2009).  My final research question, therefore, was:   
3. To what extent do OSCAR and TEAM scores correlate (i.e. 
statistically measure similar team characteristics)? 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Phase 1 – Reliability assessment 
This phase aimed to assess the inter-rater reliability of both tools to ensure that they 
can be used reliably in assessing team skills in resuscitation contexts. Reliability 
assessment was performed by watching 24 pre-recorded resuscitation simulations 
(Appendix 5.2). The simulations had all been performed by cardiac arrest teams from 
St Mary’s Hospital (large teaching hospital, London, UK). Twenty took place within 
the hospital’s simulation centre, with small resuscitation teams consisting of a 
physician, an anaesthetist, and two nurses. These lasted an average of 5.5 minutes 
each.  Four additional simulations were carried out “in situ” in clinical areas of the 
hospital, performed by the real on-duty resuscitation team for the day. These were 
inevitably longer simulations, and lasted an average of 13.5 minutes each.  
 
The simulation recordings were watched by two resuscitation experts; one 
resuscitation officer, and one anaesthetist.  This was a different pair of assessors to 
the initial development of OSCAR phase. Assessors were kept blinded to each 
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other’s ratings throughout this phase, and were trained in their observations prior to 
the beginning of the study. Each assessor watched each video once and applied both 
tools (i.e., OSCAR and TEAM).   
 
Ethics permission for this study was included in the award made by the North West 
London Research Ethics Committee on 4th November 2008, as the simulation videos 
had been made as part of other studies, and permission had been granted to 
retrospectively analyse these videos.  Study title: A clinical study of a novel 
resuscitation trolley, REC reference: 08/H0722/91 (Appendix 4.1).   
 
5.2.2 Phase 2 – Content comparison and correlation of scorings 
In this phase, the structure and use of the two tools were critically compared, and 
then the team ratings they generated were statistically correlated and plotted. Strong 
positive correlations between the two tools would provide evidence that they are 
broadly quantifying the same skill-sets (i.e. evidence for concurrent validity).  
 
5.2.3 Statistical analyses 
Data analyses were carried out using SPSS v.18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). 
Inter-rater reliability refers to the level of agreement between two (or more) assessors 
using an assessment instrument, and it is required in order to ensure that independent 
(blinded) assessors can produce consistent results (Abell, et al., 2009). Intraclass 
correlation coefficients (ICC) were used to assess this aspect of TEAM and OSCAR, 
as recommended in the literature.  ICC values of 0.70 or higher indicate adequate 
agreement in scoring (Abell, et al., 2009). Moreover, I also carried out non-
parametric Wilcoxon tests to test whether the average scores allocated by each 
	   110	  
assessor were significantly different (non-significant results would indicate the 
desirable consistency in the scoring between the two assessors). Concurrent validity 
was assessed using non-parametric Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients between 
OSCAR and TEAM scores. Scatterplots of these correlations as well as Bland-
Altman plots were also produced. Bland-Altman plots are typically used to assess the 
level of agreement between two different measurement tools (Bland & Altman, 
1999).   
 
Given the differences in the structure of the two tools, some algebraic manipulation 
was necessary for the correlational analyses to be possible. I computed an average 
score on each tool and expressed it as a percentage score (%).  For the TEAM tool, I 
based the analyses on the first 11 questions, which are all scored on 0-4 point scales. 
The final question that assesses global performance on a 10-point scale was not 
included in this analysis, as it is scored on a different scale, it does not assess an 
individual skill or behavior, and there is no OSCAR equivalent for comparison. 
TEAM scores, potentially ranging between 0 and 44, were then expressed as a 
percentage. For the OSCAR tool, there are 6 behaviours scored separately for 3 
subgroups (anaesthetists, physicians, and nurses) – therefore a total of 18 ratings. 
Each rating is made on a 0-6 scale, and therefore OSCAR total scores, potentially 
ranging between 0 and 108, were again expressed as a percentage to allow direct 
comparison with TEAM.  This manipulation enabled me to make the direct statistical 
comparison of scores using the OSCAR and TEAM tools.  It is important to point out 
that whilst this overall percentage was fairly straightforward to calculate for the 
TEAM tool as it is devised to measure overall team performance, for OSCAR this 
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overall percentage score was an aggregate of overall scores for different team 
members, which acted as a surrogate for the overall score. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Phase 1 – Reliability assessment 
A total of 85 healthcare providers were assessed in the study; 55 in the in situ 
simulations, given that these are attended by complete resuscitation teams, and 30 in 
the simulation centre simulations, with each of these participants performing two 
different simulations.  
 
5.3.1.1 Inter-rater reliability of OSCAR  
Scores from both assessors were compared across the three subgroups (anaesthetists, 
physicians, nurses) and six behaviours that OSCAR captures. Of the 18 scored 
behaviours, all achieved highly significant ICC results, 11 of which were very high 
with results ≥ 0.70 (Table 5.1).   This data serves as an additional, more extensive, 
assessment of the inter-rater reliability of OSCAR, following on from the analyses 
made during the tool development. 
 
 
Table 5.1 - OSCAR intraclass correlation coefficients between the two assessors across behaviours 
and subgroups (**p<0.001) 
 
 Behaviour / Skill 
Team 
Subgroup Communication Cooperation Coordination Leadership Monitoring 
Decision-
making 
Anaesthetists 0.70** 0.61** 0.71** 0.68** 0.66** 0.61** 
Physicians 0.85** 0.77** 0.87** 0.88** 0.79** 0.74** 
Nurses 0.72** 0.68** 0.58** 0.75** 0.64** 0.75** 
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Table 5.2 illustrates the median (range) scores given by both assessors for each team 
group and behaviour.  Wilcoxon comparison between the two sets of data clearly 
demonstrates no significant difference between scorings, with the exception of four 
behaviour modes – “Monitoring/situational awareness”, “Decision-making” and 
“Coordination” for nursing staff, and “Cooperation” for anaesthetists.  Even in these 
four occasions, however, the actual scores given were similar, with identical medians 
(4) for Monitoring/situational awareness scores, and Cooperation scores.  
 
Table 5.2 - OSCAR descriptive statistics (median / range) across behaviours, subgroups and 
assessors; with significance of difference between the two sets of ratings 
Assessor 1 = Anaesthetist, Assessor 2 = Resuscitation Officer 
 
Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
Assessor  Assessor  Assessor  Behaviour/Skill 
1 2 
Significance 
1 2 
Significance 
1 2 
Significance 
Communication 4 (3-6) 4 (3-6) 0.53 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 1.00 4 (3-5) 4 (3-5) 0.48 
Cooperation 4 (3-6) 4 (3-5) 0.03 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 0.71 4 (3-5) 4 (3-5) 0.48 
Coordination 4 (3-5) 4 (3-5) 0.48 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 0.18 4.50 (3-6) 4 (3-5) 0.03 
Leadership 4 (3-6) 4 (3-6) 0.11 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 0.18 4 (3-5) 4 (3-5) 0.16 
Monitoring 4 (3-6) 4 (3-6) 0.76 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 0.26 4 (3-5) 4 (2-5) 0.01 
Decision-making 5 (3-6) 4 (3-6) 0.25 5 (3-6) 5 (3-6) 0.32 4 (3-5) 3 (3-5) 0.005 
 
5.3.1.2 Inter-rater reliability of TEAM  
Ratings allocated by the two assessors were compared across the 11 individual 
behaviours that TEAM captures, as well as the final global assessment that the tool 
generates. All achieved highly significant ICC results, with 7 of the total 12 
comparisons achieving ICC results ≥ 0.70 (Table 5.3). 
  
Table 5.3 also summarises the descriptive statistics (median and range) of the ratings 
allocated to each one of the TEAM items by both assessors.  Statistical comparisons 
(Wilcoxon) of these ratings revealed that 6 of the 12 ratings achieved significance – 
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thereby suggesting some overall disagreement between assessors.  However, once 
again, these differences were small in absolute terms (identical medians in four 
behaviours; medians that differed by 0.50 in the remaining two behaviours), and 
never led to a difference in overall opinion of the assessors (i.e. one rating the team 
as “neutral” and the other as “good”). 
 
Table 5.3 – TEAM intraclass correlation coefficients (**p<0.001) and descriptive statistics 
(median/range) across items and assessors 
Assessor 1 = Anaesthetist,  Assessor 2 = Resuscitation Officer 
 
Assessor scores – median (range) TEAM 
Question ICC 1 2 
Significance (p) 
1 0.59** 3.50 (1-4) 3 (1-4) 0.02 
2 0.69** 3.50 (2-4) 3 (2-4) 0.03 
3 0.70** 3 (1-4) 3 (1-4) 0.02 
4 0.73** 3 (2-4) 3 (2-4) 0.71 
5 0.78** 3 (2-4) 3 (2-4) 0.18 
6 0.67** 3 (2-4) 2.50 (2-4) 0.06 
7 0.73** 3 (2-4) 3 (1-4) 0.06 
8 0.77** 3 (2-4) 3 (1-4) 0.03 
9 0.54** 3 (1-4) 3 (1-4) 0.001 
10 0.70** 3 (2-4) 3 (2-4) 0.41 
11 0.63** 3 (2-4) 3 (2-4) 0.02 
12 0.88** 7 (4-10) 7 (5-10) 0.21 
 
 
Taken together, these findings indicate that two independent and blinded assessors 
from different backgrounds can use both OSCAR and TEAM to capture a range of 
different behaviours across the resuscitation team successfully (with slightly better 
overall reliability for the OSCAR scoring).   
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5.3.2 Phase 2 – Content comparison and correlation of scorings 
 (concurrent validity) 
Figure 5.1 provides a direct comparison of the two tools.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Chart comparing attributes of TEAM and OSCAR 
 
Comparison TEAM OSCAR 
People assessed Entire resuscitation team Individuals within resuscitation team 
Number of 
assessments 12 48 (plus 18 overall scores) 
Speed of use Approx 1 minute Approx 3 minutes 
Length of tool 1 page 3 pages 
Ease of use 
Easy to use without instruction, 
although prior knowledge of non-
technical skills required 
May require some guidance prior to 
first use, in addition to knowledge of 
non-technical skills 
Potential uses • Quick global perspective during real or simulated event 
• Greater information  
• Useful for debrief from real or 
simulated event  
• Identify areas of weakness 
• Guide further training 
requirements. 
• Potential to include in personal 
training portfolios 
 
 
The striking difference is that whilst OSCAR scores three sub-teams over six 
behaviour modes, with up to four behaviour examples given for each behaviour, the 
TEAM tool just rates the entire team over 12 different aspects. The result is that 
whilst OSCAR has a possible 48 individual scores and 18 overall scores to award, 
TEAM awards just 12 scores. This means, for example, that where there is one score 
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for “Communication” in the TEAM tool, this facet is scored 10 times, with 3 
additional “overall scores” in the OSCAR tool. OSCAR thus appears to be 
significantly more detailed in its skills coverage, though a more time-consuming tool 
to use.  
 
TEAM and OSCAR scores were converted to percentages (%) to allow direct 
statistical tool comparison. Overall, there was a strong correlation between TEAM 
and OSCAR scores (Spearman’s rho = 0.74, p < 0.0001; Figure 5.2).  The Bland-
Altman plot demonstrates good agreement between the two tests, as shown by the 
relatively small number of points falling outside the 95% limits.  Of note, however, is 
the fact that the tools had closest correlation at “average” scores.  In general at low 
levels of performance the TEAM tool tended to score lower, and at higher levels of 
performance, the TEAM tool tended to score higher.  This most likely reflects the 
different scoring methods employed by the two tools.   
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Figure 5.2 – a) Spearman’s rho correlation and scatterplot between TEAM and OSCAR scores 
converted to percentages (%).  b) Bland-Altman plot of the TEAM and OSCAR percentage scores.  
The solid line represents the mean difference and the dashed lines 95% limits of agreement 
 
Figure 5.2a) 
 
Figure 5.2b) 
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5.4 Discussion 
The aim of this additional study was to compare two recently published tools for the 
assessment of non-technical skills in the context of resuscitation – the Observational 
Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR), and the Team 
Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM).  In summary, I have demonstrated strong 
inter-rater reliability for both tools when comparing ratings from two independent 
assessors, and strong correlation between the two tools when comparing percentage 
score surrogates.  These results confirm that both tools are valid for use in the 
assessment of non-technical skills in resuscitation.  
 
Whilst both tools achieved reasonable inter-rater reliability, findings were marginally 
better for the OSCAR tool than for the TEAM tool. I feel this is most likely to reflect 
the fact that the assessors had prior experience of using the OSCAR tool, having both 
used it during the initial development stages, and subsequent assessments of 
simulation teams, whereas this was the first time they had used the TEAM tool. One 
interpretation of this finding is that the TEAM tool is reasonably intuitive to use, 
such that assessors who are experienced and trained in assessing non-technical skills 
are able to use TEAM reasonably well even without prior tool-specific training. The 
lack of inter-assessor agreement in some elements of TEAM (compared to OSCAR), 
however, suggests that even adequately experienced assessors would likely benefit 
from tool-specific training. Training assessors prior to launching assessment 
programmes for team and non-technical skills is a recommendation that is 
increasingly emerging in the non-technical skills literature within healthcare (Hull, et 
al., 2012).  
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When we used the tools to rate resuscitation teams, we found that OSCAR requires a 
degree of concentration if unfamiliar with it, and takes a few minutes to complete 
thoroughly due to its length. However, if it is used properly, the result is a 
comprehensive assessment of individual team-members within the resuscitation 
team.  For example, it was possible to identify that whilst nurses often lacked in their 
decision-making skills, they tended to score highly on cooperation skills, whereas the 
anaesthetic personnel tended to be strongest at demonstrating leadership qualities.  I 
suspect this represents the traditional hierarchical structure and roles within 
healthcare, but may also reflect personalities of staff attracted to different specialties 
(Arora, et al., 2010); this is something that ought to be explored further in the future, 
using validated metrics of personality and self-perceptions alongside OSCAR.  The 
more detailed information that stems from OSCAR, however, not only enables direct 
feedback to specific team members, but also enables the trainers to direct training to 
weaknesses within individual groups (e.g. helping nursing personnel to improve their 
decision making skills). The assessment of individuals rather than an entire team also 
means that excellent participants and poorly performing candidates can be identified 
within the same team – thus tailoring feedback to individuals’ needs rather than 
allocating a single score to an entire team.   
 
In contrast, the TEAM tool is shorter and quicker to use with a total of 12 items 
assessed and scored. The potential problem here, as mentioned above, is that by only 
giving a global score for the entire team it is not possible to identify weaker (or 
indeed excellent) team-members. Situations where a particularly strong team-
member could inflate the scores of an entire team, even if other team members are 
well below average, can thus arise. This aspect of TEAM scoring, in my experience, 
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occasionally made awarding a score challenging. Moreover, given that many teams 
have a mix of abilities, this may make TEAM assessors award many average scores, 
without adequate differentiation of levels of skills within the team. The higher 
agreement between the two tools at average levels of performance (compared to 
below or above average levels) is in accordance with this observation: TEAM scores 
may concentrate around the middle of the scale whereas with OSCAR some team 
members can indeed score higher than others – but when OSCAR scores are 
aggregated for comparison with TEAM, higher- and lower-scoring team members 
produce overall performance scores near the middle of the scale.  Finally, scoring of 
a team’s morale (TEAM Question 6) was rather problematic.  Morale is a highly 
subjective concept, difficult to observe with any level of objectivity – and thus our 
assessors tended to allocate scores near the middle of the scale.  This was highlighted 
as a problem for raters also by the original TEAM developers (Cooper, et al., 2010b).  
Whilst team morale is extremely important, this may be something that should be 
discussed in a formal debrief, rather than rated using a tool – and in future research 
this item may be considered for removal.  Overall, in my experience, whilst the tool 
is useful as a start to assessing non-technical skills, it would not be possible to use it 
to identify specific training needs, and may not help identify poor performers.    
 
In the light of this study, I envisage a role for both tools. TEAM is quick and easy to 
use whilst a simulated, or real, resuscitation process is taking place, enabling fast 
global assessment of the team. OSCAR may have more potential as both an 
assessment and a training tool in giving far more detailed information about 
individual abilities.  This enables it to be used as part of a formal structured debrief 
on courses, and training sessions (Arora, et al., 2012). Having identified areas of 
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weakness this can be used to inform and focus future training. I envisage that both 
tools can be used to assess level of performance in both simulated scenarios and real 
resuscitation episodes – non-technical behaviours can be linked to clinical tasks and 
immediate learning can take place both for individuals as well as for resuscitation 
teams as a whole (Siassakos, et al., 2011).  Doing so not just within pre-specified 
training episodes (i.e. simulation) but also on-the-job directly embeds maintenance of 
high-level skills into daily clinical routine.  Finally, there is also a possibility of 
individuals keeping their OSCAR assessments as part of their personal training 
portfolio. 
 
5.4.1 Limitations 
It is important to acknowledge that both tools have only been utilised in a simulated 
environment, although it is most likely this is where the greatest use will be for them 
in the near future. This may influence how the individuals and the teams behave and 
are subsequently rated, as the environment is “staged”. Evaluation of team 
performance in a simulated environment has its limitations for a number of reasons, 
such as length of scenario and attitudes towards simulation. It is difficult to 
appreciate fully how this study would translate into the rating of an actual cardiac 
arrest situation. Clinician performance may be more difficult to assess in real-time 
cardiac arrest situations, which may influence the reliability of both tools. 
Practically, although certainly desirable, a prospective evaluation of tools such as 
OSCAR and TEAM in real cardiac arrests is difficult because of the low incidence of 
such events – therefore further simulation-based evaluations are likely to be useful.  
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Another limitation is the fact that using two scoring tools to rate the same simulation 
scenario may inevitably inflate the correlations between the tools (but it does not 
affect inter-assessor agreement). This is an inherent problem with any study where 
multiple assessments of various skills are carried out concurrently – and indeed of 
real life simulation and training settings, where the number of assessors or simulation 
faculty is often limited. Further evaluation of correlation between the two tools 
reported here, and also other assessments are thus required – ideally with assessors 
scoring only one tool each.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
I have demonstrated that two recently developed tools that assess team-working and 
non-technical skills in resuscitation contexts, OSCAR and TEAM, can be used to 
assess reliably team-working of cardiac arrest teams in a simulated environment. I 
have also shown that the two tools correlate reasonably well with one another, 
thereby providing evidence for the validity of their measurements. Taken together 
with the previous studies carried out for each one of these tools (Cooper, et al., 
2010b; Walker, et al., 2011), the present findings corroborate the reliability and 
validity evidence base as well as practical feasibility of both tools. In the light of my 
findings, I propose that there is a place for both tools – with TEAM acting as a quick, 
instant assessment tool for the entire team, but OSCAR enabling more detailed 
breakdown of the assessment, facilitating constructive feedback to all team-members, 
and identifying areas of weakness in sub-teams or individuals that can help focus 
future directed learning. 
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6 Unannounced In Situ Simulations: Integrating 
Training and Clinical Practice 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As described in chapter 3, simulation-based training for healthcare providers is well-
established as a viable, efficacious training tool (Issenberg, et al., 2005), particularly 
for team-working skills, which are known to be important in prevention of error.  It 
significantly enhances learning through feedback, repetitive practice, and variation of 
difficulty all within a controlled, safe environment (Yule, et al., 2006; Sevdalis & 
Brett, 2009; Vincent, et al., 2004).  Several studies have demonstrated an 
improvement in quality of care as well as retention of skills when simulation training 
is used in addition to standard training (Wayne, et al., 2008). 
 
Simulations can be delivered in many ways, from low-fidelity part-task simulation to 
integrated fully immersive environments – with higher fidelity considered a key 
advantage (Kneebone, 2003). Simulation suites, however, are costly to develop, and 
releasing clinical staff to attend training is often difficult (Weinstock, et al., 2005).  
Such factors restrict access to simulation training, and limit training to single 
specialist groups (Kassab, et al., 2010). 
 
Given that clinical errors affecting patient safety are often blamed on failures 
embedded within the structure and functioning of the overall health care system 
(Herzer, et al., 2009), the creative use of the clinical environment during training will 
potentially enhance trainees resilience and adaptability in the face of system 
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problems.  In a recent study of a series of unannounced cardiac arrests, Lighthall, et 
al (2010) identified several hazardous events occurring during the arrest simulations, 
which could have compromised patient care if they had occurred during a real 
resuscitation.  In situ simulation does appear to have the potential to identify 
previously unreported risks and hazards and to bring these fully into the training 
scenario (Herzer, et al., 2009).  
 
As I have mentioned previously, patients receiving emergency resuscitation care are 
exposed to a higher rate of adverse events than the general hospital population.  This 
supports the need for non-technical skills training specifically for emergency care 
teams.  Therefore, I wanted to assess an application of in situ simulation where 
training is taken to the clinical environment, thus decreasing required resources, 
whilst increasing realism and affordability, and widening multidisciplinary team 
participation, and enabling assessment and training of non-technical team-working 
skills in real clinical teams. 
 
6.2 Aims 
The aim of this study was to assess the process of delivering unannounced in situ 
simulated resuscitation training.  In particular, I wanted to assess the following three 
aspects, which can be described as separate study outputs: 
Aim 1 To explore the feasibility, practical and ethical issues around 
unannounced cardiac arrest simulations 
Aim 2 To assess the attitudes of participants to unannounced in situ simulation 
for resuscitation training 
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Aim 3 To assess latent risks and hazards within the infrastructure of the hospital 
setting that are identified during the in situ simulation 
 
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Design 
This was an observational, prospective, simulation study to assess the impact of an 
unannounced in situ simulation programme for multidisciplinary resuscitation 
training.  
 
Ethics permission for this study was included in the award made by the North West 
London Research Ethics Committee on 4th November 2008.  Study title: A clinical 
study of a novel resuscitation trolley, REC reference: 08/H0722/91 (Appendix 4.1). 
This ethics approval included observations of real resuscitation teams and recording 
of simulated resuscitation attempts.  The study was also part of an on-going 
programme of resuscitation training, and so was exempt from requiring specific 
ethical approval as part of service evaluation and audit.  
 
6.3.2 Participants 
Participants included a total of 55 resuscitation team members.  Given that the 
simulations were clinical, ward-based, scenarios for the multidisciplinary 
resuscitation team, participants consisted of nursing staff from the chosen location, 
and members of the on-call cardiac arrest team for the day.  Clinicians alerted to 
attend a cardiac arrest within our hospital include anaesthetists, intensive care 
doctors, the medical on-call team for the day, and resuscitation nurses.  Additional 
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specialist team members may attend as required, for example trauma surgeons for a 
trauma patient scenario.  The number of staff that arrives at a particular arrest 
location will depend on other clinical commitments at that time, although a cardiac 
arrest “call” takes high priority.  A variable number of participants attended our 
simulations ranging from 7 to 15. 
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
6.3.3.1 Location Selection 
An appropriate location was selected in which to perform the in situ simulation.  
Given the nature of the simulation, and the fact that I wanted as few people as 
possible to have prior warning of the event, a secluded location such as a side-room 
was chosen if possible. This enabled the simulation team to set up the relevant 
equipment without too many staff seeing, and also prevented patients and relatives in 
the vicinity from witnessing the resuscitation simulation, which could potentially 
have led to unnecessary distress. Table 6.1 lists locations in which in situ simulations 
were performed for the purposes of this study. 
Table 6.1 – In situ simulation locations 
 
Number Simulation Location 
1 Acute admissions ward – side room 
2 Interventional radiology – recovery side-bay 
3 Endoscopy suite* 
4 Corridor near lifts (in a quiet corridor) 
5 Labour ward room 
6 Clinical Decision Unit – empty bay area 
7 Trauma Unit – side room 
 
* - Simulation became a didactic training session due to difficulties with staff.  Therefore unable to 
formally assess non-technical teamworking skills for this simulation 
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6.3.3.2 Simulation set-up 
Figure 6.1 explains the step-wise process of setting up an in situ simulation.  
 
Figure 6.1 – How to run an in situ simulation 
 
Set-up 
1. Identify a suitable location to run the simulation, and select a pertinent scenario for that location.  
Ward managers at the identified location should be involved at this stage to ensure that running the 
simulation will not present any risk, and coordinate an appropriate time. 
2. Identify key aims and objectives of the simulation 
3. Check the various clinical commitments around the hospital to determine whether it is safe to run 
the simulation 
4. Assemble the simulation faculty (at least 2, but preferably 3 people) and the simulation equipment 
at the desired location. 
5. Set up the equipment in the chosen location, preferably in a way so as to minimise disruption to 
patients, relative, and staff.  A side-room on a ward, for example is preferable as staff will be less 
aware that something is planned 
6. Ensure any audiovisual equipment is used in such a way that only the simulation team, and not real 
patients, are being recorded. 
7. Warn any patients or relatives in the vicinity of what will be happening so as not to cause any 
distress when they see the cardiac arrest team arrive.  Also warn important members of staff as 
required (e.g. ITU Consultant on-call) 
Simulation 
1. Recruit one member of nursing staff from the clinical location.  Explain to them what is 
happening, including a brief introduction to the mannequin in terms of the degree of fidelity.  They 
may be used to mannequins that don’t breathe, don’t talk, and don’t have a pulse.  Therefore this 
will all need to be explained to them to enable the simulation to run smoothly with a high degree 
of “buy-in” at later stages. 
2. Describe the clinical scenario to the 1st participant, and ask them to proceed “as if it were a normal 
patient”. 
3. During the initial stages, participants may need some encouragement and prompting.  For 
example, if they say “now I’d like to call for help”, they should be told to go and do that as if it 
were real. 
4. The simulation should then proceed with minimal interference from the simulation faculty. 
5. The faculty need to ensure the mannequin responds appropriately to treatment instigated by the 
arrest team 
6. After the simulation has run (approximately 10-15 minutes), a similar length of time should be 
spent debriefing the team on technical and non-technical skills, with adequate time for questions 
and teaching at the end of the session – the technique of advocacy with inquiry is used to elicit 
responses from team members. 
Post-Simulation 
1. Debrief should occur with faculty members to identify any technical, fidelity or scenario issues. 
2. Equipment should be suitably cleaned and stored for the next session 
3. A robust reporting system should be in place to document and act on any risk assessment issues 
identified during the simulation.  These should be followed up in a timely manner to ensure the 
appropriate action has been taken to rectify the issue 
4. A record of the simulation is kept noting the area, scenario, personnel and key learning points 
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Once a location and time had been identified the process of actually setting up for the 
simulation could proceed.   All simulations were performed using a Laerdal SimMan 
3G Patient Simulator (Laerdal Medical, Stavanger, Norway) offering the highest 
fidelity patient simulation currently available.  This consists of a high fidelity patient 
simulator wirelessly connected to a laptop computer, which is used to control heart 
rate, blood pressure, heart sounds, respiratory rate, oxygen saturations and lung 
sounds, in addition to various other physiological parameters.  A second laptop 
computer is used as a “patient monitor” for participants to view a realistic display of 
the changing patient observations.   
 
Simulations were recorded using a Smots™ mobile recording system (Scotia UK plc, 
Edinburgh, UK).  This consists of a mobile camera and microphone system mounted 
on wheels for flexibility.  This operates in conjunction with a laptop computer, which 
is used to manipulate, annotate, and save images recorded.   The images can be used 
for constructive feedback to participants, and to enable retrospective detailed analysis 
of the simulations.  
 
6.3.3.3 Scenario 
A simulation scenario that was pertinent for the location was chosen from a 
selection, and one member of nursing staff from the area was recruited.  Where 
possible, scenarios were based on real incidents that have occurred within the 
hospital NHS trust, thus increasing the learning opportunity.  The faculty team 
explained what was happening to a member of nursing staff from the clinical 
location, including a brief introduction to the mannequin in terms of the degree of 
fidelity.  The clinical scenario was then described clearly to the nurse, and they were 
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then asked to proceed “as if it were a normal patient”.  During the initial stages, the 
participants occasionally needed some encouragement and prompting. When the 
crash team arrived, they were similarly told that it was a simulation and that they 
were expected to treat the patient as they would in real life.  The simulation usually 
then proceeded with minimal interference from the simulation faculty, other than 
ensuring the mannequin responded appropriately to any treatment instigated by the 
arrest team.   
 
The simulations ran for approximately 15 minutes, with a similar length of time 
spent debriefing the team on technical and non-technical teamworking skills.  
Participants were then asked to complete a short questionnaire exploring their 
opinions of the simulation (Appendix 6.1).  
 
6.3.4 Measures 
6.3.4.1 Aim 1 - To explore the feasibility, practical and ethical issues around 
unannounced cardiac arrest simulations 
Observations were made and noted accordingly by the simulation faculty in relation 
to all aspects of the simulation; from issues during the set-up process to practical and 
ethical issues related to the simulation itself.   
 
On completion of the simulation, audiovisual footage was viewed by two members 
of the simulation faculty, and non-technical teamworking skills were critically 
appraised using the Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for 
Resuscitation (OSCAR) described in Chapter 3.   
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6.3.4.2 Aim 2 - To assess attitudes of participants to unannounced in situ 
simulation for resuscitation training 
On finishing the simulation and debrief, participants were asked to complete a short 
questionnaire consisting of two sections.  The first section elicited demographic 
details including simulation and resuscitation experience.  The second section asked 
for participants’ opinions to various statements relating to the simulation process, 
scored on a 5-point Likert scale (Appendix 6.1). 
 
6.3.4.3 Aim 3 - To assess latent risks and hazards within the infrastructure of 
the hospital setting that are identified during in situ simulation 
During the simulation, and retrospectively when watching audiovisual footage, the 
simulation faculty noted any infrastructure or system flaws that were identified, that 
may have led to staff or patient harm. 
 
6.3.5 Statistical Analysis 
All data analyses were carried out using SPSS v. 18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA).  The tests included calculation of mean (standard deviation (SD)) for 
parametric datasets, and median (intraquartile range (IQR)) for ordinal datasets such 
as questionnaire ratings.  
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Aim 1 – To explore the feasibility, practical and ethical issues around 
unannounced cardiac arrest simulations 
My experience of in situ simulation has confirmed the benefits, but also potential 
difficulties previously described by others who have used this approach to training.  
This is described in greater detail below. 
 
6.4.1.1 Understanding the impact of the real environment on technical skills 
One of the benefits, as demonstrated by some of our participant opinion results in 
table 6.3, and those of Lighthall, et al (2010) is the benefit of delivering training 
directly to the entire multidisciplinary team in a low-risk, believable environment 
that is relevant to them (Kobayashi, et al., 2008), and preventing the need to provide 
“relief” for a pre-planned training session.  The time spent giving structured feedback 
is as valuable as the simulation itself, as it is rare for team members participating in a 
“real” cardiac arrest to spend time de-briefing due to the pressures of clinical work, a 
finding that was similarly reported by Miller, et al (2012).  During the feedback 
sessions, we have been able to clarify details of the resuscitation protocol, have 
taught team members practical issues such as how to assemble an arrest drug 
“minijet”, and have reinforced correct use of the defibrillator.  
 
6.4.1.2 Assessing the non-technical skills of actual clinical teams 
The nature of the unannounced in situ simulations means that “real” cardiac arrest 
teams are brought together, and we are therefore able to assess genuine team 
interactions during an emergency resuscitation event.  Table 6.2 illustrates overall 
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team scores using the “OSCAR” non-technical skills scoring system, from both 
raters, for five of the simulations.  Video-recording problems prevented recording of 
the sixth simulation, which therefore prevented retrospective behaviour rating.  
 
Table 6.2 – Overall OSCAR ratings for individual teams from in situ simulations. 
Rater 1 (R1) = Anaesthetist, Rater 2 (R2) = Resuscitation Officer 
Subteams: A = Anaesthetists, P = Physicians, N = Nurses 
 
In Situ Simulation Session Number 
1 2 3 4 5 Behaviour Sub-Team 
R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 R2 
A 4 5 5 6 4 4 3 3 3 3 
P 5 5 6 6 5 5 3 4 5 5 Communication 
N 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 
A 4 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 
P 5 5 5 6 5 5 3 4 5 4 Cooperation 
N 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 
A 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 3 
P 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 3 4 5 Coordination 
N 4 4 6 5 6 5 4 4 5 5 
A 4 5 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 
P 5 5 6 6 5 5 3 4 5 4 Leadership 
N 4 4 4 3 5 5 3 3 4 4 
A 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 3 3 
P 5 5 5 6 5 5 3 4 5 4 Monitoring 
N 4 4 5 4 5 5 3 3 4 3 
A 4 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 2 3 
P 5 5 6 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 
Decision-
making 
N 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 
 
 
These clearly depict a wide variation in the abilities of teams in relation to their non-
technical skills.  The fact that these teams may have never worked together 
reinforces the importance of training these skills, so that team members have shared 
knowledge, skills and attitudes.  Teaching of teamworking skills has recently been 
introduced as a concept to current ALS courses, but they are not taught in detail.  We 
therefore create an awareness of non-technical skills, emphasise excellent 
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behaviours, and mention those requiring some improvement in our feedback.  
Benefits of team training are hard to measure and demonstrate, but we know from 
other clinical team training programmes (King, et al., 2008), that training may lead to 
a reduction in mortality, and improve teamworking and task completion.   
 
6.4.1.3 Equipment and Faculty 
From a practical perspective, in situ simulation can be time-consuming for faculty, 
when compared with simulation centre sessions where everything is permanently set, 
ready to start.  Set-up time for faculty members in the initial stages was up to 2 
hours, which requires significant commitment from the simulation team.  This time 
included assessing the overall workload within the hospital, and transferring and 
setting up all the required equipment for the simulation. We have managed to reduce 
this time with experience to 30-60 minutes. However, this still has the potential to 
strain an overstretched faculty, and highlights the importance of having dedicated 
simulation staff with appropriate clinical expertise, and simulation experience. 
 
6.4.1.4 Availability of clinical staff 
Despite attempts to ensure all areas of the hospital that will be affected by the 
simulation are not busy at the time, including assessing the workload of the medical 
on-call team, we have had two occasions when issues arose that we did not 
anticipate.  An example includes putting a call out during a medical meeting that we 
were not aware of, leading to some frustration from the General Medical Department 
on that particular day.  We have also realised that whilst we attempt to make the 
simulation unannounced, it is important for certain key personnel, such as the 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) Consultant on-call for the day, to be aware that it is a 
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simulation so as to excuse their team from the training, in exceptional circumstances, 
if it is unsafe for them to leave the ICU. Whilst this is the approach we have taken in 
our hospital, one could argue that this never really “tests the system” from a risk 
assessment/latent factors perspective.  The decision of which approach to take rests 
with the simulation team and it is of course a trade off between resources and 
acceptable (or safe) levels of “stress” to the hospital system.  In the light of our 
experience, and those of others, we take the view that integrated clinical education 
within the workplace should always be a priority, and therefore emergency sessions 
ought to be attended by relevant personnel.  Our in situ simulation programme has 
the full backing of the clinical governance committee and post-graduate department 
as a resuscitation training priority.  
 
6.4.1.5 Potential impact on patient care 
One of my concerns when setting up the in situ simulation programme was the 
potential for delay in actual patient care during the conduct of a simulation. There 
has so far been no evidence of any detrimental effect on patient care as a result of our 
simulations, although obviously training of any kind reduces direct contact time with 
patients.  It is critical to anticipate potential problems and time the in situ simulations 
accordingly. Prior to starting the simulation every effort is made to ensure that the 
clinical environments throughout the hospital are not busy.  During the simulation, 
any staff members called away for an emergency are immediately excused.   
However, in practice, this has never actually occurred.  Positive reactions to in situ 
simulation have also emerged from the patient population.  A study at Cincinnati 
Children’s Hospital Medical Center addressed relatives’ perception of in situ 
simulation (Patterson, et al., 2008).  While training sessions clearly had the potential 
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to delay healthcare provision they found that families “were glad the health care 
teams were practicing for high-risk situations and that the additional time spent 
waiting because of a simulation was not significant in the context of an Emergency 
Department visit”. 
 
6.4.2 Aim 2 – To assess attitudes of participants to unannounced in situ 
simulation for resuscitation training   
A total of 55 members of staff completed post-simulation questionnaires.  Of these 
37 (67.3%) were doctors – anaesthetists, physicians, and speciality (e.g. Trauma 
surgeons) and 17 (31%) were nurses, with 1 midwife also completing feedback.  
Surprisingly, 25% of the nurses and 11% of the doctors reported that they had never 
attended a cardiac resuscitation event in real life.  This is likely to reflect the 
nationwide decrease in the number of in hospital cardiac arrests that I will refer to in 
the discussion.  However, it may also reflect the reduction in working hours of junior 
staff to keep in line with the European Working Time Directive that has been 
imposed over recent years.  This finding further supports a programme of regular in 
situ resuscitation training. 
 
Feedback from the 55 cardiac arrest team members that took part in the in situ 
simulations was very positive.  Comprehensive results are shown in Table 6.3.  
Overall, participants strongly agree that in situ simulations are a realistic 
representation of an arrest event, and that the clinical environment improves realism.  
They also strongly agree that the in situ simulations are useful for training and 
assessment of technical and non-technical skills, that they are more useful than 
simulations performed in a laboratory environment, and that the unannounced nature 
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of them better represents their actual behaviour in a real event.  All participants had 
experience of emergency care training in a simulation centre environment, such as an 
ALS course, with which to compare this experience.  Informally, many team-
members have asked us to return for further unannounced simulations at a later date, 
and have little objection to the time away from clinical duties.  
 
 
Table 6.3 – Participants’ attitudes towards unannounced adult in situ simulation training in 
resuscitation. 
1= Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
Statement N Median (IQR) 
Realism of the Simulations 
The simulated environment is a realistic representation of an actual cardiac arrest 54 4 (4-5) 
The simulated environment is a realistic representation of a peri-arrest event 55 4 (4-5) 
The clinical environment increases the realism of the simulation 54 5 (4-5) 
The model used is a realistic representation of a real unwell patient 54 4 (3-4) 
The simulation scenario is realistic overall 55 4 (4-4) 
Training and Assessment 
This simulation offers a good opportunity for training technical skills 53 5 (4-5) 
This simulation offers a good opportunity for training non-technical skills 55 5 (4-5) 
This simulation offers a good opportunity for assessment of technical skills 53 4 (3-5) 
This simulation offers a good opportunity for assessment of non technical skills 52 4.5 (4-5) 
Attitudes towards Unannounced Simulation 
My behaviour in this simulation mirrors my behaviour in a real emergency 52 4 (3-4) 
I would benefit by repeating this simulation in the future 53 5 (4-5) 
I felt that an unannounced scenario is a better test of how I would perform in a 
true emergency 55 5 (4-5) 
This simulation is more useful than a simulation which you were warned of in 
advance 53 4 (3-5) 
This simulation was more useful than a similar scenario taking place in the skills 
laboratory or during a formal course. 51 4 (4-5) 
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6.4.3 Aim 3 – To assess latent risks and hazards within the infrastructure 
of the hospital setting that are identified during in situ simulation 
One of the potential benefits of running a simulation in the ward environment using 
ward equipment is the opportunity to assess the infrastructure of the environment 
itself as part of a risk assessment process.  This was mentioned by Lighthall, et al., 
(2010), and is something I have also identified. I encountered a multitude of issues 
that could not have been identified in a simulation centre environment, but may have 
critically compromised patient care if they had been identified during a real cardiac 
arrest.  Table 6.4 lists some of my findings, with the corrective action taken.   
 
Table 6.4 – Examples of some risk assessment issues identified during in situ simulations, and the 
corrective action taken 
 
Event Location Safety Issues Identified Corrective Action Taken 
Endoscopy Suite 
1. Crash Team access swipe-card didn’t 
enable access to endoscopy suite 
2. Incorrect defibrillator pads stocked which 
were incompatible with machine in use 
1. Security informed, and crash access 
codes updated 
2. Resuscitation dept and Nurse in charge 
informed.  Correct pads supplied, and 
ordering process changed 
Labour Ward Room 
1. Medical team unaware of location of 
Labour Ward, therefore delaying arrival 
time 
2. “Cardiac Arrest” call not activated on 
Labour Ward anaesthetist’s bleep, 
therefore delaying arrival of anaesthetist 
1. Further education at staff induction to 
hospital emphasising the importance of 
learning locations in the hospital 
2. Switchboard informed to put crash call 
out on labour ward bleep in future 
Clinical Decision Unit 
1. Poorly stocked resuscitation trolley, no 
intubation bougie available, leading to 
failed intubation of mannequin 
2. Nursing staff uncertain of terminology or 
use of advanced airway equipment, and 
therefore unable to help struggling 
anaesthetist 
3. Delay in arrest team arrival due to recent 
building work that led to frequent moves 
and renaming of wards, causing 
confusion over location of event.  
1. Trolley used on ward was not appropriate 
for use as resuscitation trolley.  
Therefore, new larger trolley supplied by 
resuscitation department with space for 
all equipment required.  Nursing staff 
made aware of importance of regular 
trolley checks 
2. Nursing staff educated in advanced 
airway equipment.  Nurse in charge 
informed of need for on-going staff 
training in this area 
3. Trust board made aware of issues, and 
need for increased signage and 
communication with staff during hospital 
refurbishment and structure changes 
Trauma Unit 
1. Delay in starting basic peri-arrest care 
due to a lack of basic equipment in 
critical care bedspace. 
1. Simulation was performed in a new ward 
area.  This highlighted an issue of lack of 
basic stock.  The ward manager was 
informed, and stock policy amended. 
 
	   137	  
As an example, when running an arrest simulation in the endoscopy unit, it was 
brought to my attention that the emergency team did not have access to the unit using 
their security cards, thus prolonging the time taken to get to the patient.  This has 
subsequently been amended. Since all the equipment used is from the clinical area, I 
was able to assess other aspects such as stocking of the resuscitation trolley.  In the 
endoscopy suite, for example, I identified defibrillator pads that were not compatible 
with the defibrillator machine they use.  In the event of a real cardiac arrest, this 
could have been catastrophic as it would not have been possible to assess a cardiac 
rhythm or defibrillate the patient if required.  The unit is located in a remote site, and 
so there would have been an extensive delay before another machine or pads could 
have been located.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
I have described my experiences of an unannounced in situ resuscitation training 
programme that was instituted in our hospital with a view to improving the 
resuscitation process from technical and non-technical skills to overall infrastructure 
assessment.  Whilst there are clearly potential difficulties in terms of practical and 
ethical issues around running the scenarios, I have also demonstrated some of the 
benefits.  I acknowledge that there are clearly occasions when lab-based simulation 
training is more appropriate, such as for large throughput courses (e.g. ALS), or 
repetitive skills practice (e.g. central venous cannulation), but in my opinion there are 
occasions when in situ simulation is superior; such as for training real 
multidisciplinary teams in emergency situations.  However, I should emphasise that 
to my knowledge, no direct comparison has been performed. 
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In my experience, the practical challenges of setting up and running the simulation 
gradually diminished with time as faculty staff increased their skills and gained 
confidence in the programme.  These challenges take on minor significance in 
comparison with the potential benefits in terms of technical and non-technical skills 
training, and infrastructure risk assessment that this form of training offers.  With 
increased awareness throughout the hospital of our simulation training programme, 
managers from a variety of areas have asked us to perform simulations as part of a 
clinical risk assessment, and not just in the context of a clinical training session.  It is 
vitally important that a robust reporting system is in place to ensure this risk 
assessment is documented and reported back to relevant individuals to ensure a 
change can occur.   
 
It is a very positive aspect of these simulations that, although intended as a training 
intervention, they resulted in the identification of what are effectively “latent factors” 
that can contribute to problems in care delivery during an arrest in our hospital.  This 
aspect of in situ simulation has been described in the literature (Lighthall, et al., 
2010; Garden, et al., 2010) – and indeed is often the ultimate endpoint of such 
simulations.  For example, Herzer, et al., (2009) advocate the use of in situ 
simulation to “identify hazards and defects associated with latent failure modes that 
are embedded in the system” in their recommendations to prospectively identify and 
mitigate clinical hazards, thus improving patient safety.  They argue that a high 
fidelity simulator should be used to add realism, as a participant’s belief in the 
scenario is essential if they are to take the simulation seriously and therefore perform 
as they would in real life.  This is required to enable observation of real team 
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interactions, and to uncover latent systemic failures, which is what we obtained in 
our simulations.   
 
Whilst there is little evidence in the literature to support a relationship between the 
level of simulation fidelity and training effectiveness, Beaubien and Baker, (2004) 
describe different modes of simulation for team training, and describe a system 
where simulation fidelity can be divided into Equipment Fidelity (degree to which 
the simulator duplicates the appearance and feel of the real system), Environment 
Fidelity (degree to which the simulator duplicates sensory information from the task 
environment) and Psychological Fidelity (degree to which a trainee perceives the 
simulation to be a believable surrogate for the task).  They argue that whilst all three 
aspects are inter-related, the psychological fidelity is considered most important for 
effective team training as it is essential for trainees to behave in the simulation as 
they would in the real world.  They also conclude by stating that “if the primary goal 
is to maximise the transfer of trained behaviours to the post-training environment, the 
trainer may select a simulator that mimics the environmental conditions of the real 
system”.  Clearly, by actually using the real clinical environment, maximum 
environmental fidelity is being employed. As discussed by Patterson, et al., (2008), 
there is currently limited evidence about the effectiveness of simulation in terms of 
transfer of skills to the ward environment.  However it would seem logical that the 
more realistic and relevant a simulation is for a particular cohort of clinicians, the 
more they are likely to be able to apply what they have learnt to their day-to-day 
practice.  This is an area that could be assessed in more detail in the future.   
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As I mentioned in chapter 3, various high-profile team-training programmes (Neily, 
et al., 2010; King, et al., 2008) implemented in the United States of America, have 
been shown to enhance patient safety and reduce mortality.  Therefore, this supports 
our argument that training real cardiac arrest teams in a believable environment may 
in the long-term lead to a reduction in patient errors and adverse events during a 
resuscitation attempt.   
 
The ability to set the simulation equipment up in any location enabled us to perform 
scenarios in locations where cardiac arrest events are rare.  Training staff who have 
less exposure to cardiac arrest events is becoming more critical in our own and other 
hospitals as the overall reduction in the number of cardiac arrests due to earlier 
identification of the “unwell patient”, and the reduction in working hours of training 
doctors in the UK means that, surprisingly, in our study 25% of nurses and 11% of 
the doctors had never attended a real cardiac arrest.  This trend of a reduction in real 
arrest events has been seen in our hospital audit data, but also seems to be a trend 
that other hospitals have anecdotally reported (Spearpoint, et al., 2009), although to 
date there is no conclusive published data.  The National Cardiac Arrest Audit 
(Nolan, et al., 2009) will hopefully publish data in the near future relating to this. As 
we know, repeated practice in a task is essential to gain expertise (Kneebone, 2009).  
Therefore, contextual practice, especially in locations that experience a very low 
number of cardiac arrests, is likely to improve the skills of staff in these areas for a 
time when they are faced with a real emergency.  
 
To date, most resuscitation training has either taken place on resuscitation courses on 
low-fidelity part-task mannequins, or in designated high fidelity simulation suites.  I 
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have demonstrated the benefits of taking the resuscitation training directly to the 
clinical environment so as to provide training with a view to assessing and improving 
technical and non-technical teamworking skills in real cardiac arrest teams, but also 
as a means of identifying latent failure modes within the system that could pose a 
risk to patients or staff.   Equally importantly, I have demonstrated that staff enjoy 
this method of resuscitation training and perceive it to be more beneficial than 
simulations of which they are aware in advance, and those based in a simulation 
centre or course environment.   
 
One potential concern of the unannounced nature of our simulations is whether the 
learners can change rapidly from doing their clinical duties to being part of a 
simulation where there is no briefing to the situation of the patient simulator.  In my 
experience, this was not a problem.  Participants often pause very briefly when they 
first arrive at the simulation, but then rapidly become absorbed in the situation.  Also, 
whilst being in their clinical environment is an advantage in terms of familiarity, 
there is the risk of participants being distracted by pending clinical duties or other 
patients in the ward environment, thus reducing the learning potential during the 
simulation. This is part of the trade off between doing a simulation in situ and 
attending a training session during protected educational time in a simulation lab. 
 
In future I hope to demonstrate an improvement in cardiac arrest teams technical and 
non-technical skills, and hope to demonstrate an improvement in retention of skills 
when using a realistic and relevant clinical location as the basis of the training.  I also 
hope to demonstrate a continued identification of previously unidentified latent 
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hazards, associated with an improvement in patient safety with regards to embedded 
systems and hospital infrastructure.  
 
As I have previously mentioned, it is well recognised that having good non-technical 
team-working skills is important for safe and efficient task performance, and that a 
failure in these skills may contribute to the errors and adverse events in patient care. 
Rates of error are known to be higher than normal in pressured, time-critical areas 
involving many team members, and unstable patients (Stahl, et al., 2009), such as a 
resuscitation attempt.  This reinforces the importance of training these skills, which 
are not taught on standard ALS courses.  By doing this training, I therefore create an 
awareness of non-technical skills, emphasise excellent behaviours, and mention those 
requiring some improvement in our feedback. 
 
6.5.1 Limitations  
A limitation of this research is that I have been unable to demonstrate a direct 
comparison between in situ simulation training and simulation centre training, and 
therefore I am, inevitably, skewing my participant perception data due to the fact that 
the in situ simulation is fresh in their minds.  However, it would be very difficult to 
perform a direct randomised study comparing these two forms of training for 
unannounced resuscitation training, as by the very nature of our study I am using the 
on-call cardiac arrest team of the day.  It would not be ethical for me to summon 
them to the simulation suite (a remote hospital location) in case a real patient were to 
require their care, thus delaying treatment.   
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It is also true that participants may give a favourable report of something because 
they feel someone is taking an interest in their problems.  This may also potentially 
bias my participant perception results.  However, if this leads to improved 
enthusiasm in resuscitation training, and enhancement of the clinical environment 
leading to improvements in patient safety in the area of resuscitation, this is surely a 
benefit? 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Based on the available evidence base and also my experience, in situ simulation is a 
useful training tool, conveying a greater sense of realism, and team interaction, at a 
fraction of the cost of laboratory-based simulation.  Whilst courses remain valuable 
for teaching the technical skills, in situ simulation can play an important 
complementary role in reinforcing these skills and providing a bridge to the clinical 
environment and the use of these skills in patient care.  In situ simulation is 
particularly valuable for the training and assessment of non-technical skills critical 
for successful teamwork, and is something that could be implemented in every 
hospital even when finances are stretched, and space for simulation suites is not 
available.  The additional benefit of having an opportunity to risk-assess the clinical 
environment to identify system failures and latent problems cannot be emphasised 
enough, and is a good reason to perform the simulation even if a specific training 
session has not been planned.  Overall in situ simulation has the potential to 
significantly improve the safety of patients in hospitals.   
 
 
	   144	  
7 Assessment of the Resus:Station in comparison to a 
standard trolley for stocking and checking 
 
    
 
The next two chapters describe two studies assessing the Resus:Station resuscitation 
trolley, in comparison to a standard resuscitation trolley.  The first looks at the 
effects of the new design on the trolley stocking and checking process for nursing 
staff.  The second (Chapter 8) looks at the use of the trolley by a small resuscitation 
team performing resuscitation attempts in simulated cardiac arrest scenarios.   
 
7.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, one of the reasons for designing the Resus:Station was to 
resolve issues relating to poorly stocked resuscitation trolleys.  In 2004/5 a total of 86 
incidents involving resuscitation trolleys were reported to the National Patient Safety 
Agency.  Most of these incidents related to poorly stocked trolleys, equipment 
missing during an arrest event, or staff being uncertain how to use the equipment.  Of 
these incidents, 13 led to patient harm, and 10 were thought to have directly 
contributed to patient death.   
 
Given that the UK Resuscitation Council already issues clear guidance regarding the 
stocking and checking of resuscitation trolleys, it was felt that simply repeating this 
guidance was unlikely to lead to any change.  Therefore they decided to sponsor a 
project to redesign the resuscitation trolley with the aim of improving the stocking 
process, with the hope that this would lead to a reduction in the incidence of missing 
equipment at resuscitation attempts, and thus improve patient safety.  This led to the 
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Resus:Station prototype already described.  Figure 7.1 recaps the development 
process, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 7.1 – A brief explanation of the development process in designing the Resus:Station 
 
The Multidisciplinary Team 
A team of designers, academics, clinicians, and clinical psychologists from the Helen Hamlyn Centre, 
Imperial College, and St Mary’s Hospital was brought together to lead the re-design process. 
Analysis Methods Used 
The initial steps involved identifying the requirements of a resuscitation trolley.  A combination of 
task analysis, and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Price, 2008) of the overall resuscitation 
process identified many potential areas for design work (Brodie, et al., 2009; West, et al., 2008). 
Problems Identified 
1. A crowded environment during resuscitation can make access to equipment stored in the current 
trolley difficult. 
2. Drawers in the current trolley often don’t open properly, exacerbating problems accessing 
equipment. 
3. The design of the current trolley often prevents several drawers being opened at once. 
4. It is difficult for more than one person to access the trolley at a time. 
5. Equipment may not be stored correctly, and may lead to wrong equipment being selected, or the 
equipment required not being found. 
6. Poorly stocked trolleys are being taken to the resuscitation scene, pointing to wider problems of 
the restocking procedure. 
7. A crowded environment at the resuscitation can potentially pressurise the team function, and poor 
trolley design may exacerbate this problem. 
Design Solutions in the Resus:Station 
1. An “open layout” design means all equipment can be seen at a glance, making access easier. 
2. The open layout, with individual labelled pockets for each item, may also help to facilitate the 
stock check. 
3. When the trolley is not being used, blinds are locked in place to prevent “casual theft” of items. 
4. The trolley splits into three sections – Airway, Drugs & Defibrillator, and Circulation – facilitating 
access to equipment for many team members.  For example, the Airway section can be placed at 
the head of the bed next to the Anaesthetist enabling direct access to all the airway equipment 
required. 
5. Labels on each individual item pocket helps with the stock-check, and also helps inexperienced 
staff identify the correct equipment. 
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7.2 Aims 
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of the ergonomic design on the trolley 
checking and stocking process.  I specifically aimed to:  
Aim 1 Assess attitudes, opinions and beliefs of participants regarding the new 
Resus:Station when compared with the standard resuscitation trolley. 
Aim 2 Compare speed of the trolley check when using the Resus:Station 
compared with the standard resuscitation trolley. 
Aim 3 Compare the accuracy of the trolley check when using the Resus:Station 
compared with the standard resuscitation trolley. 
 
7.3 Methods 
7.3.1 Design 
This was a randomised crossover study to determine speed and accuracy of nursing 
staff using both the standard and newly designed resuscitation trolley.  
 
Ethics permission for this study was awarded by the North West London Research 
Ethics Committee on 4th November 2008.  Study title: A clinical study of a novel 
resuscitation trolley, REC reference: 08/H0722/91 (Appendix 4.1).   
 
7.3.2 Participants 
A total of 60 participants were recruited to this study, with varying levels of 
experience from Healthcare Assistants to Ward Managers.  Eligible participants were 
those that had experience of checking resuscitation trolleys. 
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An initial 40 participants were recruited prior to the trolleys being placed in the 
clinical ward environment.  These participants, therefore, had never seen the 
Resus:Station prior to the study session.  A further 20 participants were recruited 
from wards that had used the Resus:Station for six months as part of a clinical trial.  
These nurses were therefore familiar with the trolley, and so I wanted to see whether 
this familiarity had an effect on their attitudes and performance in the study. 
 
7.3.3 Procedure 
Overall, participants were asked to complete two trolley checks, as they would on the 
ward (Figure 7.2).  For one they used the newly designed Resus:Station, and for the 
other a standard resuscitation trolley with which they were familiar.  
 
Figure 7.2 – Illustration of overall study format 
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Participants were randomised as to the order of trolley use, using a computerised 
random number generator (www.randomizer.org), with the result of randomisation 
concealed from the researcher enrolling participants until just prior to the study 
session.  Due to the nature of the study it was not possible to blind participants or 
researchers.  The study took place in a side room, close to the ward environment.  
The participants who were not familiar with the Resus:Station were given a brief 
explanation of the project and a short chance to look at the trolley in detail just prior 
to checking it. 
 
7.3.4 Measures 
7.3.4.1 Attitudes and views 
After each trolley check, irrespective of which trolley had been used, participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire (Appendix 7.1) giving their opinions to a 
series of statements about the trolley used.  They were asked to rate how strongly 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement on a Likert scale of one to seven, with 
any additional comments in a free-text box.  At the end of the session they were 
asked to complete a final questionnaire with a similar format asking them to state 
their preference of trolley, new or old (Appendix 7.2). In addition, information was 
elicited regarding participant demographics – including age, experience, and 
questions relating to issues with equipment on a resuscitation trolley. 
 
7.3.4.2 Speed of checking 
To measure the speed with which participants completed the trolley check, each was 
timed using a stopwatch.  Participants were unaware of this. 
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7.3.4.3 Accuracy of checking 
Accuracy was assessed in terms of whether participants identified specific items that 
were missing, or had expired on both trolleys.  In total five items were missing, and 
three items had expired on each trolley (Figure 7.3).  Of the items missing, three 
were thought to be important, such as an intubation bougie, and two less important, 
such as a gauze swab.  Items missing or expired were consistent throughout all study 
sessions, and were selected as being of equal importance, although they were 
different on both trolleys.  Participants were unaware that the trolley was 
incompletely stocked, but were asked to report at the end of the check if they noticed 
any errors.   
 
 
Figure 7.3 – Items missing from the study trolleys 
 
Missing Items Standard Trolley Resus:Station 
1 Small sharps box Yankauer sucker 
2 Intubation bougie 1 laryngoscope handle 
3 Guedel airway size 3 Bag valve mask 
4 ET tube size 8 Gauze swabs 
5 Catheter mount 2 green needles 
Expired Items   
1 Suction catheter size 14 1 set of defibrillator pads 
2 10 ml syringe 1 blood giving set 
3 1 set of blood bottles 1 litre Saline 
 
 
7.3.5 Statistical Analyses 
All data analyses were carried out using SPSS v. 18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA).  The tests used included calculating mean (standard deviation) for parametric 
datasets, and median (Interquartile Range (IQR)) for non-parametric datasets such as 
questionnaire ratings.  A Wilcoxon test was used to assess the significance of the 
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difference between non-parametric datasets, whilst a paired t-test was used to assess 
the significance of the difference between parametric datasets.  The independent t-
test was used for parametric datasets, when the groups were not directly related to 
one another. 
 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Demographics 
A total of 60 nurses were recruited to the study.  Of these the majority, 49, were 
female.  Participants had a range of backgrounds from Student Nurses to Ward 
Managers, but the majority were “Nurses” (29) or “Junior Sisters” (17), with a mean 
of 10.07±8.05 years experience.  Of these, 76.7% report having attended an arrest 
where equipment was missing from the trolley, and 30% admit to having taken 
equipment from a resuscitation trolley when there isn’t an emergency. 
 
7.4.2 Aim 1 – Assess attitudes, opinions and beliefs of participants 
regarding the new Resus:Station when compared with the standard 
resuscitation trolley 
The overall user feedback results for all participants clearly indicate a strongly 
significant preference for the newly designed “Resus:Station” for all aspects (Table 
7.1).  This includes the fact that it is very easy to find equipment on the trolley, the 
design makes checking the trolley easier, and that it is easy to see at a glance if items 
are missing from the trolley. 
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Table 7.1 – Participant opinions to statements relating to the trolley they have used (standard or 
Resus:Station) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Overall Data 
Trolley Used – Median (IQR) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3.0 (3-4) 7.0 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to access equipment on this trolley 4.0 (3-5) 7.0 (6-7) <0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
checking the trolley easier 4.0 (2-4) 7.0 (6-7) <0.001 
The layout of the equipment on this trolley 
makes checking it easier 4.0 (2-4) 7.0 (6-7) <0.001 
The checklist supplied with the trolley makes it 
easier to find equipment 5.0 (3-6) 7.0 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to check expiry dates of items stored 
in the trolley 4.0 (3-6) 6.0 (4-7) <0.001 
It is easy to assess the quantity of items stored 
in the trolley 4.0 (3-5) 6.0 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if items are missing 
from the trolley 2.0 (2-3.75) 6.0 (5-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if extra items (not on 
the checklist) are on the trolley 3.0 (2-4) 6.0 (5-7) <0.001 
 
 
The final questionnaire results report a strong preference for the ergonomically 
designed trolley (Table 7.2); for every aspect participants preferred the 
Resus:Station.  The preference for the Resus:Station was apparent regardless of 
which trolley was used first (Appendix 7.3 and 7.4).  
 
Table 7.2 – Overall preference of trolley 
1 = Definitely Resus:Station, 4 = No Preference, 7 = Definitely Old Trolley 
 
Question Score – Median (IQR) 
Overall Use 1 (1-2) 
Ease of finding equipment 1 (1-2) 
Layout of equipment 1 (1-2) 
Ease of checking the trolley 1 (1-2) 
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This also remains true when the data is analysed depending on whether the job titles 
were “Nurse” or “Junior Sister”.  Data analysis was not meaningful for the remaining 
job categories due to insufficient group numbers. 
 
Table 7.3 shows a further breakdown of results into whether the nurses were already 
familiar with the trolley, or whether it was the first time they had seen the trolley.  As 
can be seen, for all except one question there was no significant difference in 
responses to statements.  The exception was to the statement “It is easy to check 
expiry dates of items stored in the trolley”.  The nurses that were familiar with the 
trolley answered less favourably (median 4.5 (4-6)) than those unfamiliar with the 
trolley (median 6 (5-7)).  
 
Table 7.3 – Participant opinions to statements about the Resus:Station depending on whether they are 
familiar with it or not (Median (IQR)). 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
All Participants 
Resus:Station Opinions Signif of Diff Question 
Not Familiar 
(N=40) 
Familiar  
(N=20) 
Mann-
Whitney 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 7 (6-7) 7 (6-7) 0.819 
It is easy to access equipment on this trolley 7 (6-7) 7 (6-7) 0.388 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
checking the trolley easier 7 (6-7) 7 (6-7) 0.331 
The layout of the equipment on this trolley 
makes checking it easier 7 (6-7) 7 (6-7) 0.978 
The checklist supplied with the trolley makes it 
easier to find equipment 7 (6-7) 7 (6-7) 0.592 
It is easy to check expiry dates of items stored 
in the trolley 6 (5-7) 4.5 (4-6) 0.009* 
It is easy to assess the quantity of items stored 
in the trolley 6 (6-7) 6 (5-7) 0.239 
It is easy to see at a glance if items are missing 
from the trolley 7 (5-7) 6 (5-6.75) 0.121 
It is easy to see at a glance if extra items (not on 
the checklist) are on the trolley 6 (5-7) 6 (4-6.75) 0.051 
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7.4.3 Aim 2 – To determine differences in speed of the trolley check when 
using the Resus:Station compared with the standard resuscitation 
trolley 
The results in Table 7.4 show that overall there was no statistically significant 
difference in the speed with which the participants checked both the trolleys (p = 
0.896).   
 
Table 7.4 – Mean time taken (seconds) to check the standard trolley and the Resus:Station, with 
significance of the difference between the two trolleys assessed using the paired t-test (* = significant 
result) 
 
Trolley used - mean (SD) Significance 
Group Analysis 
Standard Trolley Resus:Station Paired T-test 
Overall results  (n=60) 552.25s (225.292) 555.35s (247.85) 0.896 
Standard Trolley First (n=25) 629.72s (292.14) 558.76s (286.98) 0.068 
Resus:Station First  (n=35) 496.91s (142.37) 552.91s (220.113) 0.049* 
Not familiar with R:S (n=40) 582.8s (253.64) 613.13s (270.05) 0.324 
Familiar with R:S (n=20) 491.15s (140.24) 439.0s (140.31) 0.12 
 
When analysing the data on the basis of which trolley was used first, there is one 
significant result.  However, it can be seen that in both cases, the trolley that was 
checked second was faster, suggesting this result represents a learning effect from 
performing the check twice in succession, rather than any improvement in speed 
based on the trolley design.  
 
The data was further analysed to see if there was any difference in results depending 
on whether nursing staff were already familiar with the Resus:Station, or whether 
this was the first time they had ever seen it. Nursing staff who were unfamiliar with 
the Resus:Station had a mean checking time that was longer than for the standard 
trolley (standard = 582.8±253.64 seconds, Resus:Station = 613.13±270.05 seconds), 
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whilst those that had previously used the Resus:Station had a mean checking time 
that was faster than for the standard trolley (standard = 491.15±140.24, Resus:Station 
= 439.0±140.31).  However, neither of these results achieved significance.  
 
Finally, when comparing the checking speeds on the basis of familiarity with the 
Resus:Station, it can be seen that there was no significant difference between the two 
groups when checking the standard trolley (Table 7.5).   
 
Table 7.5 – Comparison of mean trolley checking speeds, in seconds (with standard deviation), 
depending on whether participants were familiar or unfamiliar with the Resus:Station, with 
significance of difference assessed using the independent t-test (** = strongly significant result) 
 
Familiarity with new Resus:Station Significance 
Group Analysis Not familiar with 
R:S (n=40) 
Familiar with R:S 
(n=20) Independent T-test 
Standard Trolley  582.8s (253.64) 491.15s (SD 140.24) 0.139 
Resus:Station  613.13s (SD 270.05) 439.0s (140.31) 0.002** 
 
 
This result was unsurprising, since all nursing staff were familiar with the standard 
trolley from routine use on the ward.  However, there is a strongly significant 
difference (p = 0.002) between the speed of checking the Resus:Station by those that 
were familiar with it, and those that had never seen it before; with familiar 
participants being faster.  This confirms that with time, and exposure, nursing staff 
become faster in their use of the new trolley.  This fact, in combination with the trend 
towards faster checks when compared with the standard trolley for familiar 
participants, suggests that the new ergonomic design is, indeed, easier and faster to 
check.  However, the study should ideally be repeated on a larger cohort of 
“familiar” participants to see if significance is achieved.   
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7.4.4 Aim 3 – To determine differences in the accuracy of the trolley check 
when using the “Resus:Station” compared with the standard 
resuscitation trolley. 
Table 7.6 lists the frequency of identification of specific items in terms of the 
percentage of participants that correctly identified them. 
 
Table 7.6 – The percentage (%) of participants that identified each piece of missing equipment 
 
 Standard Trolley Resus:Station 
Missing Items Item Detail % Identified Item Detail % Identified 
1 Small sharps box 91.7 Yankauer sucker 83.3 
2 Intubation bougie 85 1 laryngoscope handle 66.7 
3 Guedel airway size 3 80 Bag valve mask 85 
4 ET tube size 8 73.3 Gauze swabs 76.7 
5 Catheter mount 71.6 2 green needles 65 
Expired Items     
1 Suction catheter size 14 15 1 set of defib pads 16.7 
2 10 ml syringe 8.3 1 blood giving set 13.3 
3 1 set of blood bottles 13.3 1 litre Saline 45 
 
 
As can be seen in table 7.7, when comparing the accuracy of identifying missing 
equipment during the trolley checks, there was no significant difference, although I 
am unable to exclude a type 1 error.  The median number of items identified was 4.5 
for the standard trolley and 4 for the Resus:Station, from a maximum of 5 items.   
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Table 7.7 – Comparing the accuracy of identifying missing equipment on the standard trolley and the 
Resus:Station.  Results quoted as Median (IQR), with significance of the difference assessed using 
Wilcoxon test.  (* = statistically significant result) 
 
Missing equipment identified Significance 
Group Analysis 
Standard Trolley Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall results  (n=60) 4.5 (4-5) 4 (3-5) 0.225 
Standard Trolley First (n=25) 4 (2.5-5) 4 (3-5) 1.0 
Resus:Station First  (n=35) 5 (4-5) 4 (2-5) 0.133 
Not familiar with R:S (n=40) 5 (4-5) 4.5 (2-5) 0.024* 
Familiar with R:S (n=20) 4 (2.25-5) 4 (4-5) 0.106 
 
 
When looking at the group sub-analysis, there remains no statistically significant 
difference on the basis of which trolley was checked first.  The only significant result 
in this dataset occurred when looking at participants who had no previous experience 
with the Resus:Station.  These participants had a significantly lower rate of accuracy 
when checking the Resus:Station compared with the standard trolley (p = 0.024).  
However, this difference is very marginal in terms of the actual number of items 
identified (median 4.5, compared with median 5), and is likely to represent the fact 
that the participants had no prior experience with the trolley.  When directly 
comparing those that were familiar with the Resus:Station and those that were not I 
found there was no benefit conferred from familiarity. 
 
When comparing accuracy on the basis of identifying expired equipment during the 
trolley checks, the majority of results do have a significant difference suggesting 
participants had a greater ability to identify expired equipment when using the 
Resus:Station in comparison with the standard trolley (Table 7.8).  However, this 
may reflect a design failure in the study, rather than being a true significant 
difference, as I will discuss later.   
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Table 7.8 – Comparing the accuracy of identifying expired equipment in the standard trolley and the 
Resus:Station  (Median (IQR)), with significance of the difference assessed using Wilcoxon test. 
 
Expired equipment identified Significance 
Group Analysis 
Standard Trolley Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall results  (n=60) 0 (0-1) 1 (0-1) 0.001 
Standard Trolley First (n=25) 0 (0-0) 1 (0-1) 0.053 
Resus:Station First  (n=35) 0 (0-1) 0 (0-1) 0.007 
Not familiar with R:S (n=40) 0 (0-1) 0 (0-1) 0.03 
Familiar with R:S (n=20) 0 (0-0.75) 1 (0-1) 0.008 
 
 
7.5 Discussion 
I have demonstrated no improvement in speed or accuracy in trolley checking when 
nursing staff use the Resus:Station in comparison with the standard resuscitation 
trolley.  However, as this study was a pilot and has not been powered, it is not 
possible to exclude a type 1 error.  Study participant opinions, however, were 
strongly in favour of the new trolley design. 
 
Results from the questionnaires capturing user opinions of the Resus:Station in 
comparison with the standard trolley, clearly demonstrate a significant preference for 
the new trolley.  This is despite it being the first time many of the participants had 
ever seen the trolley.  It is interesting to note that the familiarity of the standard 
trolley from routine ward use did not bias results in favour of that trolley. Nursing 
staff strongly agreed that the design and layout of the Resus:Station would help them 
to check and stock the trolley.   
 
When the data was sub-analysed into those that were familiar, and those that were 
not familiar with the new trolley, those with some familiarity responded less 
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favourably to the statement “It is easy to check expiry dates of items stored in the 
trolley”.  It is perhaps unsurprising that participants did not find checking expiry 
dates any easier than on the standard trolley as ultimately all expiry dates are printed 
in small type on obscure parts of packaging.  Therefore, it would generally be very 
hard to see an expiry date on any item without removing it from the trolley to 
examine it in detail.  Therefore the design of the trolley itself would be unlikely to 
make this task any easier.  What is interesting, though, is that prior to actually using 
the Resus:Station, the favourable impact of the “first impression” is so great that 
nursing staff believe it would be easier to check expiry dates.  Credit should therefore 
be given to the designers for the powerful design concept they have created.  The fact 
that both those familiar, and those unfamiliar with the trolley believe it makes their 
role of checking and stocking the trolley easier confirms the success of the 
ergonomic design in terms of perception. 
 
The original aim of the project to redesign the resuscitation trolley was to improve 
resuscitation attempts and reduce adverse events at the attempts.  One of the ways to 
do this is to improve the reliability of the trolley stocking and checking process, and 
so reduce the incidence of missing equipment.  Despite my other study (discussed in 
Chapter 8) demonstrating that the ergonomic design improves efficiency of a 
resuscitation attempt by making it easier for staff to locate equipment compared with 
the standard trolley (Walker, et al., 2012), in this study missing and expired 
equipment was identified with equal accuracy on the standard and new resuscitation 
trolleys.  The exception was when looking just at those participants with no previous 
experience of the Resus:Station.  These participants had a lower rate of accuracy in 
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identifying missing equipment on the Resus:Station than on the standard trolley, 
which is likely to simply represent the effect of unfamiliarity of the situation.   
 
Nolan (2000) explains that multi-step processes are inherently prone to human error, 
even if each individual step has a low risk of error.  Despite the slight reduction in 
steps by virtue of the design, I have been unable to significantly reduce the overall 
number due to the large number of items that need to be present on the trolley and 
individually checked.  It is probable, therefore, that inaccuracies will continue until a 
time when the process is fully automated.   
 
A surprisingly low number of participants checked the expiry date of the defibrillator 
pads, which is one of the most important items to check on a trolley, as expired pads 
tend to have dried gel, impeding the quality of patient contact and affecting the 
success of defibrillation (AED Brands Resource Centre, 2010). The fact that only 
16.7% of the nurses checked these suggests it is rarely checked.  One could possibly 
conclude from this that, whilst the NPSA, in their initial report, correctly stated that 
adequate guidance has already been issued by the Resuscitation Council regarding 
stocking and checking trolleys, perhaps this guidance has not been dissipated and 
taught sufficiently to all members of staff responsible for checking a resuscitation 
trolley?  The recent NCEPOD report of in-hospital resuscitation attempts (NCEPOD, 
2012) states that only 50% of hospitals checked the resuscitation trolley after every 
resuscitation attempt. This is clearly going to increase the likelihood of equipment 
availability issues.  To me this suggests staff responsible for trolley checking do not 
understand the importance of this task. 
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Increasing the speed of the stock check was not an aim of the project, although 
increased speed would confer an additional benefit. One might think that if it is 
easier to see all the equipment, then it might be faster to check everything is present.  
However, the results show that this is not the case. Whilst it is true to say that the 
segregated, and more logically organised trolley layout confers a benefit in terms of 
speed when locating equipment during a resuscitation attempt (Walker, et al., 2012), 
the same is not true when checking the trolley.  This reflects the fact that many 
sections contain more than one item – for example 5 packets of gauze in the “Gauze 
section”, and so to check the trolley accurately these need to be removed, counted 
and then replaced – a time-consuming process that is similar with the standard 
trolley.  There was a trend towards a faster speed when using the Resus:Station as 
nursing staff became more familiar with its use.  However, the study would need to 
be repeated with a larger number of participants to ascertain if there is any significant 
difference.  This does, however, suggest that the ergonomic principles in the design 
have been successful.  
 
7.5.1 Limitations 
Expired items were identified with greater accuracy on the new resuscitation trolley 
than the standard trolley. However, in hindsight, this represents an error in the study 
design, and is therefore a limitation of this study.  When deciding which items to 
pick as expired items, the aim was to choose items of similar importance.  The 
expired items chosen for the standard trolley were a suction catheter, a 10ml syringe, 
and a set of blood bottles.  The expired items chosen for the Resus:Station were a set 
of defibrillator pads, a blood giving set, and a litre of saline.  It can clearly be seen 
from the results giving percentages of participants that identified each of these items 
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that the litre of saline was the item that the greatest number of participants identified.  
However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that this is viewed by clinicians 
as being a “drug” as it is administered intravenously to a patient, and therefore is 
something members of staff are taught to routinely check.  This would become habit 
for competent staff.  It is somewhat surprising, and concerning, that only 45% of 
participants checked the expiry date of this item. When this item was discounted 
from data analysis, there was no significant difference between the two groups.   
 
In hindsight, if I had randomised not only the order of trolley use, but also the 
missing/expired equipment set on the trolleys, this would have corrected for any 
selection bias in terms of the equipment itself.   
 
7.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have described a thorough process of assessment of the stocking and 
checking process for the “Resus:Station”, in comparison with a standard resuscitation 
trolley.  I have demonstrated highly significant results, in terms of user opinions, in 
favour of the Resus:Station.  However, whilst participants perceive this trolley to be 
easier to check, we have been unable to demonstrate any improvement in the 
accuracy of trolley check.  There is a trend towards participants being faster at 
checking this ergonomically designed trolley when they are experienced in its use, 
but without an improvement in accuracy this would have no benefit in terms of 
patient safety. 
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8 The Resus:Station: The use of clinical simulations 
 to evaluate a novel resuscitation trolley 
 
    
 
8.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 2, the Resus:Station is a novel resuscitation trolley that was 
designed by the Helen Hamlyn Centre, part of the Royal College of Art, on 
instruction from the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA).  They had identified an 
unacceptably high number of critical incidents reported relating to the resuscitation 
trolley, in particular in relation to failures in stocking the trolley adequately.  Some 
of these incidents were thought to have contributed directly to patient death.  The 
new trolley was designed in an ergonomic fashion with the aim of improving 
efficiency of use in the day-to-day and emergency setting, and increasing patient 
safety at resuscitation attempts.  
 
Prior to placing the trolleys on the wards it was important to ensure they were safe to 
use, and that staff understood how to use them intuitively without instruction.  This 
was especially important for a resuscitation trolley, given the stressful nature and 
circumstances in which it is used.  I therefore conducted a series of simulations using 
the new resuscitation trolley during a simulated cardiac arrest, comparing its use with 
the current standard model of resuscitation trolley. 
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8.2 Aims 
The aim of the study was to assess the use of the 2nd generation Resus:Station in a 
simulated environment to ensure it was safe to use prior to placement in the clinical 
environment.  I specifically wanted to assess the following three aspects, which can 
be described as separate study outputs: 
Aim 1 Differences in efficiency of the resuscitation attempt when using the 
Resus:Station, compared with the standard resuscitation trolley. 
Aim 2 Attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of participants regarding the new 
Resus:Station, when compared with the standard resuscitation trolley 
Aim 3 Differences in team performance in terms of behaviours, and non-
technical skills when using the Resus:Station compared with the standard 
resuscitation trolley.  
 
8.3 Methods 
8.3.1 Design 
This was a randomised crossover simulation study to determine efficiency, 
experience and team performance of cardiac arrest teams using both the standard and 
newly designed resuscitation trolley.  Randomisation of teams, using a computerised 
random number generator (www.randomizer.org) was performed to determine the 
order in which trolleys were used for each team.  The result of this was concealed 
from the researcher enrolling participants, and was revealed just prior to the start of 
each simulation session.  Due to the nature of the study it was not possible to blind 
participants or researchers. 
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Ethics permission for this study was awarded by the North West London Research 
Ethics Committee on 4th November 2008.  Study title: A clinical study of a novel 
resuscitation trolley, REC reference: 08/H0722/91 (Appendix 4.1).   
 
8.3.2 Participants 
Small cardiac arrest teams consisting of an anaesthetist, a physician, and a nurse 
were recruited for each simulation session.  Eligible participants all had some 
experience of attending real resuscitation attempts, with eligible physicians having 
led such attempts. To help facilitate the resuscitation simulation, one member of the 
research team acted as an additional junior nurse.  His only role in this study was to 
perform chest compressions when requested by the study participants, to enable the 
participants to perform other resuscitation tasks.  At no point did he offer any other 
advice or assistance to the team, or interact with either trolley in any way.  Fifteen 
teams, consisting of a total of 45 participants were recruited.  
 
8.3.3 Procedure 
The diagram (Figure 8.1) below graphically depicts the overall format for the 
simulation study sessions. 
 
Overall participants were asked to complete two short cardiac arrest simulations in 
our simulation centre, one using the newly designed Resus:Station and one using the 
standard resuscitation trolley used in our hospital, with which they were familiar 
from use on the hospital wards.  
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Prior to each simulation, participants were given a standardised simulation scenario 
to read, and the simulation then began.  All simulations were performed using a 
Laerdal SimMan 3G Patient Simulator (Laerdal Medical, Stavanger, Norway) 
offering the highest fidelity patient simulation currently available.  Simulations were 
recorded using a SMOTS™ mobile recording system (Scotia UK plc, Edinburgh, 
UK), for the purposes of constructive feedback to participants, and to enable 
retrospective detailed analysis of the simulations. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 – Illustration of overall study format 
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If the team had been randomised to use the Resus:Station first, given that they had 
never seen the trolley before, they were at this point given a short explanation of the 
trolley in terms of how and why it was designed, and spent a few minutes exploring 
it thoroughly.  This introduction to the new trolley was performed just prior to the 
second simulation if the team were randomised to use it second. 
 
Simulations were standardised as much as possible, with the research team following 
a protocol (Appendix 8.1) determining the presentation of clinical findings to 
participants, the result of DC cardioversion or defibrillation, and when to stop 
simulation.  Despite this, each was inevitably marginally different depending on how 
the team responded to the clinical scenario.  For example, some teams reacted to 
clinical signs faster than others.  These teams were therefore often quicker at 
defibrillating, and overall these simulations tended to be shorter. The first simulation 
was always a scenario of a patient with a ruptured aortic aneurysm leading to a 
cardiac arrest, and the second simulation was a scenario of a patient with chest pain 
leading to a cardiac arrest (Appendix 8.2a & b).  Each lasted approximately five 
minutes.  
 
8.3.4 Measures 
8.3.4.1 Demographics 
On arrival at the study session, participants were asked to complete a form giving 
participant demographics (Appendix 8.3).  This not only asked standard questions 
about age and speciality, but also elicited information regarding experience at cardiac 
arrest events, and experience of issues with equipment at resuscitation attempts.  
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8.3.4.2 Efficiency 
To measure the efficiency of the resuscitation team, three clear markers were 
identified during the simulations.  These were: 
a) Time to drugs – defined as the time in seconds from the moment one of the team 
members said “let’s give some adrenaline”, or similar wording, to the time at which 
whoever was searching for the drugs had the packet in their hand. 
b) Missing equipment – defined as occasions during the simulations when a team 
member searched for an item of equipment, was unable to find it, and stated that the 
equipment was missing, despite perfectly stocked trolleys. 
c) Unnecessary drawer openings – this was only assessed when teams were using the 
standard trolley, as there are no drawers on the Resus:Station.  An unnecessary 
drawer opening was defined as an occasion when a team member opened a drawer, 
looked inside, and closed the drawer without removing equipment, which clearly 
represents inefficient use of time. 
 
Two expert clinical observers, an anaesthetist and a resuscitation officer, 
independently and retrospectively made assessments of the team efficiency by 
watching the video recordings of each study session.  These independent scores were 
then averaged (mean) to create a dataset for analysis. 
 
8.3.4.3 Attitudes and views 
After each simulation, irrespective of which trolley had been used, participants were 
asked to complete a questionnaire (Appendix 8.4) giving their opinions to a series of 
statements about the trolley used. They were asked to rate how strongly they agreed 
or disagreed with the statement on a Likert scale of one to seven, with any additional 
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comments in a free-text box. These comments were collated in the form of quotes.  
At the end of the session, they were asked to complete a final questionnaire with a 
similar format asking them to state their preference of trolley, new or old (Appendix 
8.5).  
 
8.3.4.4 Team performance 
The non-technical teamworking skills of every team during both simulations were 
retrospectively rated to determine whether a novel piece of equipment had any 
impact on these skills. Two researchers – an anaesthetist and a resuscitation officer – 
watched video recordings and rated behaviours using the “OSCAR” tool (Walker, et 
al., 2011), developed specifically for this purpose, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis.  Assessors were kept blinded to each other’s ratings during this process, and 
had been trained in the use of the tool prior to the beginning of the study. 
 
8.3.5 Statistical Analyses 
All data analyses were carried out using SPSS v. 18.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA).  The tests used included calculation of mean (standard deviation) for 
parametric datasets, and median (inter-quartile range (IQR)) for ordinal datasets such 
as questionnaire ratings.  A Wilcoxon test was used to assess the significance of the 
difference between non-parametric datasets, whilst paired t-test was used to assess 
the significance of the difference between parametric datasets.  Intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC) were used to assess inter-rater reliability of OSCAR scores.  As I 
have mentioned previously, this test is recommended in the literature (Abell, et al., 
2009) to measure the level of agreement between assessors using an assessment 
instrument, with ICC values of 0.70 or higher indicating adequate agreement. 
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8.4 Results  
8.4.1 Demographics 
Given the process of recruitment to the study, the groups were equally sized with 15 
anaesthetists, 15 physicians, and 15 nurses.  The median age of participants was 31.5 
years, with a range of 27 to 53 years.  There was no significant difference in the age 
ranges of the 3 subgroups.  Twenty-eight of the 45 participants were female (62%) 
with the remaining 17 being male (38%).   
 
Of the participants, only 5 reported to have attended between 0-10 arrests during 
their career.  Of these, 3 were nurses and 2 were medics.  The remaining participants 
all reported to have greater experience, having attended either 10-50, or greater than 
50 arrests in the past.  Figure 8.2 illustrates these results. 
 
Figure 8.2 – Approximate number of resuscitation attempts previously attended by study participants 
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As can be seen from the results, it would appear that the group of anaesthetists was 
more experienced than the physician and nurse groups.  Most participants agreed 
with the statement “I consider myself experienced in dealing with a resuscitation”.  
Only 2 of the 45 disagreed, and 6 neither agreed nor disagreed.   
 
When asked whether they had experienced problems with missing equipment at a 
resuscitation attempt 37 out of 45 (82%) reported that they had, and 51% admitted 
that they had removed equipment from a resuscitation trolley, not for use at an 
emergency.   
 
8.4.2 Aim 1 – Differences in efficiency of the resuscitation attempt when 
using the Resus:Station, compared with the standard resuscitation 
trolley. 
 
8.4.2.1 Time to drugs 
The time to administering drugs was significantly faster when using the 
Resus:Station compared with the standard trolley (mean 5.19s (SD 3.34) versus mean 
26.81s (SD 16.05); mean difference 21.62s (95% CI diff 11.48-31.76), p = 0.001).  
This time difference remains significant when analysing the sub-groups in terms of 
which trolley was used first; Resus:Station first (standard trolley mean 25.29s (SD 
18.49) versus Resus:Station mean 6.29s (SD 3.45); mean difference 19.0s (95% CI 
diff 1.09-36.91), p = 0.041) or standard trolley first (standard trolley mean 28.58s 
(SD14.19) versus Resus:Station mean 3.92 s (SD 3.0); mean difference 24.66s (95% 
CI diff 9.64-39.70), p = 0.008).  This is illustrated in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1 - Time taken to find drugs, with significance of the difference between the two trolleys 
 
Trolley used - mean (SD) Significance 
Group Analysis 
Standard Trolley Resus:Station   Paired T-test 
Overall results (n=13) 26.81s (16.05) 5.19s (3.34) 0.001 
Standard Trolley First 
(n=6) 28.58s (14.19) 3.92s (3.0) 0.008 
Resus:Station First (n=7) 25.29s (18.49) 6.29s (3.45) 0.041 
 
 
8.4.2.2 Missing equipment 
There were no occasions when using the Resus:Station that equipment was reported 
missing.  However, during four of the fifteen study sessions using the standard 
trolley team members were unable to find a piece of equipment on the trolley, 
specifically: 
 1. An intubating bougie 
 2. Saline ampoules 
 3. Amiodarone minijet 
 4. The mask for a self-inflating bag 
On each occasion, the research team was able to find the equipment on the trolley for 
participants after the simulation had finished. 
 
8.4.2.3 Unnecessary drawer openings 
During our short simulations, there was a median of 6.75 (IQR 2.13-9.38) wasted 
drawer openings when using the standard trolley. There are no drawers on the 
Resus:Station with which to make a direct comparison.   
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8.4.3 Aim 2 - Attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of participants regarding the 
 new Resus:Station, when compared with the standard resuscitation 
 trolley 
The overall user feedback results for all participants clearly indicate a strongly 
significant preference for the newly designed Resus:Station for all aspects (Table 
8.2).  This includes the enhancement of teamwork during a resuscitation attempt, the 
fact that equipment is easily accessible, and the fact that it is intuitive to use and 
could be used without instruction.   
Table 8.2 – Participant opinions to statements relating to the trolley they have used (standard or 
resus:station)   Likert Scale : 1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = neither, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Overall Data 
Trolley Used – Median (IQR) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall this is an excellent trolley with no 
problems 3.0 (1.5-4) 5.0 (4-6) <0.001 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3.0 (2-5) 5.0 (5-6) <0.001 
I think it would be easy to check and stock this 
trolley 3.0 (2-5) 6.0 (5.25-7) <0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
resuscitation easier 3.0 (2-4) 5.0 (4.5-6) <0.001 
All the equipment required for intubation is easily 
accessible 4.0 (2-5) 6.0 (5-6) <0.001 
The aesthetic design of this trolley is appealing 4.0 (3-4) 5.0 (4-6) <0.001 
This trolley enhances teamwork in resuscitation 3.0 (2-4) 4.5 (4-6) <0.001 
The design of this trolley is intuitive and its use 
does not need explaining 3.0 (2-4) 5.0 (5-6) <0.001 
All the drugs and fluids required for resuscitation 
are easy to find 3.0 (2-4) 5.5 (5-6) <0.001 
There is sufficient workspace on top to lay 
equipment out if required 3.0 (1-3) 6.0 (5-6) <0.001 
I would be able to use this trolley without 
instruction 3.0 (2-5) 6.0 (5-6) <0.001 
This trolley significantly contributes to a 
successful resuscitation 3.0 (2-4) 5.0 (4-6) <0.001 
This trolley could be better designed 6.0 (5-7) 5.0 (4-6) <0.001 
This trolley would benefit from a review of its 
design 6.0 (5-7) 5.0 (3-5) <0.001 
There are flaws I can identify in this trolley 6.0 (5-7) 5.0 (3.25-5) <0.001 
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The final questionnaire results report a strong preference for the ergonomically 
designed trolley (Table 8.3); for every aspect participants preferred the 
Resus:Station.  This is particularly true for the final statement “To aid the restocking 
process” which not only has the lowest median score (median 1 (IQR 1-2)), but also 
has the smallest total range of responses (1-4), with no participants stating a 
preference for the standard trolley.  The preference for the Resus:Station was 
apparent regardless of which trolley was used first.  
 
Table 8.3 – Overall preference of trolley 
Likert Scale : 1 = Definitely Resus:Station, 4 = No preference, 7 = Definitely old trolley 
 
Question Score – Median (IQR) 
Overall Use 2 (1-3) 
Ease of finding equipment 2 (1-3.5) 
Aesthetic Design 2 (1-3.5) 
To facilitate teamwork 3 (2-4) 
To facilitate running an efficient resuscitation 2 (1.5-3) 
To aid the restocking process 1 (1-2) 
 
 
Tables 8.6, 8.7, and 8.8 in the appendix show a further breakdown of these results 
into different team subgroups – anaesthetists, physicians, and nurses.  It can be seen 
that once again there is a significant difference between the two columns of results 
with a preference for the Resus:Station.  However, unlike previously, due to the 
smaller numbers (n=15) there are six statements, from a total of 45, where the 
difference between the responses relating to the Resus:Station or standard trolley is 
not significant.  
 
	   174	  
Table 8.4 lists a representative selection of quotes from participants about the 
Resus:Station, with positive quotes far outnumbering negative quotes. 
 
Table 8.4 – A representative selection of quotes from study participants about the Resus:Station 
 
Positive Quotes about the Resus:Station 
“I like the way you can see everything immediately.” 
“I’m familiar with the old trolley and therefore found it easier to use.  However, I like the colour 
coded sections of the Resus:Station, and thought the labelling of items could facilitate easier retrieval 
for people less familiar with resuscitation equipment.” 
“Normally you’re stressed finding things; you’re throwing things in the air and asking for things.  It’s 
not efficient communication asking for things.  Now that time can be used to communicate efficiently 
with each other.” 
“I love it.” 
“It’s miles better than the current trolley.” 
“I like the fact that we (Anaesthetists) can take the airway stuff, and not be “faffing” with everyone 
else around the trolley.” 
Negative Quotes about the Resus:Station 
“The trolley is huge – storage may be an issue – could it be made smaller in any way?” 
“It’s a great idea, and visually it’s perfect, but it’s too big.” 
“Because the trolley was taken to the left of the bed (as you look at the bed), the airway section was 
nearest the feet, and so then there was a jumble trying to get the trolley to me (the anaesthetist).” 
“There’s a lot of wasted space in the trolley.” 
 
 
8.4.4 Aim 3 – Differences in team performance in terms of behaviours, 
and non-technical skills when using the Resus:Station compared with 
the standard resuscitation trolley.  
Having rated teams using the OSCAR tool, I then made a comparison of the median 
scores for each behaviour exemplar when the team used the Resus:Station or the 
standard trolley to see if there was a significant difference between ratings (Table 
8.5).  Overall, the teams performed equally well for all dimensions of team 
performance, on the new trolley and the old trolley, even though it was the first time 
they had ever seen the Resus:Station.  
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This remained true when subanalysis looked at which trolley was used first 
(Appendix 8.9), and also when looking at different team members – anaesthetists, 
physicians, and nurses (Appendix 8.10).  It is important to note in the sub-analysis, 
that 3 individual exemplar ratings reported statistically significant results.  However, 
when looking at these results in detail it can be seen that in each case, the behaviour 
scores when using the 2nd trolley were greater than when using the first trolley, 
irrespective of which model was used first.  Therefore these significant results are 
likely to represent the learning effect of doing two simulations in quick succession 
and are unlikely to represent any effect of the trolley itself. 
 
Table 8.5 - Overall results (median (IQR)) for the whole team using OSCAR to rate behaviours, with 
Wilcoxon assessment of the significance of difference when using the different trolleys. ( *= p < 0.05) 
 
Overall Scores 
Behaviour 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
1 4 (3.5-4.5) 4 (3.5-5) 0.205 
2 4 (3.5-5) 4.5 (3.5-5) 0.182 
3 4 (3.25-4.5) 4.5 (3.25-5) 0.062 
Communication 
4 4 (3.5-5) 4 (4-5) 0.112 
1 4.5 (4-5) 4 (3-6) 0.217 
2 4 (3.5-4.75) 4.5 (4-5) 0.084 Co-operation 
3 4 (3.5-5) 4.5 (3.5-5) 0.874 
1 4.5 (3.5-5) 4 (3.5-5) 0.256 
2 3.5 (3-4.5) 4.5 (3.75-5) 0.049* Co-ordination 
3 3.5 (3-4) 4 (3-4.75) 0.586 
1 4 (3.25-5) 4 (3.5-5) 0.636 
2 3.5 (3.5-5) 4.5 (3.5-5) 0.433 Leadership 
3 3.5 (3-4.625) 4 (3.5-4.5) 0.246 
1 4 (3.5-4.5) 4 (3-5) 1.0 
2 4 (3.5-4.5) 4 (3.5-5) 0.367 Monitoring 
3 3 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 1.0 
1 4 (3.5-5) 4.75 (3.5-5) 0.751 
2 4 (3.5-5) 4 (3.5-5) 1.0 
Decision 
Making 
3 3 (3-4) 3.5 (3-4) 0.107 
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Scores from both assessors were compared to assess inter-rater reliability.  Of the 18 
scored behaviours (three team subgroups, and six behaviour categories) that the tool 
assesses, all achieved highly significant (p < 0.001) ICC results, twelve of which 
were very high with results ≥ 0.70 (Table 8.6).   This represents further evidence of 
the inter-rater reliability of the OSCAR tool. 
 
Table 8.6 – OSCAR intraclass correlation coefficients between the two assessors across behaviours 
and subgroups for all simulations (n=30) (** p<0.001) 
 
 Behaviour / Skill 
Team 
Subgroup Communication Co-operation Co-ordination Leadership Monitoring 
Decision 
Making 
Anaesthetists 0.71** 0.57** 0.71** 0.62** 0.70** 0.57** 
Physicians 0.93** 0.90** 0.91** 0.91** 0.87** 0.88** 
Nurses 0.76** 0.64** 0.55** 0.81** 0.69** 0.81** 
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8.5 Discussion 
I have demonstrated improved efficiency when resuscitation teams are exposed to the 
new Resus:Station resuscitation trolley for the first time in a simulated environment.  
Study participants opinions were strongly in favour of the new trolley, and there 
were no detrimental effects on non-technical team-working skills.   
 
Historically, it has been unusual to conduct clinical trials of pieces of equipment.  
However, as has been highlighted in the “Design for Patient Safety” reports 
(Department of Health and Design Council, 2004), there is an increasing appreciation 
of the links between design of equipment, human error, and patient safety issues.  As 
I mentioned in Chapter 1, in 2001, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) in the US published a report (Croteau & Schyve, 
2000) looking at ways to improve patient safety standards.  In this, Spath stated “If 
healthcare is to improve patient safety, systems and processes must be designed to be 
more resistant to error occurrence and more accommodating of error consequence”. 
Reason (2000) argues that processes that require perfect human performance are 
fatally flawed and Grout (2006) goes on to coin the term “Mistake proofing” to 
change the physical design of a process to reduce human error.  Having redesigned 
an item with these issues in mind, it remains important to demonstrate safety and 
benefit when compared with the previous standard.  Whilst the NPSA has produced a 
guide to user testing in the development of medical devices (NPSA, March 2010b), I 
was unable to find examples of equipment testing in the literature.  I have therefore 
developed a novel way to evaluate a piece of equipment in a simulated environment 
prior to introducing it to the ward, a process that is now being used for trials of other 
clinical equipment. 
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Whilst developing a protocol to assess efficiency of the resuscitation team, I looked 
in detail for consistent elements that were seen during resuscitations and were 
accurately measureable as surrogate markers of efficiency.  A number of candidate 
measures, such as time to intubation, were assessed, but having examined the video 
recordings of simulations, they were found not to be robust, as they did not reliably 
have fixed points in time.  There were a variety of reasons for this.  Some related to 
the fact that many thought processes are not consciously verbalised, and are therefore 
not possible to measure.  Others related to the fact that whilst clinicians adhere to a 
treatment protocol during resuscitation, there are occasions – based on specific 
circumstances, and experience – where it may be appropriate to deviate from the 
protocol.  For example, an anaesthetist may consciously decide, for many reasons, to 
delay intubation during a resuscitation attempt.  Therefore, measuring time to 
intubation from the beginning of the scenario would not accurately reflect efficiency 
in terms of equipment usage.  
 
My first reliable marker of efficiency was “Time to Drugs”.  The use of adrenaline in 
resuscitation has recently been trialled by Jacobs et al (2011).  Although they were 
unable to demonstrate improved survival with the use of adrenaline, it remains in the 
guidelines and so the general issue of the time interval between decision and delivery 
of drugs seems a plausible marker of efficiency.  I found it encouraging that 
medications were accessed significantly faster when using the Resus:Station in 
comparison to the standard trolley.  Of note is the fact that this remained true even 
when analysing the subgroups in terms of trolley order of use.  When performing two 
simulations consecutively there is likely to be a degree of learning of the process of 
the simulation.  One anticipates the second simulation will run more smoothly as the 
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participants understand what to expect, and get to know each other.  Therefore, it is 
significant that despite the possibility of a learning effect participants were able to 
find drugs significantly faster on the Resus:Station, even when this trolley was used 
first.  This is especially encouraging since in their report initiating this project, the 
National Patient Safety Agency highlighted the fact that time is of the essence at a 
resuscitation attempt, and that time spent searching for equipment is a waste of time 
and may potentially affect that patient’s chances of survival.  The potential 
importance of this finding was highlighted in Ornato et al’s (2012) review of NRCPR 
data and resuscitation system errors, mentioned in Chapter 1.  In their results, they 
specifically demonstrate decreased survival when administration of adrenaline was 
delayed, and in their recommendations state that training should be targeted to avoid 
the types of errors that have the greatest impact on survival, including minimising 
delays in medication administration.  I feel that this, and my data relating to 
equipment that was not found during simulations is particularly encouraging when 
one remembers the cumulative effect of staff searching for multiple pieces of 
equipment over the course of a prolonged resuscitation attempt.  Difficulty finding 
equipment leads to members of staff being sent away to look for it elsewhere, leads 
to delays in delivery of care, may increase stress levels amongst team members, and 
may increase the rates of error and adverse events.  This is on top of the emergency 
situation itself causing stress, which can affect performance (Norris & Lockey, 
2012). Importantly, Sandroni et al (2005) noted that even resuscitation courses lead 
to stress that causes indecision and delay.   
 
My final marker of efficiency identified the fact that when using the standard trolley, 
team members tend to open and close drawers successively without removing a piece 
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of equipment whilst hunting for something.  This happened an average of 6.75 times 
per simulation during my study.  Given that the mean length of the simulation (5 min 
51s) is very short compared to the time spent at a real cardiac arrest, it is bewildering 
to imagine how many times drawers are opened unnecessarily at a clinical event.  
One participant is quoted as saying “There’s one noise heard at arrests more than any 
other – the sound of those metal drawers slamming shut as people frantically search 
for what probably isn’t there”.  This not only delays delivery of equipment, but also 
potentially increases the noise and stress levels at the resuscitation attempt.  
Participants often commented that the simulation seemed calmer when using the 
Resus:Station rather than the standard trolley.  Unnecessary noise has been shown by 
others to make errors more probable, and potentiate the risk of negative outcomes for 
patients (Tijunelis, et al., 2005; Donchin & Seagull, 2002). 
 
The results from the questionnaires capturing opinions of the new Resus:Station 
when compared with the standard trolley clearly demonstrated a strong preference 
for the new design.  These results are even more powerful when it is remembered 
that the study session was the first time any of the participants had ever seen the new 
Resus:Station.  One might expect the fact that all participants are familiar with the 
standard trolley from routine use on the wards to bias results in its favour.  Some 
participants commented on this fact, and stated that if they were to repeat the study 
having become familiar with the new trolley, they might score it even more 
favourably. I found it particularly interesting that study participants found the new 
trolley that they had never seen before more intuitive to use than the trolley with 
which they were already familiar.  This was not an outcome that had been 
anticipated, but confirms the success of the ergonomic design (Department of Health 
	   181	  
and Design Council, 2004; Clarkson, et al., 2004).  It was also reassuring that the 
possible effect of learning from performing two simulations in quick succession did 
not have a significant impact on the questionnaire results.  
 
When comparing the degree of significance in results between the three subgroups – 
anaesthetists, physicians, and nurses – it would seem that the anaesthetists have 
responded to the questions with a greater degree of difference in favour of the 
Resus:Station than the physicians or nurses.  It is not possible to state conclusively 
why this is.  However, one explanation may be that there is more of a benefit to the 
anaesthetic group from the new trolley than to either of the other groups.  The current 
situation when using the standard trolley is that the trolley is usually placed 
somewhere near the foot of the bed.  Nursing staff and physicians fight to access 
equipment from it, but given their position at the head of the bed, the anaesthetist 
generally has to wait patiently for another team member to pass relevant equipment 
to them.  The splitting design of the Resus:Station, however, enables the anaesthetist 
to be given their own section, which can be wheeled to a position next to him by the 
patient’s head.  This enables a greater degree of independence and autonomy on 
behalf of the anaesthetist as they are no longer reliant on other team members in 
order to carry out their job.  For nursing staff and physicians, whilst the ergonomic 
design may improve access to equipment, it is unlikely to have quite such an obvious 
impact on their role. 
 
In terms of viewpoints from different team members, it was also interesting to note 
that the physicians did not think there was a significant difference between the two 
trolleys in terms of access to equipment for intubation.  Given that they do not tend 
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to get involved in accessing intubation equipment – a job for the anaesthetists and 
nursing staff – it seems fair to ignore this result. 
 
I did not demonstrate any significant difference in the non-technical teamworking 
skills of teams when using the two trolleys.  This was despite it being the first time 
teams had ever seen the Resus:Station.  My aim was specifically to demonstrate no 
detrimental effect to provide reassurance that it is safe to use in a clinical 
environment.  Interestingly, when participants were asked whether they thought the 
new trolley had any effect on teamworking, some commented that there was less 
communication when using the ergonomically designed trolley, and that team 
members tended to get on with their own tasks without communicating to others.  
This was interpreted by some as being detrimental to teamwork during the 
resuscitation.  However, not all communication contributes to optimal team function 
– especially if it concerns the pursuit of elusive items of equipment.  Flin et al 
(2008c) refer to what the US naval air-service term “comm-brevity” emphasising that 
during periods of high workload, only the most relevant information should be given 
to preserve cognitive resources of the sender and the receiver.  This is something I 
plan to analyse in greater detail in a separate study, as in the long-term, it is likely 
that the new trolley may actually improve teamwork.   
 
Finally, in subanalysis of the questionnaire data, the majority of statements for which 
there was less of a significant difference in responses between the two trolleys 
related to aesthetic design of the trolley, and whether participants felt the trolley had 
flaws in its design or needed a further redesign.  I found it somewhat reassuring that 
participants had fewer concerns about what the trolley actually looked like than its 
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functionality, given that it is, after all, required to work well in an emergency 
situation, and not just “look good” when it’s not in use. The Resus:Station trolley 
used for the purposes of the study was a prototype.  Various flaws and problems in 
need of improvement had already been identified by the study group prior to starting 
the research.  Lessons learnt from the simulations have guided subsequent design 
refinement and development prior to manufacture of the final product.  It is 
interesting that participants generally felt that the old design standard trolley has 
more flaws and is in greater need of redesign than the sub-optimal version of the 
Resus:Station.  This is reassuring as it demonstrates that ward staff agreed that there 
is a problem with the trolley they currently use at a resuscitation attempt, and that it 
should be redesigned to improve its functionality.  This therefore helps to justify the 
process that has been undertaken over the past few years in designing the 
Resus:Station. 
 
8.5.1 Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is that the small cardiac arrest team, and short 
simulation scenario limited the possibilities for efficiency assessment.  I would 
ideally repeat this at a real arrest with a full resuscitation team.  However, this small 
study has enabled me to have some insight into the potential impact of an 
ergonomically designed resuscitation trolley. 
 
I was also limited by some technical problems with the video recording equipment 
used. During one simulation, the equipment failed to record, despite the fact that it 
appeared to be working.  Therefore, for this simulation I was unable to gather any 
efficiency data as this required retrospective analysis of the video.  However, it did 
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not affect questionnaire results, nor assessment of teamworking skills, which was 
performed from recollection immediately after the study session had finished.  A 
further limitation of the recording equipment was highlighted in one of the final 
studies in which it became apparent that having only one camera angle was 
insufficient.  In this session, it was not possible to determine accurately the length of 
time taken to find the drugs as the person searching had his back to the camera.  This 
explains the small total number, of 13, for the drug efficiency data. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have described a thorough process of verification and validation of 
the Resus:Station in a simulated environment when comparing it to a standard 
resuscitation trolley.  I have demonstrated strongly positive results in terms of team 
efficiency and user opinion, and no detrimental effect on non-technical teamworking 
skills.  I can therefore conclude that in this environment, the new design of trolley is 
safe to use, and has the potential to reduce error and improve efficiency at a 
resuscitation attempt.  However, the potential impact may be subtle, and would 
require a large clinical study to demonstrate an effect on patient outcomes.  
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9 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I have attempted to look at a systems based approach to design to 
identify areas where improvement may lead to better outcomes from in-hospital 
resuscitation attempts.  Care of a patient in the emergency setting is particularly 
prone to errors and adverse events for many reasons, including time-pressured 
decision making, increased rate of patient interventions, and the fact that teams may 
never have worked together, or even met each other before.  Recent analysis of 
incident reports from resuscitation attempts suggests that the majority of incidents 
relate to issues with the resuscitation team, problems related to human performance, 
and incidents relating to malfunctioning or absent equipment.  I have therefore 
looked particularly at the areas of individual and team behaviours, equipment design, 
and environmental factors as areas for potential improvement during cardiac arrest 
events.  In this final chapter, I will summarise the work I have presented, review the 
limitations of the methods I have used, and discuss the clinical implications of this 
work, and future work in this field. 
 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
9.2.1 Key findings in the development of OSCAR study  
The Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR) 
was developed to meet a need for an assessment tool to assess non-technical skills in 
resuscitation teams.  Behaviour modes to be assessed – Communication, 
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Cooperation, Coordination, Monitoring/Situation Awareness, Leadership, and 
Decision-making - were chosen having reviewed other non-technical skills 
assessment tools in the fields of anaesthesia and surgery.  
 
Exemplar behaviours were initially developed.  These were then validated in terms of 
face and content validation.  Finally, a reliability assessment in terms of internal 
consistency and inter-rater reliability, was performed by two independent raters using 
the tool to assess teams in simulated resuscitation attempts.  The result was a 
psychometrically robust, scientifically sound, and clinically relevant tool for use by 
someone with experience in resuscitation. 
 
9.2.2 Comparison between OSCAR and TEAM 
Shortly after completing the development of OSCAR, the TEAM tool was published.  
I wanted to compare these two tools to assess concurrent validity, which examines 
whether two instruments designed to assess similar skills and behaviours actually 
produce comparable assessments when used at the same time; and if so, I wanted to 
establish how best each one may be utilised. 
 
I discovered that not only did both OSCAR and TEAM achieve high levels of inter-
rater reliability, but they also demonstrated a high degree of concurrent validity.  
This demonstrated that they did, indeed, measure similar skills and behaviours.  I 
discovered that whilst TEAM is quicker and simpler to use, the OSCAR tool gives a 
much more comprehensive assessment of the whole team.  As I have discussed, in 
my view both tools have a useful role, although the more detailed information 
gleaned from OSCAR enables direct feedback to specific team members, and also 
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enables the trainers to direct training to weaknesses within individual groups, and 
focus future training.   
 
9.2.3 In situ simulation for resuscitation training 
In situ, unannounced resuscitation simulations were performed in clinical 
environments using the on-call cardiac arrest team for the day.  These were 
performed as part of an ongoing programme of resuscitation training.  This was a 
relatively new way to offer resuscitation training at the time, and so the purpose of 
the study was to assess ethical and practical considerations when performing these 
simulations, elicit participants’ opinions of this form of training, and assess the non-
technical teamworking skills of these resuscitation teams.  
 
Overall we found that participants found this form of resuscitation training more 
useful than that performed in a simulation centre.  They found the clinical 
environment more realistic, and felt that the fact that they had no prior warning of the 
simulation meant their behaviour was a better representation of how they would 
behave in a real event.  The fact that the on-call team for the day attended meant we 
had an opportunity to assess teamworking skills of a real resuscitation team.   
 
An outcome that had initially been unexpected was the opportunity to use the 
simulation to identify latent hazards within the clinical environment.  During the 
course of the simulations, we identified issues at each event that could have led to 
patient harm.  This is obviously a significant benefit to this form of training, when 
compared with other simulation training, as it provides an opportunity to rectify the 
situation before any harm occurs, thus improving patient safety.   
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9.2.4 Assessment of stocking and checking of the Resus:Station 
The purpose of this study was to assess whether the new, ergonomically designed 
trolley has any impact on the trolley checking and stocking process performed by 
nursing staff, when compared with a standard resuscitation trolley.  In particular I 
assessed the time taken to check the trolley, the accuracy of the check in terms of 
identifying missing and expired equipment, and user opinions regarding the 
Resus:Station in comparison with a standard trolley with which they were familiar. 
 
User feedback results clearly indicated a strongly significant preference for the 
Resus:Station for all aspects.  This included the opinion that the design makes 
checking the trolley easier, and that it is easy to see at a glance if items are missing 
from the trolley. This preference was apparent regardless of which trolley was used 
first.  Overall, there was no statistically significant difference in the speed with which 
the participants checked the trolleys, or the frequency that missing or expired items 
were identified on both trolleys.  These last two findings may reflect the fact that 
multistep processes are inherently prone to human error, even if each individual step 
has a low risk of error.  Therefore, inaccuracies in the trolley check are likely to 
continue until a time when the process is fully automated.   
 
9.2.5 Assessment of the Resus:Station in a simulated environment 
The purpose of this study was to assess the newly designed Resus:Station 
resuscitation trolley, and compare it to a resuscitation trolley commonly used in 
hospitals in terms of effects on the efficiency of the resuscitation team, user opinions, 
and effects on non-technical teamworking skills.  I wanted to assess whether there 
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was any benefit to the Resus:Station in a simulated environment, and also to ensure 
that it was safe to use prior to placing it in a clinical environment.   
 
In this study I demonstrated that in terms of team efficiency, time to locate drugs was 
significantly faster when using the Resus:Station than when using the standard 
trolley.  There were no reports of missing equipment when using the Resus:Station, 
whilst on four occasions using the standard trolley, participants were unable to locate 
items which were present on the trolley.  When using the standard trolley, there was 
an average of 6.75 unnecessary drawer openings in our short simulations, 
representing inefficient use of time.   
 
User feedback results clearly indicated a highly significant preference for the newly 
designed Resus:Station for all aspects, and teams performed equally well for all 
dimensions of team performance using both trolleys, despite it being their first 
exposure to the Resus:Station. 
 
I was therefore able to conclude that the trolley is safe to use, and has the potential to 
improve efficiency at a resuscitation attempt. 
 
9.3 Methodology and Limitations 
9.3.1 Development of OSCAR  
The main limitation during the initial development of the Observational Skill-based 
Clinical Assessment tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR) was the relatively limited use in 
the assessment phase – a total of 8 simulation videos.  However, subsequent work 
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continued the assessment of internal consistency and inter-rater reliability, which had 
always been very strong, leading to a large total number of correlations.   
 
A limitation of both the development of OSCAR study, and the subsequent study 
comparing OSCAR with TEAM was that they were both only used to rate behaviours 
in simulated resuscitation attempts.  Whilst I suspect it would be possible to use both 
at a real cardiac arrest event, it is difficult to understand fully how the tools would 
translate to a real arrest situation.  Clinician performance may be more difficult to 
assess, which may influence the reliability of the tools.  Ideally a large clinical study 
should be performed assessing its use in this setting. 
 
The tool comparison study was limited by the fact that the assessors were using both 
tools in quick succession.  Ideally assessors should only score using one tool each, 
and some time should pass before scoring again with a different tool, so as to prevent 
any scoring bias. 
 
9.3.2 In situ simulations for resuscitation training 
A limitation of the in situ simulation study is that I was not able to demonstrate a 
direct comparison between in situ simulation training and simulation centre training.  
Therefore my data in terms of participant perception of the training was inevitably 
skewed due to the fact that the in situ simulation was fresh in their minds, and 
because participants are more likely to give a favourable report of something if they 
feel someone is taking an interest in their problems.  Ideally, in situ simulation 
training should be directly compared with simulation centre training in a randomised 
trial to conclusively determine whether there is a benefit.  
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9.3.3 Assessment of the Resus:Station 
The main limitation of the study assessing nurses checking a resuscitation trolley was 
in the design of the study in terms of the selection of “missing and expired” 
equipment, and the fact that in addition to trolley order of use being randomised, I 
could have also randomised which equipment was missing from which trolley.  This 
would have prevented potential selection bias in terms of the equipment that was 
missing from the trolley. 
 
When assessing the use of the Resus:Station by small resuscitation teams, the main 
limitation was that the small teams, and short simulation scenarios limited the 
possibilities for efficiency assessment.   
 
9.4 Future Research 
9.4.1 OSCAR 
In the field of non-technical skills assessment, there are a number of studies we hope 
to undertake in the future, to build on the work that has already been carried out. 
 
9.4.1.1 Testing during resuscitation attempts 
The OSCAR tool was developed and assessed on teams performing simulated 
resuscitation attempts.  Whilst we anticipate that its use can be extrapolated to the 
real-time clinical environment, we hope to demonstrate this by rating these skills at 
real resuscitation attempts.   I hope that the use of this tool will help to encourage de-
brief at real cardiac arrest attempts – an area that is extremely important, yet 
frequently neglected due to pressures of clinical workload. 
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9.4.1.2 Further development in training settings 
As described in Chapter 4, I noticed whilst using OSCAR that the team subgroups 
tended to have expertise in different non-technical skill-sets.  I hypothesised that this 
may relate to the personalities of staff attracted to different specialties.  This is 
something we would like to explore further, as this may in future enable us to tailor 
training to specific personality types, and will give us a greater understanding of 
likely training requirements for different speciality groups.   I also, anecdotally, 
noticed that different ethnic groups had different approaches towards non-technical 
teamworking skills. Similarly this is something that would warrant further 
exploration. 
 
9.4.1.3 Testing use and evaluation in other centres 
In the development of any instrument, it is critical it moves on beyond the developers 
for use and evaluation in other centres.  I am currently collaborating with the North-
West Simulation Education Network (http://www.northwestsimulation.org.uk/) who 
have started using OSCAR to train and standardise non-technical teamworking skills 
within their network of 26 NHS trusts.  We hope to perform an independent 
validation process for OSCAR, in particular assessing inter-rater reliability and 
internal consistency, and have plans to develop a training video to teach assessors in 
the region how to use it. 
 
9.4.1.4 Development of further non-technical skills assessment tools 
Finally there are other areas of medicine that may benefit from the use of a non-
technical skills assessment tool.  For example, I think that it would be possible to use 
OSCAR at Paediatric Resuscitation attempts without any significant changes.  The 
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other area of interest to me is teamworking in trauma teams.  Whilst many of the 
behaviours and skills are similar to those seen at a resuscitation attempt, a new tool is 
required to encompass a greater number of team members, and frequently more 
prolonged resuscitation attempts.  This is something I am currently working on. 
 
9.4.2 Simulation training 
The in situ unannounced cardiac arrest simulations are part of an ongoing 
resuscitation training programme.  There are potential areas of interest for future 
work.  Ideally we would like to try to assess whether there is, in fact, a link between 
the degree of fidelity of simulation, and the effectiveness of training.  We would also 
like to attempt a direct comparison between in situ simulations and those performed 
in the simulation centre to see if there is a benefit of one over the other for certain 
types of training.   
 
Finally, we hope to perform a long-term study assessing whether the on-going 
training leads to an improvement of the technical and non-technical skills of 
resuscitation team members, and whether there is better retention of these skills.   
 
9.4.3 Resuscitation trolley design 
The resuscitation trolley studies have demonstrated proof of concept for the 
Resus:Station trolley.  As a result of these, Bristol Maid have made the decision to go 
ahead and manufacture a version of the trolley, incorporating all the design 
modifications we have suggested to them on the basis of our simulation study and 
clinical observations.   
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Ideally, the trolley should then be assessed again on a larger scale in a multicentre 
study to assess whether there is any improvement in stocking and checking 
processes, audit whether the design has led to a change in the rate of reported 
incidents at arrests – especially in relation to equipment issues – and finally look to 
see if there is any long-term benefit in terms of clinical outcomes as a result of a 
reduction in critical incidents.  Ideally, in the longer term a process of national and 
international standardisation for emergency equipment should be performed, 
although logistically this is likely to be a challenge. 
 
9.5 Local Clinical Impact 
Having assessed the Resus:Station in a simulation environment, and having 
demonstrated that it was safe to use, I wanted to assess the trolley on the ward.  An 
audit of 6 months of cardiac arrest and medical emergency events was undertaken at 
St Mary’s Hospital, Paddington.  The locations of these events were noted, and then 
the top locations were identified to receive one of four second generation prototype 
Resus:Station trolleys. The aim was to make general observations of its use on the 
ward, and if possible attend emergency calls at these locations to observe directly 
teams using the new trolley during a real resuscitation attempt.  
 
Despite the fact that I had demonstrated that the trolley is safe and intuitive to use for 
clinicians who have never seen it before, I undertook an extensive training 
programme so as to minimise any potential problems and confusion in an emergency 
situation.  This involved attending junior doctors’ induction days and teaching 
sessions, numerous visits to the study wards to ensure as many nursing staff as 
possible had been shown how to use the trolley, and placing posters in obvious 
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locations throughout the wards with brief information about the trial, and contact 
details for members of the research team if required.  Overall I found clinical staff to 
be generally very accepting of the new trolley, although there were obviously some 
reservations. 
 
I then began the process of attempting to observe directly teams using the trolleys in 
real emergency events.  It quickly became apparent that I was not going to be able to 
make as many direct observations of the trolley in use as I had hoped for the reasons 
listed below. 
 
9.5.1 Reduction in number of emergency calls 
Over recent years there has been a reduction in the number of emergency calls within 
our hospital from an average of 32 per month in 2006 to 15 per month in 2010/11, 
when I was performing observations.  There are several reasons for this.  First is that 
over this time there was a geographical change in services within our trust, with 
cardiac services, where a large number of cardiac arrests occur, moving to a different 
hospital.  Second, is the fact that we are following a national trend in decline due to 
changes in the management of patients, and earlier identification and treatment of 
unwell patients (Spearpoint, et al., 2009).  Finally, in common with national trends, a 
significant number of events occur out of hours – either at night, or during the 
weekends.  In the recent NCEPOD audit of resuscitation attempts (NCEPOD, 2012), 
only 41% of resuscitation attempts occurred during the day (defined as 08:00 – 
17:59), and a proportion of these are likely to have occurred at the weekend.  
Therefore, all these factors reduced the chance of me being present when an arrest 
occurred. 
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9.5.2 Ethical issues encountered when attending arrests 
Of those arrest events I did manage to attend, I frequently encountered a situation 
where it would have been unethical for me to stand back and observe as this could 
have compromised the patient’s outcome.  For example, I attended a medical 
emergency call for a patient suffering from seizures.  The medical registrar was not 
present as he was busy elsewhere, and the junior medical team present was 
struggling to cannulate the patient, and was also uncertain of the correct dose of an 
appropriate drug to terminate the seizures.  Therefore, I stopped observations to help 
with the management of the patient. 
 
9.5.3 Important measures missed in delay in attending events 
Whilst I was alerted to the emergency as part of the standard bleep system within the 
hospital, there was obviously always a degree of delay before arriving at the scene.  
In this time, I often missed vital observations, such as staff accessing much of the 
equipment used in the early stages of a resuscitation attempt.  This therefore severely 
limited any possibilities of generating efficiency data from my observations.   
 
9.5.4 Large study numbers required 
As I have already mentioned, in essence, the simulation study described previously 
was not only an assessment of the trolley in terms of safety, but was also a pilot study 
to determine what might be feasible as part of my clinical observations.  I realised 
that the markers of efficiency I had identified during the simulations were very 
subtle, and that in order to power a study sufficiently to elicit a difference in overall 
patient outcomes when using the Resus:Station in comparison to the standard trolley, 
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a large multicentre study would be required.  Therefore the clinical study I performed 
became purely observational.  
 
Having realised these limitations, however, we chose to leave the trolleys on the 
wards for the planned six months to elicit anecdotal feedback from members of staff 
to help us identify design flaws in need of improvement prior to the next design 
iteration.  This was an extremely useful process, and Table 9.1 lists quotes from 
members of staff about the trolley.  Overall, whilst members of staff were initially 
reticent and sceptical about trialling the new trolley, by the end of the six months 
observation period, the feedback was overwhelmingly positive, whilst taking into 
account that it was a prototype, and therefore had flaws in its design.   Unfortunately, 
we were only able to elicit quotes from three of the four wards as, at the time, the 
fourth ward had just completely changed speciality, including a complete change of 
staff.  The new staff had only recently started, and had not had very much time to use 
the Resus:Station.   
 
In conclusion, my clinical observations of the use of the Resus:Station revealed that 
despite design issues, staff were overwhelmingly in favour of the new trolley design 
concept.  However, a large multicentre study would be required to identify benefits 
in terms of patient outcome.  The process was helpful in terms of enabling 
identification of further design flaws that can be remedied in the next trolley 
iteration. 
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Table 9.1 – Quotes from clinical staff about the Resus:Station 
 
Acute Medical Unit (AMU) 
• I love it 
• It’s a dream to check – especially on nights as it takes no time 
• The size of (some of) the pockets are too small for big hands  
• I love the layout 
• I like the fact that you can see everything clearly 
• Some of the pockets aren’t the right size for the equipment, so it’s difficult to squeeze them in (e.g. 
cannula) 
• It’s difficult to clip it all together again once you’ve separated it 
• It’s too big, and too heavy 
• We used it at an arrest, and the separation bit was really useful as we gave the airway section to the 
anaesthetist and let him get on with his job.  Also, the tables were really useful to have. 
• Overall we really like it apart from minor issues 
• If we got used to it, it would make life much easier 
• Checking it is much easier 
Charles Pannett Ward 
• The thing we don’t like about it on a day-to-day basis is that it’s too big and heavy 
• I like being able to see everything 
• It’s much quicker to check 
• It’s great being able to take just one section (e.g. airway) to a bedside if needed 
• When we’ve used it in an emergency it’s been much better than the old trolley – the whole 
situation was much calmer than normal as you could see everything 
• When we’re not using it, it’s big and gets in the way, but when we’ve actually had to use it, it’s 
fantastic! 
Victoria Ward 
• We used the trolley in an arrest the other night and it was so much easier to find stuff, there was no 
rummaging 
• It’s too big, and hard to push, but otherwise it’s so much better than the current trolley 
• It’s much easier and quicker to find everything 
• I think the drugs section needs changing as the pockets aren’t the right size so it’s not easy to see 
the drugs 
• Generally everyone likes it apart from minor problems 
• I wouldn’t want to have the old trolley back 
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9.6 Wider Clinical Implications for Resuscitation 
9.6.1 Teamwork 
As I have mentioned many times in this thesis, effective non-technical teamworking 
skills are extremely important in the prevention of clinical error and adverse events.  
This is particularly true in the emergency setting where there is a higher rate of 
adverse events, and teams who may have never met before have to work together in a 
pressurised, stressful environment.  
 
Prior to this study, no tools existed specifically for the purpose of assessing the non-
technical teamworking skills of resuscitation teams.  Therefore, in itself, the 
development of OSCAR represents significant progress in this field.  There are many 
potential applications for the tool, as I have described above.   
 
9.6.2 Training, assessment and guidelines 
The most recent ALS guidelines mention the importance of non-technical skills, 
however there is insufficient time on the current course to discuss or train them in 
any detail.  It is possible that future ALS courses will emphasise this further, with 
training of these essential skills.  Therefore there may be a role for OSCAR in terms 
of assessment of teamworking skills as part of the ALS course.   
 
The tool may also be used in conjunction with other tools developed – such as the 
TEAM tool – to guide future teamworking training courses, and act as a standard for 
these skills. 
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With a view to training non-technical skills, the use of in situ simulation should be 
encouraged.  In my opinion, the significant benefit of this type of training – 
especially the unannounced nature of it – is the opportunity to train real teamworking 
skills to real teams.  In my experience, no matter how imaginative a simulation 
faculty is, and how realistic a simulation centre is, the very nature of leaving the 
clinical environment to go to a specific training session puts the clinician in a 
different mindset to how they are in their normal roles.  I think there is a tendency to 
“act” how you perceive people expect you to act, rather than how you really act on a 
day-to-day basis.  I suspect that the lack of warning, and pressure of the situation at 
an unannounced simulation, combined with the familiar clinical environment is much 
more likely to bring out real behaviours – whether good or bad – that can then be 
assessed and trained as required.   
 
9.6.3 Debriefing 
An area that is woefully neglected in general after a real resuscitation attempt is team 
debriefing.  It is vitally important for clinicians to learn the art of reflection and 
critique of one’s own behaviours and performance, and those of the entire team.  By 
performing a structured debrief we can learn from what went well, but also identify 
areas for improvement.  I hope that by providing a tool that facilitates a critical 
appraisal of individual team members this may help to standardise the debrief 
process in simulations, which could then be extrapolated to the real clinical 
environment. 
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9.6.4 Equipment 
Testing the Resus:Station in terms of team efficiency at a resuscitation attempt, and 
the nursing staff stocking and checking processes was very interesting.  The project 
was initiated by the NPSA as a result of critical incidents reporting missing or broken 
equipment leading to patient harm at resuscitation attempts.   
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 8, of the 15 simulations, there were 4 occasions when 
equipment that was present was not found when using the standard resuscitation 
trolley.  On each occasion the study participants were adamant that the equipment 
was missing from the study trolley.  However, on each occasion at the end of the 
study session the equipment was found on the trolley.  This led me to question 
whether the equipment was ever missing in the first instance in the incidents reported 
to the NPSA.  Maybe it is purely the drawer design of a standard trolley that is at 
fault, preventing staff from easily finding equipment that is there.   Clearly, if this is 
the case, this further supports the work to redesign a trolley in an ergonomic fashion. 
 
In my mind, one of the interesting findings in relation to the Resus:Station was the 
fact that the ergonomic design did not improve the accuracy of the stock check 
performed by nursing staff.   When I was first designing the studies for this thesis, I 
went to a ward and observed three nurses checking a resuscitation trolley on a ward 
to gain a greater understanding of the process.  The nurses each checked the same 
trolley, and each reported a different result in terms of stock they thought was or was 
not missing.  Amazingly, none of the nurses was actually correct in their assessment.  
This supports Nolan’s publication (Nolan, 2000) stating that multi-step processes are 
inherently prone to human error.  This must be particularly true when performing a 
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relatively “mindless”, laborious task such as checking a resuscitation trolley.  I 
wonder if we will ever reach a point where a resuscitation trolley is reliably stocked, 
even with a design that supports the process, if we continue to rely on humans to 
perform the task?  In the initial stages of the trolley development process there were 
plans to tag each piece of equipment with a Radiofrequency Identification (RFID) 
tag, and use a computer on the top of each trolley to track the tags, and therefore 
effectively perform the stock take.  At that stage, the idea was too advanced for the 
technology available for financial and practical reasons.  However, I suspect in due 
course as the cost of individual RFID tags reduces; as institutions use this technology 
more commonly on a large scale for stock monitoring purposes; and as the cost of 
small tablet computers falls, this may become a realistic proposition that could be 
revisited as a solution to the trolley stock errors.    
 
From a practical perspective, one of the most significant outcomes of the 
Resus:Station studies was a list of recommendations to the manufacturers for further 
modifications prior to production of the final model.  A selection of these can be seen 
in Table 9.2.  These include suggestions made by study participants and ward staff, 
and suggestions made by the research team on the basis of observations made when 
the Resus:Station was in use.  These represent an invaluable resource with which to 
dramatically improve the design of the trolley on the basis of experience.  This is a 
unique opportunity, as prototype equipment is not usually tested on end-users in 
healthcare prior to mass production.  Therefore it is normally difficult to implement 
any change in design on the basis of end-user recommendation.    
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Table 9.2 – Resus:Station design modifications suggested as a result of the studies 
 
 Design Modification Reason 
1 Split trolley into 2 rather than 3 sections 
Only the “Airway” section needs to be separated, everything 
else can “go together”.  This would enable a simpler more 
reliable splitting mechanism, and increase the usable space, 
enabling reduction in overall size and weight 
2 Make the whole trolley smaller Easier to store and manoeuvre 
3 
Reduce the number of 
wheels in contact with the 
floor 
Improve manoeuvrability 
4 Make out of easy-clean plastic 
Improve ease of cleaning, and reduce problems with regards 
to infection control risks 
5 Improve shutter mechanism Security shutters on the prototype model are unreliable and prone to tearing and getting stuck 
6 Add “pop off” feature for shutters  
At present it is not possible to remove shutters, and therefore 
they are extremely difficult to clean.  Any body fluids would 
not be able to be removed which is clearly not acceptable in 
the long run 
7 Make individual sections more generic 
The prototype model has section dividers that have been 
created for specific brands of packaging.  However, when 
different brands are used the packets no longer store 
conveniently.  Hospitals will all use different brands and will 
change these brands constantly. Therefore, the pocket sizes 
need to be generic to fit a range of packaging types. 
8 Make “wasted space” usable 
The prototype model has significant amounts of wasted space 
within the structure.  This could be incorporated into 
additional storage space for less frequently used specific 
equipment not commonly found on a resuscitation trolley, but 
required for specialist units, such as a blood glucose machine 
on a diabetes ward 
9 Second drip stand 
A second drip stand could easily be added to the Airway 
section and may be a very useful addition, as drip stands are 
surprisingly elusive at resuscitation attempts. 
 
 
In more general terms, the studies assessing the Resus:Station have achieved the 
recommendations of the Department of Health “Design for Patient Safety” report, in 
terms of having a collaboration between designers, researchers, and healthcare 
practitioners as an approach to ergonomic design in healthcare to reduce error.  Not 
only have I demonstrated a potential reduction in error when using this 
ergonomically designed trolley, but I have also been able to identify areas where 
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further improvements can be made prior to production of the final product.  This 
therefore represents the way design should be approached in future.  It is not 
sufficient to simply design a solution to a problem; that solution must be tested to 
verify the claims, and modified again as required.  
 
9.6.5 Patient Safety 
The over-riding aim of this series of studies was to identify ways to reduce critical 
incidents and adverse events at resuscitation attempts, thus improve the safety for 
patients during an emergency and potentially improve their overall outcome.  Whilst 
I have explored a range of ways to achieve this by looking at teamwork, team 
training, and design, the unexpected finding for me was the identification of latent 
hazards in the clinical environment during in situ unannounced resuscitation 
simulation events.  To date, the simulation team has identified latent hazards at every 
in situ simulation that has been performed.  This, in itself, is a reason to continue 
performing these simulations, even if training were not to be a priority, as it is a 
simple and safe way to test the clinical environment that has the potential to identify 
and prevent many adverse events, and clinical harm.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1.1 – Adult Advanced Life Support Algorithm (Resuscitation Council UK) 
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Appendix 4.1 – Ethics approval letter 
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Appendix 4.2 – All exemplars for Anaesthetists, Physicians, and Nurses with mean 
ratings by Speciality experts (S) and Non-speciality experts (N-S), and Median 
(range) (M) for overall results.  Behaviours subsequently reviewed shaded in dark 
grey with initiating score 
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Appendix 4.3 – List of each behaviour modified with reasons for change explained 
 
Behaviour Mode Amendment made 
Anaesthetists 
Communication Extra statement added on basis of suggestions made by specialist group 
Co-ordination 1 Statement wording amended as scored less than 3 by non-specialist group 
Leadership 1 Statement wording amended as a result of suggestions made by specialist group 
Monitoring 1 Statement wording amended as scored less than 3 by non-specialist group 
Physicians 
Communication 3 Scored 3 by non-specialists, therefore discussed, and wording amended slightly 
Co-operation 2 Statement removed on basis of low score (<3) from both groups, and comments made by medics 
Co-operation 3 Statement reviewed as scored 3 from specialists, but scored highly from non-specialists (3.6), therefore decision made to keep 
Co-ordination 2 Statement removed as scored 2 from specialists, and was felt to be unimportant when reviewed 
Leadership 1 Wording altered slightly on the basis of some suggestions made by specialists 
Leadership 3 
Statement reviewed as scored 2.6 from specialists, and 3 from non-
specialists.  Wording was amended, but overall statement remained 
important 
Monitoring 1 Reviewed as scored 2.6 by specialists.  Wording altered to improve statement 
Nurses 
Communication 3 Reviewed as scored 2.8 from non-specialists.  Wording amended to improve statement 
Co-operation 3 Reviewed as scored 2.8 from specialist group.  Overall statement kept, but examples were changed to more relevant ones 
Co-ordination 2 Reviewed as scored 2.8 from the non-specialist group, however no changes made as scored highly from specialist group 
Leadership 2 Reviewed as scored 2.8 from non-specialist group.  Decision made to remove statement as not a critical behaviour example for resuscitation 
Monitoring 1 
Reviewed as scored 3 from non-specialty group.  Decision made to 
remove statement, as felt to be a less observable behaviour exemplar 
(especially in simulations) 
Monitoring 2 Reviewed as scored 2.8 from non-specialist group.  However, felt to be important, therefore statement kept 
Monitoring 3 Reviewed as scored 3 from non-specialty group.  Decision made to keep without alterations, as felt to be important 
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Appendix 4.4 – The final version of OSCAR 
 
Observational Skill-based Clinical Assessment Tool for Resuscitation (OSCAR) 
 
Date:     Assessor:   Candidate: 
 0 = Team Severely Compromised 1 = Team Compromised 
 2 = Slight detriment to team  3 = Team neither enhanced or hindered 
 4 = Moderate enhancement to team 5 = High level of enhancement to team 
   6 = Highly effective in enhancing teamwork   
 
COMMUNICATION 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score  (0-6) 
Informs team whether patient is making respiratory effort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Informs team of any other relevant clinical signs e.g. 
dilated pupil, obvious injuries, signs of aspiration 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Communication to team that they plan to intubate the 
patient if required 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Requests patient history on arrival and communicates 
details to team, if required 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Reviews patient history and notes and communicates 
relevant details clearly to the team 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Clear instructions communicated to the team regarding 
the arrest protocol 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Encourages communication from sub-teams, and 
encourages team members to give opinions  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Provides clear information about arrest events on arrival 
of arrest team 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Senior nurse provides clear, audible requests to junior 
nurse when requesting equipment e.g. additional iv bags 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Instructs other nurses on ward clearly how to assist with 
arrest or other ward duties as appropriate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
CO-OPERATION 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score  (0-6) 
A-group provides information on request from P-group 
(e.g. about the airway) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A-group assists P-group in decision making in difficult 
scenarios 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Responds to questions from other team members about 
decisions made regarding the arrest 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Supports less experienced members of P-group, and 
compensates for their lack of experience 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Provide support and assistance to A-group and P-group 
when needed e.g. finding airway adjuncts 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Help P-group locate items not routinely stocked on 
trolley, or missing from the trolley 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Assist P-group with extra tasks e.g. sending bloods, 
contacting family, contacting labs etc 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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CO-ORDINATION 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score  (0-6) 
Information provided about changes in patient condition 
as they occur 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A-group co-ordinate team to move patient e.g. floor to 
bed, up bed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Notifies N and A groups of anticipated further 
requirements for patient resuscitation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Within P group, co-ordinates tasks such as taking of 
bloods, sending samples, sending ABG etc 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Prepare Resus Trolley for use by team by bringing to 
bedside, turning monitor on etc 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Prepare further drugs in readiness for their next required 
use e.g. prepare next adrenaline minijet 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A Senior Nurse (Sister) is always present to provide 
backup to Staff Nurse 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
LEADERSHIP 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score (0-6) 
Advises team on best management, and contingency 
plans for patient, and takes lead if required 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anaesthetist assertively takes a lead in Airway control 
and Ventilation on arrival at arrest 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lead Anaesthetist supervises and supports staff lacking 
familiarity with tasks or equipment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Takes a lead and clearly instructs assistants with 
requirements for arrest and/or defers leadership as 
required if appropriate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Supervision given to staff lacking experience or 
familiarity with tasks or equipment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Instructs N-group of additional requirements e.g. recent 
blood results from computer, to call the family  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Takes a lead with initial Basic Life Support attempts until 
Arrest Team arrive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Supervision and support given to junior or inexperienced 
members of N-team 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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MONITORING 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score  (0-6) 
Maintains monitoring of patient condition, signs of 
respiration, other clinical signs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Checks ventilation is adequate with regular blood gas 
analysis and amends ventilation accordingly 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Confirms drug identity by checking syringe labeling prior 
to drug administration 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Maintains awareness of activities of other teams e.g. 
anaesthetist intubating 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Monitors progress of resuscitation protocol with careful 
checking of time, and constant reassessment of limb of 
protocol and “extra considerations” 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Checks team condition e.g. monitors for fatigue in team 
members from CPR and suggests team members change 
roles, take turns etc 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Monitors patient dignity and considers well-being of 
other patients nearby 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Maintains awareness of the needs of P and A groups 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
DECISION MAKING 
Anaesthetic Group (A) Individual Behaviour Ratings Global Score  (0-6) 
Prompt identification of the problem 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Rapidly and clearly outlines a strategy or plan, and asks 
for equipment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anticipates potential problems and prepares accordingly 
– e.g. asks for further blood to be cross-matched 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Physician Group (P) 
Rapidly decides an appropriate course of action for 
continued resuscitation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uses the team as a whole to help develop options – asks 
for opinions and processes them decisively 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Nurse Group (N) 
Prompt decision making during initial resuscitation 
attempts 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anticipates potential problems A and P teams may 
encounter e.g. pulls bed out from wall, clears area etc 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Appropriate decision making regarding timing of initial 
decision to put out a cardiac arrest call 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix 4.5 – Examples of uses, and team scores 
 
Vignette 1 
Scenario: In situ resuscitation simulation performed in the radiology department.  
Proactive, efficient nursing staff gave a comprehensive account to the Medical team 
when they arrived.  The senior physician was extremely competent, and efficiently 
distributed tasks, and led the resuscitation with a hands-off approach.  Anaesthetist 
arrived and immediately introduced himself to the team.  Competently managed the 
airway, and informed the team leader throughout of plans and changes with regards 
to the airway and breathing. 
 
Scores: 
 
Behaviour Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
Communication 5 6 5 
Co-operation 5 5 6 
Co-ordination 5 6 6 
Leadership 6 6 5 
Monitoring 5 5 5 
Decision making 6 6 6 
 
0 = Team severely compromised, 1 = Team compromised, 2 = Slight detriment to 
team,  
3 = team neither enhanced or hindered, 4 = moderate enhancement to team,  
5 = high level of enhancement to team, 6 = highly effective in enhancing teamwork 
 
 
Feedback:  All team members felt that they had worked well together, and felt 
confident in the resuscitation.  Physicians praised excellent communication from 
nursing staff and anaesthetists.  Likewise, all praised the leader for effective and 
efficient leadership. 
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Vignette 2 
Scenario: In situ resuscitation simulation performed on a ward.  Nursing staff failed 
to assess the patient properly on arrival, leading to a delay before appropriately re-
assessing, and calling for help.  However, nurses were much more effective once 
Internists had arrived.  On arrival of the Medical team, poor leadership from the 
Senior Physician initially.  Long pause with no communication initially and 
uncertainty from lead physician on how to use defibrillator as he had not encountered 
the model before, however, no deferral to other team members for advice.  
Improvement in Physician team as resuscitation progressed, leading to improvement 
in overall scores.  Lack of confidence from Anaesthetic team, although competent in 
airway management, slow in assisting Physician team when they were struggling.  
Again, an improvement as the resuscitation progressed leading to an improvement in 
overall scores. 
 
Scores: 
Behaviour Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
Communication 3 3 3 
Co-operation 3 3 3 
Co-ordination 3 3 4 
Leadership 4 3 3 
Monitoring 3 2 3 
Decision making 3 3 3 
 
0 = Team severely compromised, 1 = Team compromised, 2 = Slight detriment to 
team,  
3 = team neither enhanced or hindered, 4 = moderate enhancement to team,  
5 = high level of enhancement to team, 6 = highly effective in enhancing teamwork 
 
Feedback:  All team members felt dissatisfied with the performance during the initial 
resuscitation attempt, although agreed there was an improvement with time.  The 
first response nurse admitted that she was “fazed” by the situation.  The senior 
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physician had recently returned to clinical work from research, and admitted that he 
was lacking confidence, he wanted to refresh his ALS Course, and had never used 
the AED-type defibrillator which had confused him in the pressure of the situation.  
Constructive feedback was given to all members, and the senior physician was 
offered additional defibrillator practice by the resuscitation officer. 
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Appendix 5.1 – The TEAM Tool 	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Appendix 5.2 – Simulation Scenarios 
 
In Situ Simulation Scenarios: 
1. The “Patient” was in the side room of the acute admissions ward.  Past medical 
history of alcoholic liver disease.  Found by nursing staff performing routine 
observations to be unwell with a low blood pressure, tachycardia, and a large amount 
of malaena on the sheets.  The nurse was asked to proceed as they would normally.  
The patient deteriorated further and had a PEA arrest. 
 
2.  The “Patient” was in the recovery bay in radiology having just had an 
endovascular aortic aneurysm repair.  The nurse looking after the patient became 
concerned, and put out a medical emergency call because his observations suddenly 
deteriorated.  She was concerned about rupture and internal bleeding.  The patient 
proceeded to have a PEA arrest. 
 
3. The “Patient” was the relative of a patient.  He was feeling unwell with chest pain, 
and collapsed in the corridor outside the ward.  A nurse was passing by and put out a 
cardiac arrest call.  The patient had suffered a VF arrest secondary to Ischaemic 
Heart Disease 
 
4.  The “Patient” was in an empty bay in the Clinical Decision Unit, having presented 
the night before with a bad chest infection.  A nurse from the ward was asked to 
review the patient as the Health Care Assistant noticed he didn’t look very well.  He 
was struggling to breathe, had low oxygen saturations, and was showing signs of 
sepsis with a tachycardia and hypotension.  The patient proceeded to a hypoxic and 
hypotensive PEA arrest. 
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Simulation Centre Scenarios 
The simulation centre scenarios took place as part of another study.  Small cardiac 
arrest teams were recruited – an anaesthetist, a medical registrar, and a nurse.  They 
were asked to perform two scenarios, which were identical in each study session.  
For the purposes of this study, ten of these sessions were watched, therefore a total of 
twenty recordings. 
 
Scenario 1:  
“You have been called to the ward as part of the “Crash Team”. When the Health 
Care Assistant found Mr Jones in bed making groaning noises, having earlier 
complained of some abdominal pain, he immediately put out a cardiac arrest call.  
Mr Jones is currently an inpatient under the care of the Vascular team.  He is known 
to have a large abdominal aortic aneurysm that the Vascular team is hoping to repair 
within the next few days” 
 
Scenario 2: 
“You have been called to the ward as part of the “Crash Team”.  When the Health 
Care Assistant found Mr Smith in bed making groaning noises, having earlier 
complained of some central crushing chest pain, he immediately put out a cardiac 
arrest call.  Mr Jones is currently an inpatient under the Cardiologists being 
investigated for crescendo angina.  He has had a myocardial infarction in the past, 
although he can’t remember when it was.  He currently takes medications for 
hypertension and hypercholesterolaemia, is known to be diabetic, and continues to 
smoke 40 cigarettes a day.” 
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Appendix 6.1 – Post-simulation questionnaire 
 
Resuscitation Simulation Questionnaire 
 
 
Simulation date:  
 
 
Job:  Doctor  Nurse  Other (please Specify)    
 
Specialty: _________________________________ Age: _______ Gender: ________ 
 
Grade:_________________________ 
 
 
Primary role within the team during the scenario: Team leader/Team member 
 
 
Q1. How many Cardiac Arrest Calls have you attended in real patients?(please circle) 
 
0  <10   10-50   >50 
 
 
Q2. Have you participated in any of the following types of simulation? Please tick all appropriate 
boxes. 
 
 
Bench-top simulation/ALS/ATLS/ILS      
 
Virtual Reality simulation       
 
Full team simulation courses       
    
Non technical Skills/Crisis Resource management Courses    
 
Are you currently ALS certified (ALS <2years) (please Circle) Yes/No 
 
 
 
In today’s Simulated Scenario: 
 
 
Was it clear who the Team Leader was?  (please circle) 
 
 Yes Throughout  Sometimes  Not at all 
 
The team Leader Changed during the scenario?  Yes/No
	   236	  
 
Below are a number of statements regarding your simulation experience today. Please read each 
statement carefully and indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by circling the appropriate 
number on the scale below. Please ensure that you respond to all statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 Strongly agree 
The simulated environment is a 
realistic representation of an actual 
cardiac arrest. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The simulated environment is a 
realistic representation of a peri-arrest 
event 
1 2 3 4 5 
The clinical environment increases the 
realism of the simulation. 1 2 3 4 5 
The model used is a realistic 
representation of a real unwell patient 1 2 3 4 5 
The simulation scenario is realistic 
overall 1 2 3 4 5 
The conduct of the arrest was affected 
by resuscitation equipment 1 2 3 4 5 
This simulation offers a good 
opportunity for training technical 
skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This simulation offers a good 
opportunity for training non-technical 
(i.e. communication, team) skills. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I felt that an unannounced scenario is a 
better test of how I would perform in a 
true emergency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 Strongly agree 
This simulation offers a good opportunity 
for assessment of technical skills 1 2 3 4 5 
 
This simulation offers a good opportunity 
for assessment of non-technical (i.e. 
communication, team) skills. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
My behaviour in this simulation mirrors 
my behaviour in a real emergency. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I would benefit by repeating this 
simulation in the future. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
This simulation is more useful than a 
simulation or which you are warned in 
advance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
This simulation was more useful than a 
similar scenario taking place in the skills 
laboratory/during a formal course. 
1 2 3 4 5 
What	  are	  the	  most	  useful	  components	  of	  the	  session:	  
How	  could	  the	  scenario	  be	  improved?	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Appendix 7.1 – Post-trolley check questionnaire 
	  
Resus-­trolley	  checking	  Study	  
Participant	  Demographics	  and	  Questionnaire	  	  	  Date:	   	   	   	   Time:	  	   	   	   Participant	  code:	   	  	  Sex:	  	  Male	  	  /	  	  Female	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	  Job:	  	  	  ………………………	   No	  of	  years	  experience:	  …………………….	  Grade:	  ……………………..	  	  Specialty:	  ……………………………………………………………………	  	  	  Have	  you	  ever	  experienced	  problems	  with	  missing	  equipment	  from	  the	  resuscitation	  trolley?	  	   Yes	  	  	  /	  	  	  No	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	   	  Have	  you	  ever	  taken	  equipment	  from	  the	  trolley	  to	  use	  when	  there	  isn’t	  a	  cardiac	  arrest	  or	  Medical	  Emergency?	   Yes	  	  	  /	  	  	  No	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	  	   Strongly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Neither	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  Disagree	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agree	  It	  is	  very	  easy	  to	  find	  equipment	  on	  this	  trolley	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  access	  equipment	  on	  this	  trolley	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  The	  design	  of	  this	  trolley	  make	  makes	  my	  role	  in	  checking	  the	  trolley	  easier	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  The	  layout	  of	  the	  equipment	  on	  this	  trolley	  makes	  checking	  in	  easier	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  The	  checklist	  supplied	  with	  the	  trolley	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  find	  equipment	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  check	  expiry	  dates	  of	  items	  stored	  in	  the	  trolley	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  assess	  the	  quantity	  of	  items	  stored	  in	  the	  trolley	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  at	  a	  glance	  if	  items	  are	  missing	  from	  the	  trolley	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  at	  a	  glance	  if	  extra	  items	  (not	  on	  the	  checklist)	  are	  on	  the	  trolley	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  other	  comments?	  	  If	  so,	  please	  write	  below.	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Appendix 7.2 – Final Questionnaire 
	  
Resus	  Trolley	  Checking	  Study	  –	  Final	  Questionnaire	  (3)	  
	  Participant	  code:	   	   	   	   	   Randomization	  group:	  
	  
	  1.	  	  When	  considering	  the	  following	  factors,	  please	  indicate	  on	  the	  scale,	  which	  trolley	  you	  prefer.	  	  	   Definitely	  Resus:Station	   Resus:Station	   No	  	  Preference	   Old	  Trolley	   Definitely	  Old	  Trolley	  Overall	  use	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  Ease	  of	  finding	  equipment	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  Layout	  of	  equipment	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  Ease	  of	  checking	  the	  trolley	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  	  	  2.	  	  The	  Resus:Station	  you	  have	  used	  is	  currently	  a	  prototype	  and	  will	  be	  modified	  prior	  to	  developing	  the	  final	  version.	  	  Are	  there	  any	  problems	  that	  you	  have	  identified	  in	  the	  Resus:Station	  that	  could	  be	  improved	  (please	  write	  in	  the	  box	  below)?	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Appendix 7.3 – Participant opinions to statements about the Resus:Station from 
those that were randomised to use the standard trolley first (Median (IQR)). 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Participants using Standard Trolley First 
(n=25) 
Trolley Used – Median (IQR) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
It is very easy to find equipment on this 
trolley 3 (3-4.5) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to access equipment on this trolley 4 (3-5) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
checking the trolley easier 4 (2.5-4) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The layout of the equipment on this trolley 
makes checking it easier 4 (2.5-4) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The checklist supplied with the trolley makes 
it easier to find equipment 5 (4-6) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to check expiry dates of items stored 
in the trolley 4 (2.5-6) 6 (4-7) 0.021 
It is easy to assess the quantity of items stored 
in the trolley 4 (3-5) 6 (5.5-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if items are 
missing from the trolley 2 (1-3) 6 (5-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if extra items (not 
on the checklist) are on the trolley 2 (1-3) 6 (5-7) <0.001 
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Appendix 7.4 – Participant opinions to statements about the Resus:Station from 
those that were randomised to use the standard Resus:Station first (Median (IQR)). 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Participants using Resus:Station First 
(n=35) 
Trolley Used – Median (IQR) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3 (3-4) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to access equipment on this trolley 4 (2-5) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
checking the trolley easier 3 (2-4) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The layout of the equipment on this trolley 
makes checking it easier 4 (2-5) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
The checklist supplied with the trolley makes it 
easier to find equipment 4 (2-5) 7 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to check expiry dates of items stored 
in the trolley 4 (3-6) 6 (4-7) 0.015 
It is easy to assess the quantity of items stored 
in the trolley 4 (3-5) 6 (6-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if items are missing 
from the trolley 3 (2-4) 6 (5-7) <0.001 
It is easy to see at a glance if extra items (not on 
the checklist) are on the trolley 3 (2-4) 6 (5-7) <0.001 
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Appendix 8.1 – Simulation Protocols 
 
Simulation 1 Protocol – GI bleed 
 
Periarrest -> arrest 
CPR (whilst monitor attached) 
VF on monitor 
Shock 
CPR 
Rhythm assess - still VF 
Shock 
CPR 
Adrenaline 
 
STOP (before 3rd shock) 
 
 
 
Simulation 2 Protocol – MI 
 
Periarrest -> arrest 
CPR (whilst monitor attached) 
Brady PEA on monitor 
Adrenaline / Atropine if team remember 
CPR 
Rhythm assess – now VF on monitor 
Shock 
CPR 
Rhythm assess – still VF 
Shock 
CPR 
 
STOP (just after restarting CPR) 
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Appendix 8.2a – Simulation 1 clinical scenario (Medical Registrar) 
 
 
Simulation 1 
 
 
 You are working as the Medical Registrar on-call at St Mary’s Hospital.   
 
 You have been called as part of the “Crash Team” to a General Surgical Ward. 
 
 The ward is extremely short-staffed today.  Vash is working as a junior nurse 
doing a bank shift.  He has never worked at St Mary’s before, and therefore 
doesn’t know where anything is.  When he found Mr Jones in bed making 
groaning noises, having earlier complained of some abdominal pain, he 
immediately put out a “Cardiac Arrest Call”. 
 
 Mr Jones is currently an inpatient under the Vascular Team.  He is known to have 
a large Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm that the Vascular Team is hoping to repair 
within the next few days. 
 
 Vash is able to help you with any tasks you may require, and is happy to be told 
what to do.  
 
 
Appendix 8.2b – Simulation 2 clinical scenario (Medical Registrar) 
 
 
Simulation 2 
 
 You are working as the Medical Registrar on-call at St Mary’s Hospital.   
 
 You have been called as part of the “Crash Team” to the Cardiology Ward. 
 
 The ward is extremely short-staffed today.  Vash is working as a junior nurse 
doing a bank shift.  He has never worked at St Mary’s before, and therefore 
doesn’t know where anything is.  When he found Mr Smith in bed making 
groaning noises, having earlier complained of some central crushing chest pain, he 
immediately put out a “Cardiac Arrest Call”. 
 
 Mr Jones is currently an inpatient under the Cardiologists being investigated for 
Crescendo Angina.  He has had a Myocardial Infarction in the past, although he 
can’t remember when it was.  He currently takes medications for Hypertension 
and Hypercholesterolaemia, is known to be a diabetic, and continues to smoke 40 
cigarettes a day. 
 
 Vash is able to help you with any tasks you may require, and is happy to be told 
what to do.  
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Appendix 8.3 – Simulation study participant demographics form 
 
	  
Resuscitation	  Study	  
Participant	  Demographics	  	  	  	   Date:	  	  	   Time:	  	  	   Participant	  Code:	  	  	   Age:	  …………………	  	  	   Sex:	  	  Male	  	  /	  	  Female	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	  	   Job:	  	  	  Doctor	  	  /	  	  Nurse	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	  	   Specialty:	  ……………………………………………………………………	  	  	   Grade:	  ………………………………………………………………………..	  	  	   Approximately	  how	  many	  resuscitation	  attempts	  have	  you	  attended?	  	  	  	   0	  –	  10	  	  	  /	  	  	  10	  –	  50	  /	  	  	  >50	  	  (delete	  accordingly)	  	  	   Please	  read	  the	  following	  question	  and	  rate	  using	  the	  scale	  provided	  	  	   Strongly	  Disagree	   Neither	   Strongly	  Agree	  I	  consider	  myself	  experienced	  in	  dealing	  with	  a	  resuscitation	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  	  	  	   Have	  you	  ever	  experienced	  problems	  with	  missing	  equipment	  from	  the	  resuscitation	  trolley?	  	   	   Yes	  	  	  /	  	  	  No	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	  	  	   Have	  you	  ever	  taken	  equipment	  from	  the	  trolley	  to	  use	  when	  there	  isn’t	  a	  cardiac	  arrest	  or	  	   Medical	  Emergency?	  	   	   Yes	  	  	  /	  	  	  No	  	  (circle	  accordingly)	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Appendix 8.4 – Post simulation questionnaire 
 
 
 Date:   Participant code:  Simulation number: 
 
 Trolley Questions: 
 Please think about the resuscitation trolley that you used in the simulation you have just 
 completed.  
 
 Now read the following statements about this trolley and rate your answers according to 
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
 Strongly Disagree                                                   Neither 
Strongly 
Agree 
Overall this is an excellent trolley with no 
problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is very easy to find equipment on this 
trolley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think it would be easy to check and stock 
this trolley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
resuscitation easier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
All the equipment required for intubation is 
easily accessible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The aesthetic design of this trolley is 
appealing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This trolley enhances teamwork in 
resuscitation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The design of this trolley is intuitive and its 
use does not need explaining 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
All the drugs and fluids required for 
resuscitation are easy to find 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is sufficient workspace on top to lay 
equipment out if required 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would be able to use this trolley without 
instruction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This trolley significantly contributes to a 
successful resuscitation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This trolley could be better designed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This trolley would benefit from a review of 
its design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are flaws I can identify in this trolley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix 8.5 – Final Questionnaire 
 
 
 Trolley Questions: 
 1.  When considering the following factors, please indicate on the scale, which trolley you 
prefer. 
 
 Definitely Resus:Station Resus:Station 
No 
 Preference Old Trolley 
Definitely 
Old Trolley 
Overall use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ease of finding equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aesthetic design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To facilitate teamwork 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To facilitate running an efficient 
resuscitation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To aid the restocking process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix 8.6 – Questionnaire responses from Anaesthetists only (N=15) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree  (* = non-significant result) 
 
Anaesthetists Responses 
Trolley Used – Median (IQR) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall this is an excellent trolley with no 
problems 2 (1-4) 5 (4-6) 0.002 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3 (2-5) 6 (5-6) 0.001 
I think it would be easy to check and stock this 
trolley 3 (1-4) 6 (6-6) 0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
resuscitation easier 3 (2-4) 6 (5-7) 0.001 
All the equipment required for intubation is 
easily accessible 2 (2-4) 6 (6-7) 0.001 
The aesthetic design of this trolley is appealing 3 (2-4) 5 (4-6) 0.008 
This trolley enhances teamwork in resuscitation 3 (2-4) 4 (3-6) 0.052* 
The design of this trolley is intuitive and its use 
does not need explaining 3 (2-5) 5 (5-6) 0.002 
All the drugs and fluids required for 
resuscitation are easy to find 3 (2-4) 5.5 (5-6) 0.002 
There is sufficient workspace on top to lay 
equipment out if required 2 (1-3) 6 (5-6) 0.001 
I would be able to use this trolley without 
instruction 5 (3-6) 6 (5-6) 0.003 
This trolley significantly contributes to a 
successful resuscitation 3 (2-3) 5 (4-6) 0.001 
This trolley could be better designed 6 (5-7) 3 (2-5) 0.001 
This trolley would benefit from a review of its 
design 6 (6-7) 4 (2-5) 0.001 
There are flaws I can identify in this trolley 6 (5-7) 5 (3-5) 0.005 
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Appendix 8.7 – Questionnaire responses from Physicians only (N=15) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree  (* = non-significant result) 
 
Physicians responses 
Trolley Used – Median (Range) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall this is an excellent trolley with no 
problems 3 (2-4) 4 (4-5) 0.015 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3 (2-4) 5 (5-6) 0.022 
I think it would be easy to check and stock this 
trolley 4 (2-5) 6 (5-6) 0.001 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
resuscitation easier 4 (3-4) 5 (4-5) 0.007 
All the equipment required for intubation is 
easily accessible 4 (4-5) 4.5 (4-5.75) 0.160* 
The aesthetic design of this trolley is appealing 4 (3-4) 5 (4-6) 0.006 
This trolley enhances teamwork in resuscitation 4 (2-4) 4 (4-5) 0.010 
The design of this trolley is intuitive and its use 
does not need explaining 3 (1-4) 5 (5-6) 0.003 
All the drugs and fluids required for 
resuscitation are easy to find 3 (2-3) 5 (5-6) 0.001 
There is sufficient workspace on top to lay 
equipment out if required 3 (2-3) 5 (4-6) 0.001 
I would be able to use this trolley without 
instruction 3 (2-5) 5 (4-6) 0.012 
This trolley significantly contributes to a 
successful resuscitation 4 (3-4) 5 (4-6) 0.008 
This trolley could be better designed 5 (5-6) 5 (4-5) 0.051* 
This trolley would benefit from a review of its 
design 6 (5-6) 5 (4-5) 0.009 
There are flaws I can identify in this trolley 6 (5-7) 5 (4-5) 0.035 
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Appendix 8.8 – Questionnaire responses from Nurses only (N=15) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Neither, 7 = Strongly Agree  (* = non-significant result) 
 
Nurses responses 
Trolley Used – Median (Range) Signif of Diff Question 
Standard Resus:Station Wilcoxon 
Overall this is an excellent trolley with no 
problems 2 (1-4) 5 (4-6) 0.006 
It is very easy to find equipment on this trolley 3 (1-5) 5 (5-7) 0.007 
I think it would be easy to check and stock this 
trolley 3 (1-5) 7 (5-7) 0.005 
The design of this trolley makes my role in 
resuscitation easier 2 (1-4) 6 (4-7) 0.006 
All the equipment required for intubation is 
easily accessible 4 (2-6) 6 (5-7) 0.007 
The aesthetic design of this trolley is appealing 4 (3-5.25) 5 (4-7) 0.095* 
This trolley enhances teamwork in resuscitation 3 (1-4) 5.5 (3.75-7) 0.004 
The design of this trolley is intuitive and its use 
does not need explaining 3 (2-5) 5 (4-6.25) 0.009 
All the drugs and fluids required for 
resuscitation are easy to find 3 (2-5) 6 (5-7) 0.001 
There is sufficient workspace on top to lay 
equipment out if required 3 (1-5) 6 (5-6.25) 0.014 
I would be able to use this trolley without 
instruction 3 (2-6) 6 (4-6.25) 0.006 
This trolley significantly contributes to a 
successful resuscitation 4 (2-5) 6 (4-6) 0.005 
This trolley could be better designed 7 (5-7) 5 (2.75-7) 0.035 
This trolley would benefit from a review of its 
design 7 (5-7) 6 (3-7) 0.085* 
There are flaws I can identify in this trolley 6 (4-7) 5 (1-6) 0.073* 
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Appendix 8.9 – Subanalysis of behaviour ratings using OSCAR (Median (IQR)) 
assessing results depending on which trolley is used first, with Wilcoxon results to 
determine significance of difference  (* = statistically significant results) 
 
Standard Trolley First Resus:Station First 
Behaviour 
Standard R:S Wilcoxon Standard R:S Wilcoxon 
1 4  (3.1-4.5) 
4.25 
(3.5-5) 0.005* 
3.5  
(3.5-5) 
3.5  
(3.25-4.25) 0.119 
2 4  (3.5-5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 0.012* 
4  
(3-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.601 
3 4  (3-4.9) 
4  
(3.1-5) 0.017* 
4  
(3.5-4.5) 
4  
(3.25-5) 0.813 
Communication 
4 4  (4-4.9) 
4.25  
(4-5.25) 0.408 
3.5  
(3-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.102 
1 4.5  (3.6-5) 
4.75  
(4-5) 0.003* 
4.5  
(4-5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 0.117 
2 4  (3.5-4.9) 
4.5  
(3.6-5) 0.055 
4  
(3.25-4.75) 
4  
(3.25-5) 0.710 
Co-operation 
3 4.25  (3.1-4.9) 
4  
(3.6-5) 0.480 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-4.5) 0.680 
1 4.5  (3.6-5) 
4.75  
(4-5) 0.012* 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.25-4.75) 0.533 
2 3.5  (3-4.9) 
4  
(3-4.9) 0.012* 
4  
(3.25-4.5) 
4  
(3-4.75) 1.0 
Co-ordination 
3 3.75  (3.1-4) 
3.75 
(3.5-4) 0.705 
3.5  
(3-4.5) 
4  
(3.5-4.5) 0.785 
1 4  (3.5-4.9) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.266 
3.5  
(3-5) 
3.5  
(3.25-4.75) 0.074 
2 4.5  (3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3-5) 0.327 
4  
(3.5-4.75) 
4  
(3.25-5) 1.0 
Leadership 
3 3.75  (3-4.75) 
4  
(3.5-4.5) 0.673 
3.5  
(3-4.63) 
4  
(3.75-4.75) 0.160 
1 4  (3.1-4.5) 
4  
(3-5) 0.509 
3.5  
(3.5-4.25) 
3.5  
(3-4.75) 0.509 
2 3.5  (3.1-4.5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.306 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.856 
Monitoring 
3 3  (3-3.9) 
3  
(3-4) 0.317 
3  
(3-4.13) 
3  
(3-4.13) 0.577 
1 4.75  (3.1-5) 
5  
(3.5-5.5) 0.083 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.346 
2 4.5  (3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 1.0 
4  
(3.75-4.75) 
4  
(3.75-4.75) 1.0 
Decision 
Making 
3 3  (3-3.9) 
3.5  
(3-4) 0.083 
3  
(3-4.25) 
3.25  
(3-4.123) 0.603 
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Appendix 8.10 – Subanalysis of behaviour ratings using OSCAR (Median (IQR)) 
assessing results from the separate subteams, with Wilcoxon results to determine 
significance of difference  (* = statistically significant results) 
 
Anaesthetists Physicians Nurses 
Behaviour 
Standard R:S Wilcoxon Standard R:S Wilcoxon Standard R:S Wilcoxon 
1 4  (3.5-4.5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.236 
4  
(3.5-5) 
5  
(3.5-5) 0.862 
3.5  
(3-3.5) 
3.5  
(3-4) 0.317 
2 4  (3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-4.5) 1.0 
5  
(3-5) 
5  
(3.5-5) 0.713 
4  
(3-4.5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.160 
3 4.5  (4-5) 
5  
(4.5-5) 0.130 
4.5  
(3-4.5) 
4.5  
(3-5) 0.144 
3.5  
(3-4) 
3.5  
(3-4) 1 
Communication 
4 4  (3.5-5) 
4  
(4-5) 0.112 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1 4.5  (4-5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 0.713 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 0.705 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 0.222 
2 4.5  (3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 0.190 
4  
(3-4.5) 
4  
(3-5) 0.386 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 0.431 
Co-operation 
3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4  (3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.874 
1 4  (3.5-4.5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 0.014* 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
5  
(3-5) 0.726 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 0.855 
2 3  (3-3.5) 
3.5  
(3-4) 0.160 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3-5) 0.782 
4  
(4-5) 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 0.092 
Co-ordination 
3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.5  (3-4) 
4  
(3.5-4) 0.586 
1 4  (3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.518 
4.5 
 (3-5) 
5  
(2.9-5) 0.194 
3.5  
(3-4) 
3.5  
(3.5-4) 1.0 
2 4.5  (4.5-5) 
4.5  
(4-5.5) 0.739 
4  
(3-5) 
4.2  
(3-4.6) 0.317 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.084 Leadership 
3 3.5  (3-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 0.070 
4  
(3-4.5) 
4  
(3-4.1) 0.746 n/a n/a n/a 
1 4  (4-5) 
4  
(4-5) 1.0 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
4.75  
(3-5) 0.527 
3.5  
(3-3.5) 
3  
(3-3.5) 0.713 
2 3.5  (3-3.5) 
3.5  
(3-4) 0.372 
4.5  
(3.5-5) 
5  
(3.1-5.1) 0.751 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(4-5) 0.323 
Monitoring 
3 3  (3-3) 
3  
(3-3) 1 
4  
(3-4.5) 
3  
(3-5) 1.0 n/a n/a n/a 
1 4.5  (4-5) 
5  
(4-5.5) 0.680 
5  
(3-5) 
4  
(3-4.6) 0.317 
3.5  
(3-5) 
3.5  
(3-5) 0.305 
2 4.5  (4-5) 
4.5  
(4-5) 1.0 
4  
(3-5) 
5  
(3-5.1) 1.0 
4  
(3.5-5) 
4  
(3.5-5) 1.0 
Decision Making 
3 3  (3-4) 
4  
(3-4) 0.141 n/a n/a n/a 
3  
(3-3.5) 
3  
(3-3.5) 0.414 
 
 
 
 
 
